The Seventh Book.
CHAPTER XXI.
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Years of the War -
Arrival of Gylippus at Syracuse - Fortification
of Decelea - Successes of the Syracusans
AFTER refitting their ships, Gylippus and Pythen coasted along
from Tarentum to Epizephyrian Locris. They now received the more
correct information that Syracuse was not yet completely invested, but
that it was still possible for an army arriving at Epipolae to
effect an entrance; and they consulted, accordingly, whether they
should keep Sicily on their right and risk sailing in by sea, or,
leaving it on their left, should first sail to Himera and, taking with
them the Himeraeans and any others that might agree to join them, go
to Syracuse by land. Finally they determined to sail for Himera,
especially as the four Athenian ships which Nicias had at length
sent off, on hearing that they were at Locris, had not yet arrived
at Rhegium. Accordingly, before these reached their post, the
Peloponnesians crossed the strait and, after touching at Rhegium and
Messina, came to Himera. Arrived there, they persuaded the
Himeraeans to join in the war, and not only to go with them themselves
but to provide arms for the seamen from their vessels which they had
drawn ashore at Himera; and they sent and appointed a place for the
Selinuntines to meet them with all their forces. A few troops were
also promised by the Geloans and some of the Sicels, who were now
ready to join them with much greater alacrity, owing to the recent
death of Archonidas, a powerful Sicel king in that neighbourhood and
friendly to Athens, and owing also to the vigour shown by Gylippus
in coming from Lacedaemon. Gylippus now took with him about seven
hundred of his sailors and marines, that number only having arms, a
thousand heavy infantry and light troops from Himera with a body of
a hundred horse, some light troops and cavalry from Selinus, a few
Geloans, and Sicels numbering a thousand in all, and set out on his
march for Syracuse.
Meanwhile the Corinthian fleet from Leucas made all haste to arrive;
and one of their commanders, Gongylus, starting last with a single
ship, was the first to reach Syracuse, a little before Gylippus.
Gongylus found the Syracusans on the point of holding an assembly to
consider whether they should put an end to the war. This he prevented,
and reassured them by telling them that more vessels were still to
arrive, and that Gylippus, son of Cleandridas, had been dispatched
by the Lacedaemonians to take the command. Upon this the Syracusans
took courage, and immediately marched out with all their forces to
meet Gylippus, who they found was now close at hand. Meanwhile
Gylippus, after taking Ietae, a fort of the Sicels, on his way, formed
his army in order of battle, and so arrived at Epipolae, and ascending
by Euryelus, as the Athenians had done at first, now advanced with the
Syracusans against the Athenian lines. His arrival chanced at a
critical moment. The Athenians had already finished a double wall of
six or seven furlongs to the great harbour, with the exception of a
small portion next the sea, which they were still engaged upon; and in
the remainder of the circle towards Trogilus on the other sea,
stones had been laid ready for building for the greater part of the
distance, and some points had been left half finished, while others
were entirely completed. The danger of Syracuse had indeed been great.
Meanwhile the Athenians, recovering from the confusion into which
they had been first thrown by the sudden approach of Gylippus and
the Syracusans, formed in order of battle. Gylippus halted at a
short distance off and sent on a herald to tell them that, if they
would evacuate Sicily with bag and baggage within five days' time,
he was willing to make a truce accordingly. The Athenians treated this
proposition with contempt, and dismissed the herald without an answer.
After this both sides began to prepare for action. Gylippus, observing
that the Syracusans were in disorder and did not easily fall into
line, drew off his troops more into the open ground, while Nicias
did not lead on the Athenians but lay still by his own wall. When
Gylippus saw that they did not come on, he led off his army to the
citadel of the quarter of Apollo Temenites, and passed the night
there. On the following day he led out the main body of his army, and,
drawing them up in order of battle before the walls of the Athenians
to prevent their going to the relief of any other quarter,
dispatched a strong force against Fort Labdalum, and took it, and
put all whom he found in it to the sword, the place not being within
sight of the Athenians. On the same day an Athenian galley that lay
moored off the harbour was captured by the Syracusans.
After this the Syracusans and their allies began to carry a single
wall, starting from the city, in a slanting direction up Epipolae,
in order that the Athenians, unless they could hinder the work,
might be no longer able to invest them. Meanwhile the Athenians,
having now finished their wall down to the sea, had come up to the
heights; and part of their wall being weak, Gylippus drew out his army
by night and attacked it. However, the Athenians who happened to be
bivouacking outside took the alarm and came out to meet him, upon
seeing which he quickly led his men back again. The Athenians now
built their wall higher, and in future kept guard at this point
themselves, disposing their confederates along the remainder of the
works, at the stations assigned to them. Nicias also determined to
fortify Plemmyrium, a promontory over against the city, which juts out
and narrows the mouth of the Great Harbour. He thought that the
fortification of this place would make it easier to bring in supplies,
as they would be able to carry on their blockade from a less distance,
near to the port occupied by the Syracusans; instead of being obliged,
upon every movement of the enemy's navy, to put out against them
from the bottom of the great harbour. Besides this, he now began to
pay more attention to the war by sea, seeing that the coming of
Gylippus had diminished their hopes by land. Accordingly, he
conveyed over his ships and some troops, and built three forts in
which he placed most of his baggage, and moored there for the future
the larger craft and men-of-war. This was the first and chief occasion
of the losses which the crews experienced. The water which they used
was scarce and had to be fetched from far, and the sailors could not
go out for firewood without being cut off by the Syracusan horse,
who were masters of the country; a third of the enemy's cavalry
being stationed at the little town of Olympieum, to prevent plundering
incursions on the part of the Athenians at Plemmyrium. Meanwhile
Nicias learned that the rest of the Corinthian fleet was
approaching, and sent twenty ships to watch for them, with orders to
be on the look-out for them about Locris and Rhegium and the
approach to Sicily.
Gylippus, meanwhile, went on with the wall across Epipolae, using
the stones which the Athenians had laid down for their own wall, and
at the same time constantly led out the Syracusans and their allies,
and formed them in order of battle in front of the lines, the
Athenians forming against him. At last he thought that the moment
was come, and began the attack; and a hand-to-hand fight ensued
between the lines, where the Syracusan cavalry could be of no use; and
the Syracusans and their allies were defeated and took up their dead
under truce, while the Athenians erected a trophy. After this Gylippus
called the soldiers together, and said that the fault was not theirs
but his; he had kept their lines too much within the works, and had
thus deprived them of the services of their cavalry and darters. He
would now, therefore, lead them on a second time. He begged them to
remember that in material force they would be fully a match for
their opponents, while, with respect to moral advantages, it were
intolerable if Peloponnesians and Dorians should not feel confident of
overcoming Ionians and islanders with the motley rabble that
accompanied them, and of driving them out of the country.
After this he embraced the first opportunity that offered of again
leading them against the enemy. Now Nicias and the Athenians held
the opinion that even if the Syracusans should not wish to offer
battle, it was necessary for them to prevent the building of the cross
wall, as it already almost overlapped the extreme point of their
own, and if it went any further it would from that moment make no
difference whether they fought ever so many successful actions, or
never fought at all. They accordingly came out to meet the Syracusans.
Gylippus led out his heavy infantry further from the fortifications
than on the former occasion, and so joined battle; posting his horse
and darters upon the flank of the Athenians in the open space, where
the works of the two walls terminated. During the engagement the
cavalry attacked and routed the left wing of the Athenians, which
was opposed to them; and the rest of the Athenian army was in
consequence defeated by the Syracusans and driven headlong within
their lines. The night following the Syracusans carried their wall
up to the Athenian works and passed them, thus putting it out of their
power any longer to stop them, and depriving them, even if
victorious in the field, of all chance of investing the city for the
future.
After this the remaining twelve vessels of the Corinthians,
Ambraciots, and Leucadians sailed into the harbour under the command
of Erasinides, a Corinthian, having eluded the Athenian ships on
guard, and helped the Syracusans in completing the remainder of the
cross wall. Meanwhile Gylippus went into the rest of Sicily to raise
land and naval forces, and also to bring over any of the cities that
either were lukewarm in the cause or had hitherto kept out of the
war altogether. Syracusan and Corinthian envoys were also dispatched
to Lacedaemon and Corinth to get a fresh force sent over, in any way
that might offer, either in merchant vessels or transports, or in
any other manner likely to prove successful, as the Athenians too were
sending for reinforcements; while the Syracusans proceeded to man a
fleet and to exercise, meaning to try their fortune in this way
also, and generally became exceedingly confident.
Nicias perceiving this, and seeing the strength of the enemy and his
own difficulties daily increasing, himself also sent to Athens. He had
before sent frequent reports of events as they occurred, and felt it
especially incumbent upon him to do so now, as he thought that they
were in a critical position, and that, unless speedily recalled or
strongly reinforced from home, they had no hope of safety. He
feared, however, that the messengers, either through inability to
speak, or through failure of memory, or from a wish to please the
multitude, might not report the truth, and so thought it best to write
a letter, to ensure that the Athenians should know his own opinion
without its being lost in transmission, and be able to decide upon the
real facts of the case.
His emissaries, accordingly, departed with the letter and the
requisite verbal instructions; and he attended to the affairs of the
army, making it his aim now to keep on the defensive and to avoid
any unnecessary danger.
At the close of the same summer the Athenian general Euetion marched
in concert with Perdiccas with a large body of Thracians against
Amphipolis, and failing to take it brought some galleys round into the
Strymon, and blockaded the town from the river, having his base at
Himeraeum.
Summer was now over. The winter ensuing, the persons sent by Nicias,
reaching Athens, gave the verbal messages which had been entrusted
to them, and answered any questions that were asked them, and
delivered the letter. The clerk of the city now came forward and
read out to the Athenians the letter, which was as follows:
"Our past operations, Athenians, have been made known to you by many
other letters; it is now time for you to become equally familiar
with our present condition, and to take your measures accordingly.
We had defeated in most of our engagements with them the Syracusans,
against whom we were sent, and we had built the works which we now
occupy, when Gylippus arrived from Lacedaemon with an army obtained
from Peloponnese and from some of the cities in Sicily. In our first
battle with him we were victorious; in the battle on the following day
we were overpowered by a multitude of cavalry and darters, and
compelled to retire within our lines. We have now, therefore, been
forced by the numbers of those opposed to us to discontinue the work
of circumvallation, and to remain inactive; being unable to make use
even of all the force we have, since a large portion of our heavy
infantry is absorbed in the defence of our lines. Meanwhile the
enemy have carried a single wall past our lines, thus making it
impossible for us to invest them in future, until this cross wall be
attacked by a strong force and captured. So that the besieger in
name has become, at least from the land side, the besieged in reality;
as we are prevented by their cavalry from even going for any
distance into the country.
"Besides this, an embassy has been dispatched to Peloponnese to
procure reinforcements, and Gylippus has gone to the cities in Sicily,
partly in the hope of inducing those that are at present neutral to
join him in the war, partly of bringing from his allies additional
contingents for the land forces and material for the navy. For I
understand that they contemplate a combined attack, upon our lines
with their land forces and with their fleet by sea. You must none of
you be surprised that I say by sea also. They have discovered that the
length of the time we have now been in commission has rotted our ships
and wasted our crews, and that with the entireness of our crews and
the soundness of our ships the pristine efficiency of our navy has
departed. For it is impossible for us to haul our ships ashore and
careen them, because, the enemy's vessels being as many or more than
our own, we are constantly anticipating an attack. Indeed, they may be
seen exercising, and it lies with them to take the initiative; and not
having to maintain a blockade, they have greater facilities for drying
their ships.
"This we should scarcely be able to do, even if we had plenty of
ships to spare, and were freed from our present necessity of
exhausting all our strength upon the blockade. For it is already
difficult to carry in supplies past Syracuse; and were we to relax our
vigilance in the slightest degree it would become impossible. The
losses which our crews have suffered and still continue to suffer
arise from the following causes. Expeditions for fuel and for
forage, and the distance from which water has to be fetched, cause our
sailors to be cut off by the Syracusan cavalry; the loss of our
previous superiority emboldens our slaves to desert; our foreign
seamen are impressed by the unexpected appearance of a navy against
us, and the strength of the enemy's resistance; such of them as were
pressed into the service take the first opportunity of departing to
their respective cities; such as were originally seduced by the
temptation of high pay, and expected little fighting and large
gains, leave us either by desertion to the enemy or by availing
themselves of one or other of the various facilities of escape which
the magnitude of Sicily affords them. Some even engage in trade
themselves and prevail upon the captains to take Hyccaric slaves on
board in their place; thus they have ruined the efficiency of our
navy.
