The Third Book.


                           CHAPTER IX.





               Fourth and Fifth Years of the War -


                       Revolt of Mitylene





  THE next summer, just as the corn was getting ripe, the


Peloponnesians and their allies invaded Attica under the command of


Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, and sat


down and ravaged the land; the Athenian horse as usual attacking them,


wherever it was practicable, and preventing the mass of the light


troops from advancing from their camp and wasting the parts near the


city. After staying the time for which they had taken provisions,


the invaders retired and dispersed to their several cities.


  Immediately after the invasion of the Peloponnesians all Lesbos,


except Methymna, revolted from the Athenians. The Lesbians had


wished to revolt even before the war, but the Lacedaemonians would not


receive them; and yet now when they did revolt, they were compelled to


do so sooner than they had intended. While they were waiting until the


moles for their harbours and the ships and walls that they had in


building should be finished, and for the arrival of archers and corn


and other things that they were engaged in fetching from the Pontus,


the Tenedians, with whom they were at enmity, and the Methymnians, and


some factious persons in Mitylene itself, who were proxeni of


Athens, informed the Athenians that the Mitylenians were forcibly


uniting the island under their sovereignty, and that the


preparations about which they were so active, were all concerted


with the Boeotians their kindred and the Lacedaemonians with a view to


a revolt, and that, unless they were immediately prevented, Athens


would lose Lesbos.


  However, the Athenians, distressed by the plague, and by the war


that had recently broken out and was now raging, thought it a


serious matter to add Lesbos with its fleet and untouched resources to


the list of their enemies; and at first would not believe the


charge, giving too much weight to their wish that it might not be


true. But when an embassy which they sent had failed to persuade the


Mitylenians to give up the union and preparations complained of,


they became alarmed, and resolved to strike the first blow. They


accordingly suddenly sent off forty ships that had been got ready to


sail round Peloponnese, under the command of Cleippides, son of


Deinias, and two others; word having been brought them of a festival


in honour of the Malean Apollo outside the town, which is kept by


the whole people of Mitylene, and at which, if haste were made, they


might hope to take them by surprise. If this plan succeeded, well


and good; if not, they were to order the Mitylenians to deliver up


their ships and to pull down their walls, and if they did not obey, to


declare war. The ships accordingly set out; the ten galleys, forming


the contingent of the Mitylenians present with the fleet according


to the terms of the alliance, being detained by the Athenians, and


their crews placed in custody. However, the Mitylenians were


informed of the expedition by a man who crossed from Athens to Euboea,


and going overland to Geraestus, sailed from thence by a merchantman


which he found on the point of putting to sea, and so arrived at


Mitylene the third day after leaving Athens. The Mitylenians


accordingly refrained from going out to the temple at Malea, and


moreover barricaded and kept guard round the half-finished parts of


their walls and harbours.


  When the Athenians sailed in not long after and saw how things


stood, the generals delivered their orders, and upon the Mitylenians


refusing to obey, commenced hostilities. The Mitylenians, thus


compelled to go to war without notice and unprepared, at first


sailed out with their fleet and made some show of fighting, a little


in front of the harbour; but being driven back by the Athenian


ships, immediately offered to treat with the commanders, wishing, if


possible, to get the ships away for the present upon any tolerable


terms. The Athenian commanders accepted their offers, being themselves


fearful that they might not be able to cope with the whole of


Lesbos; and an armistice having been concluded, the Mitylenians sent


to Athens one of the informers, already repentant of his conduct,


and others with him, to try to persuade the Athenians of the innocence


of their intentions and to get the fleet recalled. In the meantime,


having no great hope of a favourable answer from Athens, they also


sent off a galley with envoys to Lacedaemon, unobserved by the


Athenian fleet which was anchored at Malea to the north of the town.


  While these envoys, reaching Lacedaemon after a difficult journey


across the open sea, were negotiating for succours being sent them,


the ambassadors from Athens returned without having effected anything;


and hostilities were at once begun by the Mitylenians and the rest


of Lesbos, with the exception of the Methymnians, who came to the


aid of the Athenians with the Imbrians and Lemnians and some few of


the other allies. The Mitylenians made a sortie with all their


forces against the Athenian camp; and a battle ensued, in which they


gained some slight advantage, but retired notwithstanding, not feeling


sufficient confidence in themselves to spend the night upon the field.


After this they kept quiet, wishing to wait for the chance of


reinforcements arriving from Peloponnese before making a second


venture, being encouraged by the arrival of Meleas, a Laconian, and


Hermaeondas, a Theban, who had been sent off before the insurrection


but had been unable to reach Lesbos before the Athenian expedition,


and who now stole in in a galley after the battle, and advised them to


send another galley and envoys back with them, which the Mitylenians


accordingly did.


  Meanwhile the Athenians, greatly encouraged by the inaction of the


Mitylenians, summoned allies to their aid, who came in all the quicker


from seeing so little vigour displayed by the Lesbians, and bringing


round their ships to a new station to the south of the town, fortified


two camps, one on each side of the city, and instituted a blockade


of both the harbours. The sea was thus closed against the Mitylenians,


who, however, commanded the whole country, with the rest of the


Lesbians who had now joined them; the Athenians only holding a limited


area round their camps, and using Malea more as the station for


their ships and their market.