"Now I need not remind you that the time during which a crew is in
its prime is short, and that the number of sailors who can start a
ship on her way and keep the rowing in time is small. But by far my
greatest trouble is, that holding the post which I do, I am
prevented by the natural indocility of the Athenian seaman from
putting a stop to these evils; and that meanwhile we have no source
from which to recruit our crews, which the enemy can do from many
quarters, but are compelled to depend both for supplying the crews
in service and for making good our losses upon the men whom we brought
with us. For our present confederates, Naxos and Catana, are incapable
of supplying us. There is only one thing more wanting to our
opponents, I mean the defection of our Italian markets. If they were
to see you neglect to relieve us from our present condition, and
were to go over to the enemy, famine would compel us to evacuate,
and Syracuse would finish the war without a blow.
"I might, it is true, have written to you something different and
more agreeable than this, but nothing certainly more useful, if it
is desirable for you to know the real state of things here before
taking your measures. Besides I know that it is your nature to love to
be told the best side of things, and then to blame the teller if the
expectations which he has raised in your minds are not answered by the
result; and I therefore thought it safest to declare to you the truth.
"Now you are not to think that either your generals or your soldiers
have ceased to be a match for the forces originally opposed to them.
But you are to reflect that a general Sicilian coalition is being
formed against us; that a fresh army is expected from Peloponnese,
while the force we have here is unable to cope even with our present
antagonists; and you must promptly decide either to recall us or to
send out to us another fleet and army as numerous again, with a
large sum of money, and someone to succeed me, as a disease in the
kidneys unfits me for retaining my post. I have, I think, some claim
on your indulgence, as while I was in my prime I did you much good
service in my commands. But whatever you mean to do, do it at the
commencement of spring and without delay, as the enemy will obtain his
Sicilian reinforcements shortly, those from Peloponnese after a longer
interval; and unless you attend to the matter the former will be
here before you, while the latter will elude you as they have done
before."
Such were the contents of Nicias's letter. When the Athenians had
heard it they refused to accept his resignation, but chose him two
colleagues, naming Menander and Euthydemus, two of the officers at the
seat of war, to fill their places until their arrival, that Nicias
might not be left alone in his sickness to bear the whole weight of
affairs. They also voted to send out another army and navy, drawn
partly from the Athenians on the muster-roll, partly from the
allies. The colleagues chosen for Nicias were Demosthenes, son of
Alcisthenes, and Eurymedon, son of Thucles. Eurymedon was sent off
at once, about the time of the winter solstice, with ten ships, a
hundred and twenty talents of silver, and instructions to tell the
army that reinforcements would arrive, and that care would be taken of
them; but Demosthenes stayed behind to organize the expedition,
meaning to start as soon as it was spring, and sent for troops to
the allies, and meanwhile got together money, ships, and heavy
infantry at home.
The Athenians also sent twenty vessels round Peloponnese to
prevent any one crossing over to Sicily from Corinth or Peloponnese.
For the Corinthians, filled with confidence by the favourable
alteration in Sicilian affairs which had been reported by the envoys
upon their arrival, and convinced that the fleet which they had before
sent out had not been without its use, were now preparing to
dispatch a force of heavy infantry in merchant vessels to Sicily,
while the Lacedaemonians did the like for the rest of Peloponnese. The
Corinthians also manned a fleet of twenty-five vessels, intending to
try the result of a battle with the squadron on guard at Naupactus,
and meanwhile to make it less easy for the Athenians there to hinder
the departure of their merchantmen, by obliging them to keep an eye
upon the galleys thus arrayed against them.
In the meantime the Lacedaemonians prepared for their invasion of
Attica, in accordance with their own previous resolve, and at the
instigation of the Syracusans and Corinthians, who wished for an
invasion to arrest the reinforcements which they heard that Athens was
about to send to Sicily. Alcibiades also urgently advised the
fortification of Decelea, and a vigorous prosecution of the war. But
the Lacedaemonians derived most encouragement from the belief that
Athens, with two wars on her hands, against themselves and against the
Siceliots, would be more easy to subdue, and from the conviction
that she had been the first to infringe the truce. In the former
war, they considered, the offence had been more on their own side,
both on account of the entrance of the Thebans into Plataea in time of
peace, and also of their own refusal to listen to the Athenian offer
of arbitration, in spite of the clause in the former treaty that where
arbitration should be offered there should be no appeal to arms. For
this reason they thought that they deserved their misfortunes, and
took to heart seriously the disaster at Pylos and whatever else had
befallen them. But when, besides the ravages from Pylos, which went on
without any intermission, the thirty Athenian ships came out from
Argos and wasted part of Epidaurus, Prasiae, and other places; when
upon every dispute that arose as to the interpretation of any doubtful
point in the treaty, their own offers of arbitration were always
rejected by the Athenians, the Lacedaemonians at length decided that
Athens had now committed the very same offence as they had before
done, and had become the guilty party; and they began to be full of
ardour for the war. They spent this winter in sending round to their
allies for iron, and in getting ready the other implements for
building their fort; and meanwhile began raising at home, and also
by forced requisitions in the rest of Peloponnese, a force to be
sent out in the merchantmen to their allies in Sicily. Winter thus
ended, and with it the eighteenth year of this war of which Thucydides
is the historian.
In the first days of the spring following, at an earlier period than
usual, the Lacedaemonians and their allies invaded Attica, under the
command of Agis, son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. They
began by devastating the parts bordering upon the plain, and next
proceeded to fortify Decelea, dividing the work among the different
cities. Decelea is about thirteen or fourteen miles from the city of
Athens, and the same distance or not much further from Boeotia; and
the fort was meant to annoy the plain and the richest parts of the
country, being in sight of Athens. While the Peloponnesians and
their allies in Attica were engaged in the work of fortification,
their countrymen at home sent off, at about the same time, the heavy
infantry in the merchant vessels to Sicily; the Lacedaemonians
furnishing a picked force of Helots and Neodamodes (or freedmen),
six hundred heavy infantry in all, under the command of Eccritus, a
Spartan; and the Boeotians three hundred heavy infantry, commanded
by two Thebans, Xenon and Nicon, and by Hegesander, a Thespian.
These were among the first to put out into the open sea, starting from
Taenarus in Laconia. Not long after their departure the Corinthians
sent off a force of five hundred heavy infantry, consisting partly
of men from Corinth itself, and partly of Arcadian mercenaries, placed
under the command of Alexarchus, a Corinthian. The Sicyonians also
sent off two hundred heavy infantry at same time as the Corinthians,
under the command of Sargeus, a Sicyonian. Meantime the
five-and-twenty vessels manned by Corinth during the winter lay
confronting the twenty Athenian ships at Naupactus until the heavy
infantry in the merchantmen were fairly on their way from Peloponnese;
thus fulfilling the object for which they had been manned
originally, which was to divert the attention of the Athenians from
the merchantmen to the galleys.
During this time the Athenians were not idle. Simultaneously with
the fortification of Decelea, at the very beginning of spring, they
sent thirty ships round Peloponnese, under Charicles, son of
Apollodorus, with instructions to call at Argos and demand a force
of their heavy infantry for the fleet, agreeably to the alliance. At
the same time they dispatched Demosthenes to Sicily, as they had
intended, with sixty Athenian and five Chian vessels, twelve hundred
Athenian heavy infantry from the muster-roll, and as many of the
islanders as could be raised in the different quarters, drawing upon
the other subject allies for whatever they could supply that would
be of use for the war. Demosthenes was instructed first to sail
round with Charicles and to operate with him upon the coasts of
Laconia, and accordingly sailed to Aegina and there waited for the
remainder of his armament, and for Charicles to fetch the Argive
troops.
In Sicily, about the same time in this spring, Gylippus came to
Syracuse with as many troops as he could bring from the cities which
he had persuaded to join. Calling the Syracusans together, he told
them that they must man as many ships as possible, and try their
hand at a sea-fight, by which he hoped to achieve an advantage in
the war not unworthy of the risk. With him Hermocrates actively joined
in trying to encourage his countrymen to attack the Athenians at
sea, saying that the latter had not inherited their naval prowess
nor would they retain it for ever; they had been landsmen even to a
greater degree than the Syracusans, and had only become a maritime
power when obliged by the Mede. Besides, to daring spirits like the
Athenians, a daring adversary would seem the most formidable; and
the Athenian plan of paralysing by the boldness of their attack a
neighbour often not their inferior in strength could now be used
against them with as good effect by the Syracusans. He was convinced
also that the unlooked-for spectacle of Syracusans daring to face
the Athenian navy would cause a terror to the enemy, the advantages of
which would far outweigh any loss that Athenian science might
inflict upon their inexperience. He accordingly urged them to throw
aside their fears and to try their fortune at sea; and the Syracusans,
under the influence of Gylippus and Hermocrates, and perhaps some
others, made up their minds for the sea-fight and began to man their
vessels.
When the fleet was ready, Gylippus led out the whole army by
night; his plan being to assault in person the forts on Plemmyrium
by land, while thirty-five Syracusan galleys sailed according to
appointment against the enemy from the great harbour, and the
forty-five remaining came round from the lesser harbour, where they
had their arsenal, in order to effect a junction with those inside and
simultaneously to attack Plemmyrium, and thus to distract the
Athenians by assaulting them on two sides at once. The Athenians
quickly manned sixty ships, and with twenty-five of these engaged
the thirty-five of the Syracusans in the great harbour, sending the
rest to meet those sailing round from the arsenal; and an action now
ensued directly in front of the mouth of the great harbour, maintained
with equal tenacity on both sides; the one wishing to force the
passage, the other to prevent them.
In the meantime, while the Athenians in Plemmyrium were down at
the sea, attending to the engagement, Gylippus made a sudden attack on
the forts in the early morning and took the largest first, and
afterwards the two smaller, whose garrisons did not wait for him,
seeing the largest so easily taken. At the fall of the first fort, the
men from it who succeeded in taking refuge in their boats and
merchantmen, found great difficulty in reaching the camp, as the
Syracusans were having the best of it in the engagement in the great
harbour, and sent a fast-sailing galley to pursue them. But when the
two others fell, the Syracusans were now being defeated; and the
fugitives from these sailed alongshore with more ease. The Syracusan
ships fighting off the mouth of the harbour forced their way through
the Athenian vessels and sailing in without any order fell foul of one
another, and transferred the victory to the Athenians; who not only
routed the squadron in question, but also that by which they were at
first being defeated in the harbour, sinking eleven of the Syracusan
vessels and killing most of the men, except the crews of three ships
whom they made prisoners. Their own loss was confined to three
vessels; and after hauling ashore the Syracusan wrecks and setting
up a trophy upon the islet in front of Plemmyrium, they retired to
their own camp.
Unsuccessful at sea, the Syracusans had nevertheless the forts in
Plemmyrium, for which they set up three trophies. One of the two
last taken they razed, but put in order and garrisoned the two others.
In the capture of the forts a great many men were killed and made
prisoners, and a great quantity of property was taken in all. As the
Athenians had used them as a magazine, there was a large stock of
goods and corn of the merchants inside, and also a large stock
belonging to the captains; the masts and other furniture of forty
galleys being taken, besides three galleys which had been drawn up
on shore. Indeed the first and chiefest cause of the ruin of the
Athenian army was the capture of Plemmyrium; even the entrance of
the harbour being now no longer safe for carrying in provisions, as
the Syracusan vessels were stationed there to prevent it, and
nothing could be brought in without fighting; besides the general
impression of dismay and discouragement produced upon the army.
After this the Syracusans sent out twelve ships under the command of
Agatharchus, a Syracusan. One of these went to Peloponnese with
ambassadors to describe the hopeful state of their affairs, and to
incite the Peloponnesians to prosecute the war there even more
actively than they were now doing, while the eleven others sailed to
Italy, hearing that vessels laden with stores were on their way to the
Athenians. After falling in with and destroying most of the vessels in
question, and burning in the Caulonian territory a quantity of
timber for shipbuilding, which had been got ready for the Athenians,
the Syracusan squadron went to Locri, and one of the merchantmen
from Peloponnese coming in, while they were at anchor there,
carrying Thespian heavy infantry, took these on board and sailed
alongshore towards home. The Athenians were on the look-out for them
with twenty ships at Megara, but were only able to take one vessel
with its crew; the rest getting clear off to Syracuse. There was
also some skirmishing in the harbour about the piles which the
Syracusans had driven in the sea in front of the old docks, to allow
their ships to lie at anchor inside, without being hurt by the
Athenians sailing up and running them down. The Athenians brought up
to them a ship of ten thousand talents burden furnished with wooden
turrets and screens, and fastened ropes round the piles from their
boats, wrenched them up and broke them, or dived down and sawed them
in two. Meanwhile the Syracusans plied them with missiles from the
docks, to which they replied from their large vessel; until at last
most of the piles were removed by the Athenians. But the most
awkward part of the stockade was the part out of sight: some of the
piles which had been driven in did not appear above water, so that
it was dangerous to sail up, for fear of running the ships upon
them, just as upon a reef, through not seeing them. However divers
went down and sawed off even these for reward; although the Syracusans
drove in others. Indeed there was no end to the contrivances to
which they resorted against each other, as might be expected between
two hostile armies confronting each other at such a short distance:
and skirmishes and all kinds of other attempts were of constant
occurrence. Meanwhile the Syracusans sent embassies to the cities,
composed of Corinthians, Ambraciots, and Lacedaemonians, to tell
them of the capture of Plemmyrium, and that their defeat in the
sea-fight was due less to the strength of the enemy than to their
own disorder; and generally, to let them know that they were full of
hope, and to desire them to come to their help with ships and
troops, as the Athenians were expected with a fresh army, and if the
one already there could be destroyed before the other arrived, the war
would be at an end.
While the contending parties in Sicily were thus engaged,
Demosthenes, having now got together the armament with which he was to
go to the island, put out from Aegina, and making sail for
Peloponnese, joined Charicles and the thirty ships of the Athenians.
Taking on board the heavy infantry from Argos they sailed to
Laconia, and, after first plundering part of Epidaurus Limera,
landed on the coast of Laconia, opposite Cythera, where the temple
of Apollo stands, and, laying waste part of the country, fortified a
sort of isthmus, to which the Helots of the Lacedaemonians might
desert, and from whence plundering incursions might be made as from
Pylos. Demosthenes helped to occupy this place, and then immediately
sailed on to Corcyra to take up some of the allies in that island, and
so to proceed without delay to Sicily; while Charicles waited until he
had completed the fortification of the place and, leaving a garrison
there, returned home subsequently with his thirty ships and the
Argives also.
This same summer arrived at Athens thirteen hundred targeteers,
Thracian swordsmen of the tribe of the Dii, who were to have sailed to
Sicily with Demosthenes. Since they had come too late, the Athenians
determined to send them back to Thrace, whence they had come; to
keep them for the Decelean war appearing too expensive, as the pay
of each man was a drachma a day. Indeed since Decelea had been first
fortified by the whole Peloponnesian army during this summer, and then
occupied for the annoyance of the country by the garrisons from the
cities relieving each other at stated intervals, it had been doing
great mischief to the Athenians; in fact this occupation, by the
destruction of property and loss of men which resulted from it, was
one of the principal causes of their ruin. Previously the invasions
were short, and did not prevent their enjoying their land during the
rest of the time: the enemy was now permanently fixed in Attica; at
one time it was an attack in force, at another it was the regular
garrison overrunning the country and making forays for its
subsistence, and the Lacedaemonian king, Agis, was in the field and
diligently prosecuting the war; great mischief was therefore done to
the Athenians. They were deprived of their whole country: more than
twenty thousand slaves had deserted, a great part of them artisans,
and all their sheep and beasts of burden were lost; and as the cavalry
rode out daily upon excursions to Decelea and to guard the country,
their horses were either lamed by being constantly worked upon rocky
ground, or wounded by the enemy.
Besides, the transport of provisions from Euboea, which had before
been carried on so much more quickly overland by Decelea from
Oropus, was now effected at great cost by sea round Sunium; everything
the city required had to be imported from abroad, and instead of a
city it became a fortress. Summer and winter the Athenians were worn
out by having to keep guard on the fortifications, during the day by
turns, by night all together, the cavalry excepted, at the different
military posts or upon the wall. But what most oppressed them was that
they had two wars at once, and had thus reached a pitch of frenzy
which no one would have believed possible if he had heard of it before
it had come to pass. For could any one have imagined that even when
besieged by the Peloponnesians entrenched in Attica, they would still,
instead of withdrawing from Sicily, stay on there besieging in like
manner Syracuse, a town (taken as a town) in no way inferior to
Athens, or would so thoroughly upset the Hellenic estimate of their
strength and audacity, as to give the spectacle of a people which,
at the beginning of the war, some thought might hold out one year,
some two, none more than three, if the Peloponnesians invaded their
country, now seventeen years after the first invasion, after having
already suffered from all the evils of war, going to Sicily and
undertaking a new war nothing inferior to that which they already
had with the Peloponnesians? These causes, the great losses from
Decelea, and the other heavy charges that fell upon them, produced
their financial embarrassment; and it was at this time that they
imposed upon their subjects, instead of the tribute, the tax of a
twentieth upon all imports and exports by sea, which they thought
would bring them in more money; their expenditure being now not the
same as at first, but having grown with the war while their revenues
decayed.
Accordingly, not wishing to incur expense in their present want of
money, they sent back at once the Thracians who came too late for
Demosthenes, under the conduct of Diitrephes, who was instructed, as
they were to pass through the Euripus, to make use of them if possible
in the voyage alongshore to injure the enemy. Diitrephes first
landed them at Tanagra and hastily snatched some booty; he then sailed
across the Euripus in the evening from Chalcis in Euboea and
disembarking in Boeotia led them against Mycalessus. The night he
passed unobserved near the temple of Hermes, not quite two miles
from Mycalessus, and at daybreak assaulted and took the town, which is
not a large one; the inhabitants being off their guard and not
expecting that any one would ever come up so far from the sea to
molest them, the wall too being weak, and in some places having
tumbled down, while in others it had not been built to any height, and
the gates also being left open through their feeling of security.
The Thracians bursting into Mycalessus sacked the houses and
temples, and butchered the inhabitants, sparing neither youth nor age,
but killing all they fell in with, one after the other, children and
women, and even beasts of burden, and whatever other living
creatures they saw; the Thracian race, like the bloodiest of the
barbarians, being even more so when it has nothing to fear. Everywhere
confusion reigned and death in all its shapes; and in particular
they attacked a boys' school, the largest that there was in the place,
into which the children had just gone, and massacred them all. In
short, the disaster falling upon the whole town was unsurpassed in
magnitude, and unapproached by any in suddenness and in horror.
Meanwhile the Thebans heard of it and marched to the rescue, and
overtaking the Thracians before they had gone far, recovered the
plunder and drove them in panic to the Euripus and the sea, where
the vessels which brought them were lying. The greatest slaughter took
place while they were embarking, as they did not know how to swim, and
those in the vessels on seeing what was going on on on shore moored
them out of bowshot: in the rest of the retreat the Thracians made a
very respectable defence against the Theban horse, by which they
were first attacked, dashing out and closing their ranks according
to the tactics of their country, and lost only a few men in that
part of the affair. A good number who were after plunder were actually
caught in the town and put to death. Altogether the Thracians had
two hundred and fifty killed out of thirteen hundred, the Thebans
and the rest who came to the rescue about twenty, troopers and heavy
infantry, with Scirphondas, one of the Boeotarchs. The Mycalessians
lost a large proportion of their population.
While Mycalessus thus experienced a calamity for its extent as
lamentable as any that happened in the war, Demosthenes, whom we
left sailing to Corcyra, after the building of the fort in Laconia,
found a merchantman lying at Phea in Elis, in which the Corinthian
heavy infantry were to cross to Sicily. The ship he destroyed, but the
men escaped, and subsequently got another in which they pursued
their voyage. After this, arriving at Zacynthus and Cephallenia, he
took a body of heavy infantry on board, and sending for some of the
Messenians from Naupactus, crossed over to the opposite coast of
Acarnania, to Alyzia, and to Anactorium which was held by the
Athenians. While he was in these parts he was met by Eurymedon
returning from Sicily, where he had been sent, as has been
mentioned, during the winter, with the money for the army, who told
him the news, and also that he had heard, while at sea, that the
Syracusans had taken Plemmyrium. Here, also, Conon came to them, the
commander at Naupactus, with news that the twenty-five Corinthian
ships stationed opposite to him, far from giving over the war, were
meditating an engagement; and he therefore begged them to send him
some ships, as his own eighteen were not a match for the enemy's
twenty-five. Demosthenes and Eurymedon, accordingly, sent ten of their
best sailers with Conon to reinforce the squadron at Naupactus, and
meanwhile prepared for the muster of their forces; Eurymedon, who
was now the colleague of Demosthenes, and had turned back in
consequence of his appointment, sailing to Corcyra to tell them to man
fifteen ships and to enlist heavy infantry; while Demosthenes raised
slingers and darters from the parts about Acarnania.
Meanwhile the envoys, already mentioned, who had gone from
Syracuse to the cities after the capture of Plemmyrium, had
succeeded in their mission, and were about to bring the army that they
had collected, when Nicias got scent of it, and sent to the Centoripae
and Alicyaeans and other of the friendly Sicels, who held the
passes, not to let the enemy through, but to combine to prevent
their passing, there being no other way by which they could even
attempt it, as the Agrigentines would not give them a passage
through their country. Agreeably to this request the Sicels laid a
triple ambuscade for the Siceliots upon their march, and attacking
them suddenly, while off their guard, killed about eight hundred of
them and all the envoys, the Corinthian only excepted, by whom fifteen
hundred who escaped were conducted to Syracuse.
About the same time the Camarinaeans also came to the assistance
of Syracuse with five hundred heavy infantry, three hundred darters,
and as many archers, while the Geloans sent crews for five ships, four
hundred darters, and two hundred horse. Indeed almost the whole of
Sicily, except the Agrigentines, who were neutral, now ceased merely
to watch events as it had hitherto done, and actively joined
Syracuse against the Athenians.
While the Syracusans after the Sicel disaster put off any
immediate attack upon the Athenians, Demosthenes and Eurymedon,
whose forces from Corcyra and the continent were now ready, crossed
the Ionian Gulf with all their armament to the Iapygian promontory,
and starting from thence touched at the Choerades Isles lying off
Iapygia, where they took on board a hundred and fifty Iapygian darters
of the Messapian tribe, and after renewing an old friendship with
Artas the chief, who had furnished them with the darters, arrived at
Metapontium in Italy. Here they persuaded their allies the
Metapontines to send with them three hundred darters and two
galleys, and with this reinforcement coasted on to Thurii, where
they found the party hostile to Athens recently expelled by a
revolution, and accordingly remained there to muster and review the
whole army, to see if any had been left behind, and to prevail upon
the Thurians resolutely to join them in their expedition, and in the
circumstances in which they found themselves to conclude a defensive
and offensive alliance with the Athenians.
About the same time the Peloponnesians in the twenty-five ships
stationed opposite to the squadron at Naupactus to protect the passage
of the transports to Sicily had got ready for engaging, and manning
some additional vessels, so as to be numerically little inferior to
the Athenians, anchored off Erineus in Achaia in the Rhypic country.
The place off which they lay being in the form of a crescent, the land
forces furnished by the Corinthians and their allies on the spot
came up and ranged themselves upon the projecting headlands on
either side, while the fleet, under the command of Polyanthes, a
Corinthian, held the intervening space and blocked up the entrance.
The Athenians under Diphilus now sailed out against them with
thirty-three ships from Naupactus, and the Corinthians, at first not
moving, at length thought they saw their opportunity, raised the
signal, and advanced and engaged the Athenians. After an obstinate
struggle, the Corinthians lost three ships, and without sinking any
altogether, disabled seven of the enemy, which were struck prow to
prow and had their foreships stove in by the Corinthian vessels, whose
cheeks had been strengthened for this very purpose. After an action of
this even character, in which either party could claim the victory
(although the Athenians became masters of the wrecks through the
wind driving them out to sea, the Corinthians not putting out again to
meet them), the two combatants parted. No pursuit took place, and no
prisoners were made on either side; the Corinthians and Peloponnesians
who were fighting near the shore escaping with ease, and none of the
Athenian vessels having been sunk. The Athenians now sailed back to
Naupactus, and the Corinthians immediately set up a trophy as victors,
because they had disabled a greater number of the enemy's ships.
Moreover they held that they had not been worsted, for the very same
reason that their opponent held that he had not been victorious; the
Corinthians considering that they were conquerors, if not decidedly
conquered, and the Athenians thinking themselves vanquished, because
not decidedly victorious. However, when the Peloponnesians sailed
off and their land forces had dispersed, the Athenians also set up a
trophy as victors in Achaia, about two miles and a quarter from
Erineus, the Corinthian station.
This was the termination of the action at Naupactus. To return to
Demosthenes and Eurymedon: the Thurians having now got ready to join
in the expedition with seven hundred heavy infantry and three
hundred darters, the two generals ordered the ships to sail along
the coast to the Crotonian territory, and meanwhile held a review of
all the land forces upon the river Sybaris, and then led them
through the Thurian country. Arrived at the river Hylias, they here
received a message from the Crotonians, saying that they would not
allow the army to pass through their country; upon which the Athenians
descended towards the shore, and bivouacked near the sea and the mouth
of the Hylias, where the fleet also met them, and the next day
embarked and sailed along the coast touching at all the cities
except Locri, until they came to Petra in the Rhegian territory.
Meanwhile the Syracusans hearing of their approach resolved to
make a second attempt with their fleet and their other forces on
shore, which they had been collecting for this very purpose in order
to do something before their arrival. In addition to other
improvements suggested by the former sea-fight which they now
adopted in the equipment of their navy, they cut down their prows to a
smaller compass to make them more solid and made their cheeks stouter,
and from these let stays into the vessels' sides for a length of six
cubits within and without, in the same way as the Corinthians had
altered their prows before engaging the squadron at Naupactus. The
Syracusans thought that they would thus have an advantage over the
Athenian vessels, which were not constructed with equal strength,
but were slight in the bows, from their being more used to sail
round and charge the enemy's side than to meet him prow to prow, and
that the battle being in the great harbour, with a great many ships in
not much room, was also a fact in their favour. Charging prow to prow,
they would stave in the enemy's bows, by striking with solid and stout
beaks against hollow and weak ones; and secondly, the Athenians for
want of room would be unable to use their favourite manoeuvre of
breaking the line or of sailing round, as the Syracusans would do
their best not to let them do the one, and want of room would
prevent their doing the other. This charging prow to prow, which had
hitherto been thought want of skill in a helmsman, would be the
Syracusans' chief manoeuvre, as being that which they should find most
useful, since the Athenians, if repulsed, would not be able to back
water in any direction except towards the shore, and that only for a
little way, and in the little space in front of their own camp. The
rest of the harbour would be commanded by the Syracusans; and the
Athenians, if hard pressed, by crowding together in a small space
and all to the same point, would run foul of one another and fall into
disorder, which was, in fact, the thing that did the Athenians most
harm in all the sea-fights, they not having, like the Syracusans,
the whole harbour to retreat over. As to their sailing round into
the open sea, this would be impossible, with the Syracusans in
possession of the way out and in, especially as Plemmyrium would be
hostile to them, and the mouth of the harbour was not large.
With these contrivances to suit their skill and ability, and now
more confident after the previous sea-fight, the Syracusans attacked
by land and sea at once. The town force Gylippus led out a little
the first and brought them up to the wall of the Athenians, where it
looked towards the city, while the force from the Olympieum, that is
to say, the heavy infantry that were there with the horse and the
light troops of the Syracusans, advanced against the wall from the
opposite side; the ships of the Syracusans and allies sailing out
immediately afterwards. The Athenians at first fancied that they
were to be attacked by land only, and it was not without alarm that
they saw the fleet suddenly approaching as well; and while some were
forming upon the walls and in front of them against the advancing
enemy, and some marching out in haste against the numbers of horse and
darters coming from the Olympieum and from outside, others manned
the ships or rushed down to the beach to oppose the enemy, and when
the ships were manned put out with seventy-five sail against about
eighty of the Syracusans.
After spending a great part of the day in advancing and retreating
and skirmishing with each other, without either being able to gain any
advantage worth speaking of, except that the Syracusans sank one or
two of the Athenian vessels, they parted, the land force at the same
time retiring from the lines. The next day the Syracusans remained
quiet, and gave no signs of what they were going to do; but Nicias,
seeing that the battle had been a drawn one, and expecting that they
would attack again, compelled the captains to refit any of the ships
that had suffered, and moored merchant vessels before the stockade
which they had driven into the sea in front of their ships, to serve
instead of an enclosed harbour, at about two hundred feet from each
other, in order that any ship that was hard pressed might be able to
retreat in safety and sail out again at leisure. These preparations
occupied the Athenians all day until nightfall.
The next day the Syracusans began operations at an earlier hour, but
with the same plan of attack by land and sea. A great part of the
day the rivals spent as before, confronting and skirmishing with
each other; until at last Ariston, son of Pyrrhicus, a Corinthian, the
ablest helmsman in the Syracusan service, persuaded their naval
commanders to send to the officials in the city, and tell them to move
the sale market as quickly as they could down to the sea, and oblige
every one to bring whatever eatables he had and sell them there,
thus enabling the commanders to land the crews and dine at once
close to the ships, and shortly afterwards, the selfsame day, to
attack the Athenians again when they were not expecting it.
In compliance with this advice a messenger was sent and the market
got ready, upon which the Syracusans suddenly backed water and
withdrew to the town, and at once landed and took their dinner upon
the spot; while the Athenians, supposing that they had returned to the
town because they felt they were beaten, disembarked at their
leisure and set about getting their dinners and about their other
occupations, under the idea that they done with fighting for that day.
Suddenly the Syracusans had manned their ships and again sailed
against them; and the Athenians, in great confusion and most of them
fasting, got on board, and with great difficulty put out to meet them.
For some time both parties remained on the defensive without engaging,
until the Athenians at last resolved not to let themselves be worn out
by waiting where they were, but to attack without delay, and giving
a cheer, went into action. The Syracusans received them, and
charging prow to prow as they had intended, stove in a great part of
the Athenian foreships by the strength of their beaks; the darters
on the decks also did great damage to the Athenians, but still greater
damage was done by the Syracusans who went about in small boats, ran
in upon the oars of the Athenian galleys, and sailed against their
sides, and discharged from thence their darts upon the sailors.
At last, fighting hard in this fashion, the Syracusans gained the
victory, and the Athenians turned and fled between the merchantmen
to their own station. The Syracusan ships pursued them as far as the
merchantmen, where they were stopped by the beams armed with
dolphins suspended from those vessels over the passage. Two of the
Syracusan vessels went too near in the excitement of victory and
were destroyed, one of them being taken with its crew. After sinking
seven of the Athenian vessels and disabling many, and taking most of
the men prisoners and killing others, the Syracusans retired and set
up trophies for both the engagements, being now confident of having
a decided superiority by sea, and by no means despairing of equal
success by land.
CHAPTER XXII.
Nineteenth Year of the War - Arrival of Demosthenes
- Defeat of the Athenians at Epipolae -
Folly and Obstinancy of Nicias
IN the meantime, while the Syracusans were preparing for a second
attack upon both elements, Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with
the succours from Athens, consisting of about seventy-three ships,
including the foreigners; nearly five thousand heavy infantry,
Athenian and allied; a large number of darters, Hellenic and
barbarian, and slingers and archers and everything else upon a
corresponding scale. The Syracusans and their allies were for the
moment not a little dismayed at the idea that there was to be no
term or ending to their dangers, seeing, in spite of the fortification
of Decelea, a new army arrive nearly equal to the former, and the
power of Athens proving so great in every quarter. On the other
hand, the first Athenian armament regained a certain confidence in the
midst of its misfortunes. Demosthenes, seeing how matters stood,
felt that he could not drag on and fare as Nicias had done, who by
wintering in Catana instead of at once attacking Syracuse had
allowed the terror of his first arrival to evaporate in contempt,
and had given time to Gylippus to arrive with a force from
Peloponnese, which the Syracusans would never have sent for if he
had attacked immediately; for they fancied that they were a match
for him by themselves, and would not have discovered their inferiority
until they were already invested, and even if they then sent for
succours, they would no longer have been equally able to profit by
their arrival. Recollecting this, and well aware that it was now on
the first day after his arrival that he like Nicias was most
formidable to the enemy, Demosthenes determined to lose no time in
drawing the utmost profit from the consternation at the moment
inspired by his army; and seeing that the counterwall of the
Syracusans, which hindered the Athenians from investing them, was a
single one, and that he who should become master of the way up to
Epipolae, and afterwards of the camp there, would find no difficulty
in taking it, as no one would even wait for his attack, made all haste
to attempt the enterprise. This he took to be the shortest way of
ending the war, as he would either succeed and take Syracuse, or would
lead back the armament instead of frittering away the lives of the
Athenians engaged in the expedition and the resources of the country
at large.
First therefore the Athenians went out and laid waste the lands of
the Syracusans about the Anapus and carried all before them as at
first by land and by sea, the Syracusans not offering to oppose them
upon either element, unless it were with their cavalry and darters
from the Olympieum. Next Demosthenes resolved to attempt the
counterwall first by means of engines. As however the engines that
he brought up were burnt by the enemy fighting from the wall, and
the rest of the forces repulsed after attacking at many different
points, he determined to delay no longer, and having obtained the
consent of Nicias and his fellow commanders, proceeded to put in
execution his plan of attacking Epipolae. As by day it seemed
impossible to approach and get up without being observed, he ordered
provisions for five days, took all the masons and carpenters, and
other things, such as arrows, and everything else that they could want
for the work of fortification if successful, and, after the first
watch, set out with Eurymedon and Menander and the whole army for
Epipolae, Nicias being left behind in the lines. Having come up by the
hill of Euryelus (where the former army had ascended at first)
unobserved by the enemy's guards, they went up to the fort which the
Syracusans had there, and took it, and put to the sword part of the
garrison. The greater number, however, escaped at once and gave the
alarm to the camps, of which there were three upon Epipolae,
defended by outworks, one of the Syracusans, one of the other
Siceliots, and one of the allies; and also to the six hundred
Syracusans forming the original garrison for this part of Epipolae.
These at once advanced against the assailants and, falling in with
Demosthenes and the Athenians, were routed by them after a sharp
resistance, the victors immediately pushing on, eager to achieve the
objects of the attack without giving time for their ardour to cool;
meanwhile others from the very beginning were taking the counterwall
of the Syracusans, which was abandoned by its garrison, and pulling
down the battlements. The Syracusans and the allies, and Gylippus with
the troops under his command, advanced to the rescue from the
outworks, but engaged in some consternation (a night attack being a
piece of audacity which they had never expected), and were at first
compelled to retreat. But while the Athenians, flushed with their
victory, now advanced with less order, wishing to make their way as
quickly as possible through the whole force of the enemy not yet
engaged, without relaxing their attack or giving them time to rally,
the Boeotians made the first stand against them, attacked them, routed
them, and put them to flight.
The Athenians now fell into great disorder and perplexity, so that
it was not easy to get from one side or the other any detailed account
of the affair. By day certainly the combatants have a clearer
notion, though even then by no means of all that takes place, no one
knowing much of anything that does not go on in his own immediate
neighbourhood; but in a night engagement (and this was the only one
that occurred between great armies during the war) how could any one
know anything for certain? Although there was a bright moon they saw
each other only as men do by moonlight, that is to say, they could
distinguish the form of the body, but could not tell for certain
whether it was a friend or an enemy. Both had great numbers of heavy
infantry moving about in a small space. Some of the Athenians were
already defeated, while others were coming up yet unconquered for
their first attack. A large part also of the rest of their forces
either had only just got up, or were still ascending, so that they did
not know which way to march. Owing to the rout that had taken place
all in front was now in confusion, and the noise made it difficult
to distinguish anything. The victorious Syracusans and allies were
cheering each other on with loud cries, by night the only possible
means of communication, and meanwhile receiving all who came against
them; while the Athenians were seeking for one another, taking all
in front of them for enemies, even although they might be some of
their now flying friends; and by constantly asking for the
watchword, which was their only means of recognition, not only
caused great confusion among themselves by asking all at once, but
also made it known to the enemy, whose own they did not so readily
discover, as the Syracusans were victorious and not scattered, and
thus less easily mistaken. The result was that if the Athenians fell
in with a party of the enemy that was weaker than they, it escaped
them through knowing their watchword; while if they themselves
failed to answer they were put to the sword. But what hurt them as
much, or indeed more than anything else, was the singing of the paean,
from the perplexity which it caused by being nearly the same on either
side; the Argives and Corcyraeans and any other Dorian peoples in
the army, struck terror into the Athenians whenever they raised
their paean, no less than did the enemy. Thus, after being once thrown
into disorder, they ended by coming into collision with each other
in many parts of the field, friends with friends, and citizens with
citizens, and not only terrified one another, but even came to blows
and could only be parted with difficulty. In the pursuit many perished
by throwing themselves down the cliffs, the way down from Epipolae
being narrow; and of those who got down safely into the plain,
although many, especially those who belonged to the first armament,
escaped through their better acquaintance with the locality, some of
the newcomers lost their way and wandered over the country, and were
cut off in the morning by the Syracusan cavalry and killed.
The next day the Syracusans set up two trophies, one upon Epipolae
where the ascent had been made, and the other on the spot where the
first check was given by the Boeotians; and the Athenians took back
their dead under truce. A great many of the Athenians and allies
were killed, although still more arms were taken than could be
accounted for by the number of the dead, as some of those who were
obliged to leap down from the cliffs without their shields escaped
with their lives and did not perish like the rest.
After this the Syracusans, recovering their old confidence at such
an unexpected stroke of good fortune, dispatched Sicanus with
fifteen ships to Agrigentum where there was a revolution, to induce if
possible the city to join them; while Gylippus again went by land into
the rest of Sicily to bring up reinforcements, being now in hope of
taking the Athenian lines by storm, after the result of the affair
on Epipolae.
In the meantime the Athenian generals consulted upon the disaster
which had happened, and upon the general weakness of the army. They
saw themselves unsuccessful in their enterprises, and the soldiers
disgusted with their stay; disease being rife among them owing to
its being the sickly season of the year, and to the marshy and
unhealthy nature of the spot in which they were encamped; and the
state of their affairs generally being thought desperate. Accordingly,
Demosthenes was of opinion that they ought not to stay any longer; but
agreeably to his original idea in risking the attempt upon Epipolae,
now that this had failed, he gave his vote for going away without
further loss of time, while the sea might yet be crossed, and their
late reinforcement might give them the superiority at all events on
that element. He also said that it would be more profitable for the
state to carry on the war against those who were building
fortifications in Attica, than against the Syracusans whom it was no
longer easy to subdue; besides which it was not right to squander
large sums of money to no purpose by going on with the siege.
This was the opinion of Demosthenes. Nicias, without denying the bad
state of their affairs, was unwilling to avow their weakness, or to
have it reported to the enemy that the Athenians in full council
were openly voting for retreat; for in that case they would be much
less likely to effect it when they wanted without discovery. Moreover,
his own particular information still gave him reason to hope that
the affairs of the enemy would soon be in a worse state than their
own, if the Athenians persevered in the siege; as they would wear
out the Syracusans by want of money, especially with the more
extensive command of the sea now given them by their present navy.
Besides this, there was a party in Syracuse who wished to betray the
city to the Athenians, and kept sending him messages and telling him
not to raise the siege. Accordingly, knowing this and really waiting
because he hesitated between the two courses and wished to see his way
more clearly, in his public speech on this occasion he refused to lead
off the army, saying he was sure the Athenians would never approve
of their returning without a vote of theirs. Those who would vote upon
their conduct, instead of judging the facts as eye-witnesses like
themselves and not from what they might hear from hostile critics,
would simply be guided by the calumnies of the first clever speaker;
while many, indeed most, of the soldiers on the spot, who now so
loudly proclaimed the danger of their position, when they reached
Athens would proclaim just as loudly the opposite, and would say
that their generals had been bribed to betray them and return. For
himself, therefore, who knew the Athenian temper, sooner than perish
under a dishonourable charge and by an unjust sentence at the hands of
the Athenians, he would rather take his chance and die, if die he
must, a soldier's death at the hand of the enemy. Besides, after
all, the Syracusans were in a worse case than themselves. What with
paying mercenaries, spending upon fortified posts, and now for a
full year maintaining a large navy, they were already at a loss and
would soon be at a standstill: they had already spent two thousand
talents and incurred heavy debts besides, and could not lose even ever
so small a fraction of their present force through not paying it,
without ruin to their cause; depending as they did more upon
mercenaries than upon soldiers obliged to serve, like their own. He
therefore said that they ought to stay and carry on the siege, and not
depart defeated in point of money, in which they were much superior.
Nicias spoke positively because he had exact information of the
financial distress at Syracuse, and also because of the strength of
the Athenian party there which kept sending him messages not to
raise the siege; besides which he had more confidence than before in
his fleet, and felt sure at least of its success. Demosthenes,
however, would not hear for a moment of continuing the siege, but said
that if they could not lead off the army without a decree from Athens,
and if they were obliged to stay on, they ought to remove to Thapsus
or Catana; where their land forces would have a wide extent of country
to overrun, and could live by plundering the enemy, and would thus
do them damage; while the fleet would have the open sea to fight in,
that is to say, instead of a narrow space which was all in the enemy's
favour, a wide sea-room where their science would be of use, and where
they could retreat or advance without being confined or
circumscribed either when they put out or put in. In any case he was
altogether opposed to their staying on where they were, and insisted
on removing at once, as quickly and with as little delay as
possible; and in this judgment Eurymedon agreed. Nicias however
still objecting, a certain diffidence and hesitation came over them,
with a suspicion that Nicias might have some further information to
make him so positive.
CHAPTER XXIII.
Nineteenth Year of the War - Battles
in the Great Harbour - Retreat and
Annihilation of the Athenian Army
WHILE the Athenians lingered on in this way without moving from
where they were, Gylippus and Sicanus now arrived at Syracuse. Sicanus
had failed to gain Agrigentum, the party friendly to the Syracusans
having been driven out while he was still at Gela; but Gylippus was
accompanied not only by a large number of troops raised in Sicily, but
by the heavy infantry sent off in the spring from Peloponnese in the
merchantmen, who had arrived at Selinus from Libya. They had been
carried to Libya by a storm, and having obtained two galleys and
pilots from the Cyrenians, on their voyage alongshore had taken
sides with the Euesperitae and had defeated the Libyans who were
besieging them, and from thence coasting on to Neapolis, a
Carthaginian mart, and the nearest point to Sicily, from which it is
only two days' and a night's voyage, there crossed over and came to
Selinus. Immediately upon their arrival the Syracusans prepared to
attack the Athenians again by land and sea at once. The Athenian
generals seeing a fresh army come to the aid of the enemy, and that
their own circumstances, far from improving, were becoming daily
worse, and above all distressed by the sickness of the soldiers, now
began to repent of not having removed before; and Nicias no longer
offering the same opposition, except by urging that there should be no
open voting, they gave orders as secretly as possible for all to be
prepared to sail out from the camp at a given signal. All was at
last ready, and they were on the point of sailing away, when an
eclipse of the moon, which was then at the full, took place. Most of
the Athenians, deeply impressed by this occurrence, now urged the
generals to wait; and Nicias, who was somewhat over-addicted to
divination and practices of that kind, refused from that moment even
to take the question of departure into consideration, until they had
waited the thrice nine days prescribed by the soothsayers.
The besiegers were thus condemned to stay in the country; and the
Syracusans, getting wind of what had happened, became more eager
than ever to press the Athenians, who had now themselves
acknowledged that they were no longer their superiors either by sea or
by land, as otherwise they would never have planned to sail away.
Besides which the Syracusans did not wish them to settle in any
other part of Sicily, where they would be more difficult to deal with,
but desired to force them to fight at sea as quickly as possible, in a
position favourable to themselves. Accordingly they manned their ships
and practised for as many days as they thought sufficient. When the
moment arrived they assaulted on the first day the Athenian lines, and
upon a small force of heavy infantry and horse sallying out against
them by certain gates, cut off some of the former and routed and
pursued them to the lines, where, as the entrance was narrow, the
Athenians lost seventy horses and some few of the heavy infantry.
Drawing off their troops for this day, on the next the Syracusans
went out with a fleet of seventy-six sail, and at the same time
advanced with their land forces against the lines. The Athenians put
out to meet them with eighty-six ships, came to close quarters, and
engaged. The Syracusans and their allies first defeated the Athenian
centre, and then caught Eurymedon, the commander of the right wing,
who was sailing out from the line more towards the land in order to
surround the enemy, in the hollow and recess of the harbour, and
killed him and destroyed the ships accompanying him; after which
they now chased the whole Athenian fleet before them and drove them
ashore.
Gylippus seeing the enemy's fleet defeated and carried ashore beyond
their stockades and camp, ran down to the breakwater with some of
his troops, in order to cut off the men as they landed and make it
easier for the Syracusans to tow off the vessels by the shore being
friendly ground. The Tyrrhenians who guarded this point for the
Athenians, seeing them come on in disorder, advanced out against
them and attacked and routed their van, hurling it into the marsh of
Lysimeleia. Afterwards the Syracusan and allied troops arrived in
greater numbers, and the Athenians fearing for their ships came up
also to the rescue and engaged them, and defeated and pursued them
to some distance and killed a few of their heavy infantry. They
succeeded in rescuing most of their ships and brought them down by
their camp; eighteen however were taken by the Syracusans and their
allies, and all the men killed. The rest the enemy tried to burn by
means of an old merchantman which they filled with faggots and
pine-wood, set on fire, and let drift down the wind which blew full on
the Athenians. The Athenians, however, alarmed for their ships,
contrived means for stopping it and putting it out, and checking the
flames and the nearer approach of the merchantman, thus escaped the
danger.
After this the Syracusans set up a trophy for the sea-fight and
for the heavy infantry whom they had cut off up at the lines, where
they took the horses; and the Athenians for the rout of the foot
driven by the Tyrrhenians into the marsh, and for their own victory
with the rest of the army.
The Syracusans had now gained a decisive victory at sea, where until
now they had feared the reinforcement brought by Demosthenes, and
deep, in consequence, was the despondency of the Athenians, and
great their disappointment, and greater still their regret for
having come on the expedition. These were the only cities that they
had yet encountered, similar to their own in character, under
democracies like themselves, which had ships and horses, and were of
considerable magnitude. They had been unable to divide and bring
them over by holding out the prospect of changes in their governments,
or to crush them by their great superiority in force, but had failed
in most of their attempts, and being already in perplexity, had now
been defeated at sea, where defeat could never have been expected, and
were thus plunged deeper in embarrassment than ever.
Meanwhile the Syracusans immediately began to sail freely along
the harbour, and determined to close up its mouth, so that the
Athenians might not be able to steal out in future, even if they
wished. Indeed, the Syracusans no longer thought only of saving
themselves, but also how to hinder the escape of the enemy;
thinking, and thinking rightly, that they were now much the
stronger, and that to conquer the Athenians and their allies by land
and sea would win them great glory in Hellas. The rest of the Hellenes
would thus immediately be either freed or released from
apprehension, as the remaining forces of Athens would be henceforth
unable to sustain the war that would be waged against her; while they,
the Syracusans, would be regarded as the authors of this
deliverance, and would be held in high admiration, not only with all
men now living but also with posterity. Nor were these the only
considerations that gave dignity to the struggle. They would thus
conquer not only the Athenians but also their numerous allies, and
conquer not alone, but with their companions in arms, commanding
side by side with the Corinthians and Lacedaemonians, having offered
their city to stand in the van of danger, and having been in a great
measure the pioneers of naval success.
Indeed, there were never so many peoples assembled before a single
city, if we except the grand total gathered together in this war under
Athens and Lacedaemon. The following were the states on either side
who came to Syracuse to fight for or against Sicily, to help to
conquer or defend the island. Right or community of blood was not
the bond of union between them, so much as interest or compulsion as
the case might be. The Athenians themselves being Ionians went against
the Dorians of Syracuse of their own free will; and the peoples
still speaking Attic and using the Athenian laws, the Lemnians,
Imbrians, and Aeginetans, that is to say the then occupants of Aegina,
being their colonists, went with them. To these must be also added the
Hestiaeans dwelling at Hestiaea in Euboea. Of the rest some joined
in the expedition as subjects of the Athenians, others as
independent allies, others as mercenaries. To the number of the
subjects paying tribute belonged the Eretrians, Chalcidians, Styrians,
and Carystians from Euboea; the Ceans, Andrians, and Tenians from
the islands; and the Milesians, Samians, and Chians from Ionia. The
Chians, however, joined as independent allies, paying no tribute,
but furnishing ships. Most of these were Ionians and descended from
the Athenians, except the Carystians, who are Dryopes, and although
subjects and obliged to serve, were still Ionians fighting against
Dorians. Besides these there were men of Aeolic race, the Methymnians,
subjects who provided ships, not tribute, and the Tenedians and
Aenians who paid tribute. These Aeolians fought against their
Aeolian founders, the Boeotians in the Syracusan army, because they
were obliged, while the Plataeans, the only native Boeotians opposed
to Boeotians, did so upon a just quarrel. Of the Rhodians and
Cytherians, both Dorians, the latter, Lacedaemonian colonists,
fought in the Athenian ranks against their Lacedaemonian countrymen
with Gylippus; while the Rhodians, Argives by race, were compelled
to bear arms against the Dorian Syracusans and their own colonists,
the Geloans, serving with the Syracusans. Of the islanders round
Peloponnese, the Cephallenians and Zacynthians accompanied the
Athenians as independent allies, although their insular position
really left them little choice in the matter, owing to the maritime
supremacy of Athens, while the Corcyraeans, who were not only
Dorians but Corinthians, were openly serving against Corinthians and
Syracusans, although colonists of the former and of the same race as
the latter, under colour of compulsion, but really out of free will
through hatred of Corinth. The Messenians, as they are now called in
Naupactus and from Pylos, then held by the Athenians, were taken
with them to the war. There were also a few Megarian exiles, whose
fate it was to be now fighting against the Megarian Selinuntines.
The engagement of the rest was more of a voluntary nature. It was
less the league than hatred of the Lacedaemonians and the immediate
private advantage of each individual that persuaded the Dorian Argives
to join the Ionian Athenians in a war against Dorians; while the
Mantineans and other Arcadian mercenaries, accustomed to go against
the enemy pointed out to them at the moment, were led by interest to
regard the Arcadians serving with the Corinthians as just as much
their enemies as any others. The Cretans and Aetolians also served for
hire, and the Cretans who had joined the Rhodians in founding Gela,
thus came to consent to fight for pay against, instead of for, their
colonists. There were also some Acarnanians paid to serve, although
they came chiefly for love of Demosthenes and out of goodwill to the
Athenians whose allies they were. These all lived on the Hellenic side
of the Ionian Gulf. Of the Italiots, there were the Thurians and
Metapontines, dragged into the quarrel by the stern necessities of a
time of revolution; of the Siceliots, the Naxians and the Catanians;
and of the barbarians, the Egestaeans, who called in the Athenians,
most of the Sicels, and outside Sicily some Tyrrhenian enemies of
Syracuse and Iapygian mercenaries.
Such were the peoples serving with the Athenians. Against these
the Syracusans had the Camarinaeans their neighbours, the Geloans
who live next to them; then passing over the neutral Agrigentines, the
Selinuntines settled on the farther side of the island. These
inhabit the part of Sicily looking towards Libya; the Himeraeans
came from the side towards the Tyrrhenian Sea, being the only Hellenic
inhabitants in that quarter, and the only people that came from thence
to the aid of the Syracusans. Of the Hellenes in Sicily the above
peoples joined in the war, all Dorians and independent, and of the
barbarians the Sicels only, that is to say, such as did not go over to
the Athenians. Of the Hellenes outside Sicily there were the
Lacedaemonians, who provided a Spartan to take the command, and a
force of Neodamodes or Freedmen, and of Helots; the Corinthians, who
alone joined with naval and land forces, with their Leucadian and
Ambraciot kinsmen; some mercenaries sent by Corinth from Arcadia; some
Sicyonians forced to serve, and from outside Peloponnese the
Boeotians. In comparison, however, with these foreign auxiliaries, the
great Siceliot cities furnished more in every department- numbers of
heavy infantry, ships, and horses, and an immense multitude besides
having been brought together; while in comparison, again, one may say,
with all the rest put together, more was provided by the Syracusans
themselves, both from the greatness of the city and from the fact that
they were in the greatest danger.
Such were the auxiliaries brought together on either side, all of
which had by this time joined, neither party experiencing any
subsequent accession. It was no wonder, therefore, if the Syracusans
and their allies thought that it would win them great glory if they
could follow up their recent victory in the sea-fight by the capture
of the whole Athenian armada, without letting it escape either by
sea or by land. They began at once to close up the Great Harbour by
means of boats, merchant vessels, and galleys moored broadside
across its mouth, which is nearly a mile wide, and made all their
other arrangements for the event of the Athenians again venturing to
fight at sea. There was, in fact, nothing little either in their plans
or their ideas.
The Athenians, seeing them closing up the harbour and informed of
their further designs, called a council of war. The generals and
colonels assembled and discussed the difficulties of the situation;
the point which pressed most being that they no longer had
provisions for immediate use (having sent on to Catana to tell them
not to send any, in the belief that they were going away), and that
they would not have any in future unless they could command the sea.
They therefore determined to evacuate their upper lines, to enclose
with a cross wall and garrison a small space close to the ships,
only just sufficient to hold their stores and sick, and manning all
the ships, seaworthy or not, with every man that could be spared
from the rest of their land forces, to fight it out at sea, and, if
victorious, to go to Catana, if not, to burn their vessels, form in
close order, and retreat by land for the nearest friendly place they
could reach, Hellenic or barbarian. This was no sooner settled than
carried into effect; they descended gradually from the upper lines and
manned all their vessels, compelling all to go on board who were of
age to be in any way of use. They thus succeeded in manning about
one hundred and ten ships in all, on board of which they embarked a
number of archers and darters taken from the Acarnanians and from
the other foreigners, making all other provisions allowed by the
nature of their plan and by the necessities which imposed it. All
was now nearly ready, and Nicias, seeing the soldiery disheartened
by their unprecedented and decided defeat at sea, and by reason of the
scarcity of provisions eager to fight it out as soon as possible,
called them all together, and first addressed them, speaking as
follows:
"Soldiers of the Athenians and of the allies, we have all an equal
interest in the coming struggle, in which life and country are at
stake for us quite as much as they can be for the enemy; since if
our fleet wins the day, each can see his native city again, wherever
that city may be. You must not lose heart, or be like men without
any experience, who fail in a first essay and ever afterwards
fearfully forebode a future as disastrous. But let the Athenians among
you who have already had experience of many wars, and the allies who
have joined us in so many expeditions, remember the surprises of
war, and with the hope that fortune will not be always against us,
prepare to fight again in a manner worthy of the number which you
see yourselves to be.
"Now, whatever we thought would be of service against the crush of
vessels in such a narrow harbour, and against the force upon the decks
of the enemy, from which we suffered before, has all been considered
with the helmsmen, and, as far as our means allowed, provided. A
number of archers and darters will go on board, and a multitude that
we should not have employed in an action in the open sea, where our
science would be crippled by the weight of the vessels; but in the
present land-fight that we are forced to make from shipboard all
this will be useful. We have also discovered the changes in
construction that we must make to meet theirs; and against the
thickness of their cheeks, which did us the greatest mischief, we have
provided grappling-irons, which will prevent an assailant backing
water after charging, if the soldiers on deck here do their duty;
since we are absolutely compelled to fight a land battle from the
fleet, and it seems to be our interest neither to back water
ourselves, nor to let the enemy do so, especially as the shore, except
so much of it as may be held by our troops, is hostile ground.
"You must remember this and fight on as long as you can, and must
not let yourselves be driven ashore, but once alongside must make up
your minds not to part company until you have swept the heavy infantry
from the enemy's deck. I say this more for the heavy infantry than for
the seamen, as it is more the business of the men on deck; and our
land forces are even now on the whole the strongest. The sailors I
advise, and at the same time implore, not to be too much daunted by
their misfortunes, now that we have our decks better armed and greater
number of vessels. Bear in mind how well worth preserving is the
pleasure felt by those of you who through your knowledge of our
language and imitation of our manners were always considered
Athenians, even though not so in reality, and as such were honoured
throughout Hellas, and had your full share of the advantages of our
empire, and more than your share in the respect of our subjects and in
protection from ill treatment. You, therefore, with whom alone we
freely share our empire, we now justly require not to betray that
empire in its extremity, and in scorn of Corinthians, whom you have
often conquered, and of Siceliots, none of whom so much as presumed to
stand against us when our navy was in its prime, we ask you to repel
them, and to show that even in sickness and disaster your skill is
more than a match for the fortune and vigour of any other.
"For the Athenians among you I add once more this reflection: You
left behind you no more such ships in your docks as these, no more
heavy infantry in their flower; if you do aught but conquer, our
enemies here will immediately sail thither, and those that are left of
us at Athens will become unable to repel their home assailants,
reinforced by these new allies. Here you will fall at once into the
hands of the Syracusans- I need not remind you of the intentions with
which you attacked them- and your countrymen at home will fall into
those of the Lacedaemonians. Since the fate of both thus hangs upon
this single battle, now, if ever, stand firm, and remember, each and
all, that you who are now going on board are the army and navy of
the Athenians, and all that is left of the state and the great name of
Athens, in whose defence if any man has any advantage in skill or
courage, now is the time for him to show it, and thus serve himself
and save all."
After this address Nicias at once gave orders to man the ships.
Meanwhile Gylippus and the Syracusans could perceive by the
preparations which they saw going on that the Athenians meant to fight
at sea. They had also notice of the grappling-irons, against which
they specially provided by stretching hides over the prows and much of
the upper part of their vessels, in order that the irons when thrown
might slip off without taking hold. All being now ready, the
generals and Gylippus addressed them in the following terms:
"Syracusans and allies, the glorious character of our past
achievements and the no less glorious results at issue in the coming
battle are, we think, understood by most of you, or you would never
have thrown yourselves with such ardour into the struggle; and if
there be any one not as fully aware of the facts as he ought to be, we
will declare them to him. The Athenians came to this country first
to effect the conquest of Sicily, and after that, if successful, of
Peloponnese and the rest of Hellas, possessing already the greatest
empire yet known, of present or former times, among the Hellenes. Here
for the first time they found in you men who faced their navy which
made them masters everywhere; you have already defeated them in the
previous sea-fights, and will in all likelihood defeat them again now.
When men are once checked in what they consider their special
excellence, their whole opinion of themselves suffers more than if
they had not at first believed in their superiority, the unexpected
shock to their pride causing them to give way more than their real
strength warrants; and this is probably now the case with the
Athenians.
"With us it is different. The original estimate of ourselves which
gave us courage in the days of our unskilfulness has been
strengthened, while the conviction superadded to it that we must be
the best seamen of the time, if we have conquered the best, has
given a double measure of hope to every man among us; and, for the
most part, where there is the greatest hope, there is also the
greatest ardour for action. The means to combat us which they have
tried to find in copying our armament are familiar to our warfare, and
will be met by proper provisions; while they will never be able to
have a number of heavy infantry on their decks, contrary to their
custom, and a number of darters (born landsmen, one may say,
Acarnanians and others, embarked afloat, who will not know how to
discharge their weapons when they have to keep still), without
hampering their vessels and falling all into confusion among
themselves through fighting not according to their own tactics. For
they will gain nothing by the number of their ships- I say this to
those of you who may be alarmed by having to fight against odds- as a
quantity of ships in a confined space will only be slower in executing
the movements required, and most exposed to injury from our means of
offence. Indeed, if you would know the plain truth, as we are credibly
informed, the excess of their sufferings and the necessities of
their present distress have made them desperate; they have no
confidence in their force, but wish to try their fortune in the only
way they can, and either to force their passage and sail out, or after
this to retreat by land, it being impossible for them to be worse
off than they are.
"The fortune of our greatest enemies having thus betrayed itself,
and their disorder being what I have described, let us engage in
anger, convinced that, as between adversaries, nothing is more
legitimate than to claim to sate the whole wrath of one's soul in
punishing the aggressor, and nothing more sweet, as the proverb has
it, than the vengeance upon an enemy, which it will now be ours to
take. That enemies they are and mortal enemies you all know, since
they came here to enslave our country, and if successful had in
reserve for our men all that is most dreadful, and for our children
and wives all that is most dishonourable, and for the whole city the
name which conveys the greatest reproach. None should therefore relent
or think it gain if they go away without further danger to us. This
they will do just the same, even if they get the victory; while if
we succeed, as we may expect, in chastising them, and in handing
down to all Sicily her ancient freedom strengthened and confirmed,
we shall have achieved no mean triumph. And the rarest dangers are
those in which failure brings little loss and success the greatest
advantage."
After the above address to the soldiers on their side, the Syracusan
generals and Gylippus now perceived that the Athenians were manning
their ships, and immediately proceeded to man their own also.
Meanwhile Nicias, appalled by the position of affairs, realizing the
greatness and the nearness of the danger now that they were on the
point of putting out from shore, and thinking, as men are apt to think
in great crises, that when all has been done they have still something
left to do, and when all has been said that they have not yet said
enough, again called on the captains one by one, addressing each by
his father's name and by his own, and by that of his tribe, and
adjured them not to belie their own personal renown, or to obscure the
hereditary virtues for which their ancestors were illustrious: he
reminded them of their country, the freest of the free, and of the
unfettered discretion allowed in it to all to live as they pleased;
and added other arguments such as men would use at such a crisis,
and which, with little alteration, are made to serve on all
occasions alike- appeals to wives, children, and national
gods- without caring whether they are thought commonplace, but loudly
invoking them in the belief that they will be of use in the
consternation of the moment. Having thus admonished them, not, he
felt, as he would, but as he could, Nicias withdrew and led the troops
to the sea, and ranged them in as long a line as he was able, in order
to aid as far as possible in sustaining the courage of the men afloat;
while Demosthenes, Menander, and Euthydemus, who took the command on
board, put out from their own camp and sailed straight to the
barrier across the mouth of the harbour and to the passage left
open, to try to force their way out.
The Syracusans and their allies had already put out with about the
same number of ships as before, a part of which kept guard at the
outlet, and the remainder all round the rest of the harbour, in
order to attack the Athenians on all sides at once; while the land
forces held themselves in readiness at the points at which the vessels
might put into the shore. The Syracusan fleet was commanded by Sicanus
and Agatharchus, who had each a wing of the whole force, with Pythen
and the Corinthians in the centre. When the rest of the Athenians came
up to the barrier, with the first shock of their charge they
overpowered the ships stationed there, and tried to undo the
fastenings; after this, as the Syracusans and allies bore down upon
them from all quarters, the action spread from the barrier over the
whole harbour, and was more obstinately disputed than any of the
preceding ones. On either side the rowers showed great zeal in
bringing up their vessels at the boatswains' orders, and the
helmsmen great skill in manoeuvring, and great emulation one with
another; while the ships once alongside, the soldiers on board did
their best not to let the service on deck be outdone by the others; in
short, every man strove to prove himself the first in his particular
department. And as many ships were engaged in a small compass (for
these were the largest fleets fighting in the narrowest space ever
known, being together little short of two hundred), the regular
attacks with the beak were few, there being no opportunity of
backing water or of breaking the line; while the collisions caused
by one ship chancing to run foul of another, either in flying from
or attacking a third, were more frequent. So long as a vessel was
coming up to the charge the men on the decks rained darts and arrows
and stones upon her; but once alongside, the heavy infantry tried to
board each other's vessel, fighting hand to hand. In many quarters
it happened, by reason of the narrow room, that a vessel was
charging an enemy on one side and being charged herself on another,
and that two or sometimes more ships had perforce got entangled
round one, obliging the helmsmen to attend to defence here, offence
there, not to one thing at once, but to many on all sides; while the
huge din caused by the number of ships crashing together not only
spread terror, but made the orders of the boatswains inaudible. The
boatswains on either side in the discharge of their duty and in the
heat of the conflict shouted incessantly orders and appeals to their
men; the Athenians they urged to force the passage out, and now if
ever to show their mettle and lay hold of a safe return to their
country; to the Syracusans and their allies they cried that it would
be glorious to prevent the escape of the enemy, and, conquering, to
exalt the countries that were theirs. The generals, moreover, on
either side, if they saw any in any part of the battle backing
ashore without being forced to do so, called out to the captain by
name and asked him- the Athenians, whether they were retreating
because they thought the thrice hostile shore more their own than
that sea which had cost them so much labour to win; the Syracusans,
whether they were flying from the flying Athenians, whom they well
knew to be eager to escape in whatever way they could.
Meanwhile the two armies on shore, while victory hung in the
balance, were a prey to the most agonizing and conflicting emotions;
the natives thirsting for more glory than they had already won,
while the invaders feared to find themselves in even worse plight than
before. The all of the Athenians being set upon their fleet, their
fear for the event was like nothing they had ever felt; while their
view of the struggle was necessarily as chequered as the battle
itself. Close to the scene of action and not all looking at the same
point at once, some saw their friends victorious and took courage
and fell to calling upon heaven not to deprive them of salvation,
while others who had their eyes turned upon the losers, wailed and
cried aloud, and, although spectators, were more overcome than the
actual combatants. Others, again, were gazing at some spot where the
battle was evenly disputed; as the strife was protracted without
decision, their swaying bodies reflected the agitation of their minds,
and they suffered the worst agony of all, ever just within reach of
safety or just on the point of destruction. In short, in that one
Athenian army as long as the sea-fight remained doubtful there was
every sound to be heard at once, shrieks, cheers, "We win," "We lose,"
and all the other manifold exclamations that a great host would
necessarily utter in great peril; and with the men in the fleet it was
nearly the same; until at last the Syracusans and their allies,
after the battle had lasted a long while, put the Athenians to flight,
and with much shouting and cheering chased them in open rout to the
shore. The naval force, one one way, one another, as many as were
not taken afloat now ran ashore and rushed from on board their ships
to their camp; while the army, no more divided, but carried away by
one impulse, all with shrieks and groans deplored the event, and ran
down, some to help the ships, others to guard what was left of their
wall, while the remaining and most numerous part already began to
consider how they should save themselves. Indeed, the panic of the
present moment had never been surpassed. They now suffered very nearly
what they had inflicted at Pylos; as then the Lacedaemonians with
the loss of their fleet lost also the men who had crossed over to
the island, so now the Athenians had no hope of escaping by land,
without the help of some extraordinary accident.
The sea-fight having been a severe one, and many ships and lives
having been lost on both sides, the victorious Syracusans and their
allies now picked up their wrecks and dead, and sailed off to the city
and set up a trophy. The Athenians, overwhelmed by their misfortune,
never even thought. of asking leave to take up their dead or wrecks,
but wished to retreat that very night. Demosthenes, however, went to
Nicias and gave it as his opinion that they should man the ships
they had left and make another effort to force their passage out
next morning; saying that they had still left more ships fit for
service than the enemy, the Athenians having about sixty remaining
as against less than fifty of their opponents. Nicias was quite of his
mind; but when they wished to man the vessels, the sailors refused
to go on board, being so utterly overcome by their defeat as no longer
to believe in the possibility of success.
Accordingly they all now made up their minds to retreat by land.
Meanwhile the Syracusan Hermocrates- suspecting their intention, and
impressed by the danger of allowing a force of that magnitude to
retire by land, establish itself in some other part of Sicily, and
from thence renew the war- went and stated his views to the
authorities, and pointed out to them that they ought not to let the
enemy get away by night, but that all the Syracusans and their
allies should at once march out and block up the roads and seize and
guard the passes. The authorities were entirely of his opinion, and
thought that it ought to be done, but on the other hand felt sure that
the people, who had given themselves over to rejoicing, and were
taking their ease after a great battle at sea, would not be easily
brought to obey; besides, they were celebrating a festival, having
on that day a sacrifice to Heracles, and most of them in their rapture
at the victory had fallen to drinking at the festival, and would
probably consent to anything sooner than to take up their arms and
march out at that moment. For these reasons the thing appeared
impracticable to the magistrates; and Hermocrates, finding himself
unable to do anything further with them, had now recourse to the
following stratagem of his own. What he feared was that the
Athenians might quietly get the start of them by passing the most
difficult places during the night; and he therefore sent, as soon as
it was dusk, some friends of his own to the camp with some horsemen
who rode up within earshot and called out to some of the men, as
though they were well-wishers of the Athenians, and told them to
tell Nicias (who had in fact some correspondents who informed him of
what went on inside the town) not to lead off the army by night as the
Syracusans were guarding the roads, but to make his preparations at
his leisure and to retreat by day. After saying this they departed;
and their hearers informed the Athenian generals, who put off going
for that night on the strength of this message, not doubting its
sincerity.
Since after all they had not set out at once, they now determined to
stay also the following day to give time to the soldiers to pack up as
well as they could the most useful articles, and, leaving everything
else behind, to start only with what was strictly necessary for
their personal subsistence. Meanwhile the Syracusans and Gylippus
marched out and blocked up the roads through the country by which
the Athenians were likely to pass, and kept guard at the fords of
the streams and rivers, posting themselves so as to receive them and
stop the army where they thought best; while their fleet sailed up
to the beach and towed off the ships of the Athenians. Some few were
burned by the Athenians themselves as they had intended; the rest
the Syracusans lashed on to their own at their leisure as they had
been thrown up on shore, without any one trying to stop them, and
conveyed to the town.
After this, Nicias and Demosthenes now thinking that enough had been
done in the way of preparation, the removal of the army took place
upon the second day after the sea-fight. It was a lamentable scene,
not merely from the single circumstance that they were retreating
after having lost all their ships, their great hopes gone, and
themselves and the state in peril; but also in leaving the camp
there were things most grievous for every eye and heart to
contemplate. The dead lay unburied, and each man as he recognized a
friend among them shuddered with grief and horror; while the living
whom they were leaving behind, wounded or sick, were to the living far
more shocking than the dead, and more to be pitied than those who
had perished. These fell to entreating and bewailing until their
friends knew not what to do, begging them to take them and loudly
calling to each individual comrade or relative whom they could see,
hanging upon the necks of their tent-fellows in the act of
departure, and following as far as they could, and, when their
bodily strength failed them, calling again and again upon heaven and
shrieking aloud as they were left behind. So that the whole army being
filled with tears and distracted after this fashion found it not
easy to go, even from an enemy's land, where they had already suffered
evils too great for tears and in the unknown future before them feared
to suffer more. Dejection and self-condemnation were also rife among
them. Indeed they could only be compared to a starved-out town, and
that no small one, escaping; the whole multitude upon the march
being not less than forty thousand men. All carried anything they
could which might be of use, and the heavy infantry and troopers,
contrary to their wont, while under arms carried their own victuals,
in some cases for want of servants, in others through not trusting
them; as they had long been deserting and now did so in greater
numbers than ever. Yet even thus they did not carry enough, as there
was no longer food in the camp. Moreover their disgrace generally, and
the universality of their sufferings, however to a certain extent
alleviated by being borne in company, were still felt at the moment
a heavy burden, especially when they contrasted the splendour and
glory of their setting out with the humiliation in which it had ended.
For this was by far the greatest reverse that ever befell an
Hellenic army. They had come to enslave others, and were departing
in fear of being enslaved themselves: they had sailed out with
prayer and paeans, and now started to go back with omens directly
contrary; travelling by land instead of by sea, and trusting not in
their fleet but in their heavy infantry. Nevertheless the greatness of
the danger still impending made all this appear tolerable.
Nicias seeing the army dejected and greatly altered, passed along
the ranks and encouraged and comforted them as far as was possible
under the circumstances, raising his voice still higher and higher
as he went from one company to another in his earnestness, and in
his anxiety that the benefit of his words might reach as many as
possible:
"Athenians and allies, even in our present position we must still
hope on, since men have ere now been saved from worse straits than
this; and you must not condemn yourselves too severely either
because of your disasters or because of your present unmerited
sufferings. I myself who am not superior to any of you in strength-
indeed you see how I am in my sickness- and who in the gifts
of fortune am, I think, whether in private life or otherwise, the
equal of any, am now exposed to the same danger as the meanest among
you; and yet my life has been one of much devotion toward the gods,
and of much justice and without offence toward men. I have, therefore,
still a strong hope for the future, and our misfortunes do not terrify
me as much as they might. Indeed we may hope that they will be
lightened: our enemies have had good fortune enough; and if any of the
gods was offended at our expedition, we have been already amply
punished. Others before us have attacked their neighbours and have
done what men will do without suffering more than they could bear; and
we may now justly expect to find the gods more kind, for we have
become fitter objects for their pity than their jealousy. And then
look at yourselves, mark the numbers and efficiency of the heavy
infantry marching in your ranks, and do not give way too much to
despondency, but reflect that you are yourselves at once a city
wherever you sit down, and that there is no other in Sicily that could
easily resist your attack, or expel you when once established. The
safety and order of the march is for yourselves to look to; the one
thought of each man being that the spot on which he may be forced to
fight must be conquered and held as his country and stronghold.
Meanwhile we shall hasten on our way night and day alike, as our
provisions are scanty; and if we can reach some friendly place of
the Sicels, whom fear of the Syracusans still keeps true to us, you
may forthwith consider yourselves safe. A message has been sent on
to them with directions to meet us with supplies of food. To sum up,
be convinced, soldiers, that you must be brave, as there is no place
near for your cowardice to take refuge in, and that if you now
escape from the enemy, you may all see again what your hearts
desire, while those of you who are Athenians will raise up again the
great power of the state, fallen though it be. Men make the city and
not walls or ships without men in them."
As he made this address, Nicias went along the ranks, and brought
back to their place any of the troops that he saw straggling out of
the line; while Demosthenes did as much for his part of the army,
addressing them in words very similar. The army marched in a hollow
square, the division under Nicias leading, and that of Demosthenes
following, the heavy infantry being outside and the baggage-carriers
and the bulk of the army in the middle. When they arrived at the
ford of the river Anapus there they found drawn up a body of the
Syracusans and allies, and routing these, made good their passage
and pushed on, harassed by the charges of the Syracusan horse and by
the missiles of their light troops. On that day they advanced about
four miles and a half, halting for the night upon a certain hill. On
the next they started early and got on about two miles further, and
descended into a place in the plain and there encamped, in order to
procure some eatables from the houses, as the place was inhabited, and
to carry on with them water from thence, as for many furlongs in
front, in the direction in which they were going, it was not
plentiful. The Syracusans meanwhile went on and fortified the pass
in front, where there was a steep hill with a rocky ravine on each
side of it, called the Acraean cliff. The next day the Athenians
advancing found themselves impeded by the missiles and charges of
the horse and darters, both very numerous, of the Syracusans and
allies; and after fighting for a long while, at length retired to
the same camp, where they had no longer provisions as before, it being
impossible to leave their position by reason of the cavalry.
Early next morning they started afresh and forced their way to the
hill, which had been fortified, where they found before them the
enemy's infantry drawn up many shields deep to defend the
fortification, the pass being narrow. The Athenians assaulted the
work, but were greeted by a storm of missiles from the hill, which
told with the greater effect through its being a steep one, and unable
to force the passage, retreated again and rested. Meanwhile occurred
some claps of thunder and rain, as often happens towards autumn, which
still further disheartened the Athenians, who thought all these things
to be omens of their approaching ruin. While they were resting,
Gylippus and the Syracusans sent a part of their army to throw up
works in their rear on the way by which they had advanced; however,
the Athenians immediately sent some of their men and prevented them;
after which they retreated more towards the plain and halted for the
night. When they advanced the next day the Syracusans surrounded and
attacked them on every side, and disabled many of them, falling back
if the Athenians advanced and coming on if they retired, and in
particular assaulting their rear, in the hope of routing them in
detail, and thus striking a panic into the whole army. For a long
while the Athenians persevered in this fashion, but after advancing
for four or five furlongs halted to rest in the plain, the
Syracusans also withdrawing to their own camp.
During the night Nicias and Demosthenes, seeing the wretched
condition of their troops, now in want of every kind of necessary, and
numbers of them disabled in the numerous attacks of the enemy,
determined to light as many fires as possible, and to lead off the
army, no longer by the same route as they had intended, but towards
the sea in the opposite direction to that guarded by the Syracusans.
The whole of this route was leading the army not to Catana but to
the other side of Sicily, towards Camarina, Gela, and the other
Hellenic and barbarian towns in that quarter. They accordingly lit a
number of fires and set out by night. Now all armies, and the greatest
most of all, are liable to fears and alarms, especially when they
are marching by night through an enemy's country and with the enemy
near; and the Athenians falling into one of these panics, the
leading division, that of Nicias, kept together and got on a good
way in front, while that of Demosthenes, comprising rather more than
half the army, got separated and marched on in some disorder. By
morning, however, they reached the sea, and getting into the
Helorine road, pushed on in order to reach the river Cacyparis, and to
follow the stream up through the interior, where they hoped to be
met by the Sicels whom they had sent for. Arrived at the river, they
found there also a Syracusan party engaged in barring the passage of
the ford with a wall and a palisade, and forcing this guard, crossed
the river and went on to another called the Erineus, according to
the advice of their guides.
Meanwhile, when day came and the Syracusans and allies found that
the Athenians were gone, most of them accused Gylippus of having let
them escape on purpose, and hastily pursuing by the road which they
had no difficulty in finding that they had taken, overtook them
about dinner-time. They first came up with the troops under
Demosthenes, who were behind and marching somewhat slowly and in
disorder, owing to the night panic above referred to, and at once
attacked and engaged them, the Syracusan horse surrounding them with
more ease now that they were separated from the rest and hemming
them in on one spot. The division of Nicias was five or six miles on
in front, as he led them more rapidly, thinking that under the
circumstances their safety lay not in staying and fighting, unless
obliged, but in retreating as fast as possible, and only fighting when
forced to do so. On the other hand, Demosthenes was, generally
speaking, harassed more incessantly, as his post in the rear left
him the first exposed to the attacks of the enemy; and now, finding
that the Syracusans were in pursuit, he omitted to push on, in order
to form his men for battle, and so lingered until he was surrounded by
his pursuers and himself and the Athenians with him placed in the most
distressing position, being huddled into an enclosure with a wall
all round it, a road on this side and on that, and olive-trees in
great number, where missiles were showered in upon them from every
quarter. This mode of attack the Syracusans had with good reason
adopted in preference to fighting at close quarters, as to risk a
struggle with desperate men was now more for the advantage of the
Athenians than for their own; besides, their success had now become so
certain that they began to spare themselves a little in order not to
be cut off in the moment of victory, thinking too that, as it was,
they would be able in this way to subdue and capture the enemy.
In fact, after plying the Athenians and allies all day long from
every side with missiles, they at length saw that they were worn out
with their wounds and other sufferings; and Gylippus and the
Syracusans and their allies made a proclamation, offering their
liberty to any of the islanders who chose to come over to them; and
some few cities went over. Afterwards a capitulation was agreed upon
for all the rest with Demosthenes, to lay down their arms on condition
that no one was to be put to death either by violence or
imprisonment or want of the necessaries of life. Upon this they
surrendered to the number of six thousand in all, laying down all
the money in their possession, which filled the hollows of four
shields, and were immediately conveyed by the Syracusans to the town.
Meanwhile Nicias with his division arrived that day at the river
Erineus, crossed over, and posted his army upon some high ground
upon the other side. The next day the Syracusans overtook him and told
him that the troops under Demosthenes had surrendered, and invited him
to follow their example. Incredulous of the fact, Nicias asked for a
truce to send a horseman to see, and upon the return of the
messenger with the tidings that they had surrendered, sent a herald to
Gylippus and the Syracusans, saying that he was ready to agree with
them on behalf of the Athenians to repay whatever money the Syracusans
had spent upon the war if they would let his army go; and offered
until the money was paid to give Athenians as hostages, one for
every talent. The Syracusans and Gylippus rejected this proposition,
and attacked this division as they had the other, standing all round
and plying them with missiles until the evening. Food and
necessaries were as miserably wanting to the troops of Nicias as
they had been to their comrades; nevertheless they watched for the
quiet of the night to resume their march. But as they were taking up
their arms the Syracusans perceived it and raised their paean, upon
which the Athenians, finding that they were discovered, laid them down
again, except about three hundred men who forced their way through the
guards and went on during the night as they were able.
As soon as it was day Nicias put his army in motion, pressed, as
before, by the Syracusans and their allies, pelted from every side
by their missiles, and struck down by their javelins. The Athenians
pushed on for the Assinarus, impelled by the attacks made upon them
from every side by a numerous cavalry and the swarm of other arms,
fancying that they should breathe more freely if once across the
river, and driven on also by their exhaustion and craving for water.
Once there they rushed in, and all order was at an end, each man
wanting to cross first, and the attacks of the enemy making it
difficult to cross at all; forced to huddle together, they fell
against and trod down one another, some dying immediately upon the
javelins, others getting entangled together and stumbling over the
articles of baggage, without being able to rise again. Meanwhile the
opposite bank, which was steep, was lined by the Syracusans, who
showered missiles down upon the Athenians, most of them drinking
greedily and heaped together in disorder in the hollow bed of the
river. The Peloponnesians also came down and butchered them,
especially those in the water, which was thus immediately spoiled, but
which they went on drinking just the same, mud and all, bloody as it
was, most even fighting to have it.
At last, when many dead now lay piled one upon another in the
stream, and part of the army had been destroyed at the river, and
the few that escaped from thence cut off by the cavalry, Nicias
surrendered himself to Gylippus, whom he trusted more than he did
the Syracusans, and told him and the Lacedaemonians to do what they
liked with him, but to stop the slaughter of the soldiers. Gylippus,
after this, immediately gave orders to make prisoners; upon which
the rest were brought together alive, except a large number secreted
by the soldiery, and a party was sent in pursuit of the three
hundred who had got through the guard during the night, and who were
now taken with the rest. The number of the enemy collected as public
property was not considerable; but that secreted was very large, and
all Sicily was filled with them, no convention having been made in
their case as for those taken with Demosthenes. Besides this, a
large portion were killed outright, the carnage being very great,
and not exceeded by any in this Sicilian war. In the numerous other
encounters upon the march, not a few also had fallen. Nevertheless
many escaped, some at the moment, others served as slaves, and then
ran away subsequently. These found refuge at Catana.
The Syracusans and their allies now mustered and took up the
spoils and as many prisoners as they could, and went back to the city.
The rest of their Athenian and allied captives were deposited in the
quarries, this seeming the safest way of keeping them; but Nicias
and Demosthenes were butchered, against the will of Gylippus, who
thought that it would be the crown of his triumph if he could take the
enemy's generals to Lacedaemon. One of them, as it happened,
Demosthenes, was one of her greatest enemies, on account of the affair
of the island and of Pylos; while the other, Nicias, was for the
same reasons one of her greatest friends, owing to his exertions to
procure the release of the prisoners by persuading the Athenians to
make peace. For these reasons the Lacedaemonians felt kindly towards
him; and it was in this that Nicias himself mainly confided when he
surrendered to Gylippus. But some of the Syracusans who had been in
correspondence with him were afraid, it was said, of his being put
to the torture and troubling their success by his revelations; others,
especially the Corinthians, of his escaping, as he was wealthy, by
means of bribes, and living to do them further mischief; and these
persuaded the allies and put him to death. This or the like was the
cause of the death of a man who, of all the Hellenes in my time, least
deserved such a fate, seeing that the whole course of his life had
been regulated with strict attention to virtue.
The prisoners in the quarries were at first hardly treated by the
Syracusans. Crowded in a narrow hole, without any roof to cover
them, the heat of the sun and the stifling closeness of the air
tormented them during the day, and then the nights, which came on
autumnal and chilly, made them ill by the violence of the change;
besides, as they had to do everything in the same place for want of
room, and the bodies of those who died of their wounds or from the
variation in the temperature, or from similar causes, were left heaped
together one upon another, intolerable stenches arose; while hunger
and thirst never ceased to afflict them, each man during eight
months having only half a pint of water and a pint of corn given him
daily. In short, no single suffering to be apprehended by men thrust
into such a place was spared them. For some seventy days they thus
lived all together, after which all, except the Athenians and any
Siceliots or Italiots who had joined in the expedition, were sold. The
total number of prisoners taken it would be difficult to state
exactly, but it could not have been less than seven thousand.
This was the greatest Hellenic achievement of any in thig war, or,
in my opinion, in Hellenic history; at once most glorious to the
victors, and most calamitous to the conquered. They were beaten at all
points and altogether; all that they suffered was great; they were
destroyed, as the saying is, with a total destruction, their fleet,
their army, everything was destroyed, and few out of many returned
home. Such were the events in Sicily.
|