  While the war went on in this way at Mitylene, the Athenians,


about the same time in this summer, also sent thirty ships to


Peloponnese under Asopius, son of Phormio; the Acarnanians insisting


that the commander sent should be some son or relative of Phormio.


As the ships coasted along shore they ravaged the seaboard of Laconia;


after which Asopius sent most of the fleet home, and himself went on


with twelve vessels to Naupactus, and afterwards raising the whole


Acarnanian population made an expedition against Oeniadae, the fleet


sailing along the Achelous, while the army laid waste the country. The


inhabitants, however, showing no signs of submitting, he dismissed the


land forces and himself sailed to Leucas, and making a descent upon


Nericus was cut off during his retreat, and most of his troops with


him, by the people in those parts aided by some coastguards; after


which the Athenians sailed away, recovering their dead from the


Leucadians under truce.


  Meanwhile the envoys of the Mitylenians sent out in the first ship


were told by the Lacedaemonians to come to Olympia, in order that


the rest of the allies might hear them and decide upon their matter,


and so they journeyed thither. It was the Olympiad in which the


Rhodian Dorieus gained his second victory, and the envoys having


been introduced to make their speech after the festival, spoke as


follows:


  "Lacedaemonians and allies, the rule established among the


Hellenes is not unknown to us. Those who revolt in war and forsake


their former confederacy are favourably regarded by those who


receive them, in so far as they are of use to them, but otherwise


are thought less well of, through being considered traitors to their


former friends. Nor is this an unfair way of judging, where the rebels


and the power from whom they secede are at one in policy and sympathy,


and a match for each other in resources and power, and where no


reasonable ground exists for the rebellion. But with us and the


Athenians this was not the case; and no one need think the worse of us


for revolting from them in danger, after having been honoured by


them in time of peace.


  "Justice and honesty will be the first topics of our speech,


especially as we are asking for alliance; because we know that there


can never be any solid friendship between individuals, or union


between communities that is worth the name, unless the parties be


persuaded of each other's honesty, and be generally congenial the


one to the other; since from difference in feeling springs also


difference in conduct. Between ourselves and the Athenians alliance


began, when you withdrew from the Median War and they remained to


finish the business. But we did not become allies of the Athenians for


the subjugation of the Hellenes, but allies of the Hellenes for


their liberation from the Mede; and as long as the Athenians led us


fairly we followed them loyally; but when we saw them relax their


hostility to the Mede, to try to compass the subjection of the allies,


then our apprehensions began. Unable, however, to unite and defend


themselves, on account of the number of confederates that had votes,


all the allies were enslaved, except ourselves and the Chians, who


continued to send our contingents as independent and nominally free.


Trust in Athens as a leader, however, we could no longer feel, judging


by the examples already given; it being unlikely that she would reduce


our fellow confederates, and not do the same by us who were left, if


ever she had the power.


  "Had we all been still independent, we could have had more faith


in their not attempting any change; but the greater number being their


subjects, while they were treating us as equals, they would


naturally chafe under this solitary instance of independence as


contrasted with the submission of the majority; particularly as they


daily grew more powerful, and we more destitute. Now the only sure


basis of an alliance is for each party to be equally afraid of the


other; he who would like to encroach is then deterred by the


reflection that he will not have odds in his favour. Again, if we were


left independent, it was only because they thought they saw their


way to empire more clearly by specious language and by the paths of


policy than by those of force. Not only were we useful as evidence


that powers who had votes, like themselves, would not, surely, join


them in their expeditions, against their will, without the party


attacked being in the wrong; but the same system also enabled them


to lead the stronger states against the weaker first, and so to


leave the former to the last, stripped of their natural allies, and


less capable of resistance. But if they had begun with us, while all


the states still had their resources under their own control, and


there was a centre to rally round, the work of subjugation would


have been found less easy. Besides this, our navy gave them some


apprehension: it was always possible that it might unite with you or


with some other power, and become dangerous to Athens. The court which


we paid to their commons and its leaders for the time being also


helped us to maintain our independence. However, we did not expect


to be able to do so much longer, if this war had not broken out,


from the examples that we had had of their conduct to the rest.


  "How then could we put our trust in such friendship or freedom as we


had here? We accepted each other against our inclination; fear made


them court us in war, and us them in peace; sympathy, the ordinary


basis of confidence, had its place supplied by terror, fear having


more share than friendship in detaining us in the alliance; and the


first party that should be encouraged by the hope of impunity was


certain to break faith with the other. So that to condemn us for being


the first to break off, because they delay the blow that we dread,


instead of ourselves delaying to know for certain whether it will be


dealt or not, is to take a false view of the case. For if we were


equally able with them to meet their plots and imitate their delay, we


should be their equals and should be under no necessity of being their


subjects; but the liberty of offence being always theirs, that of


defence ought clearly to be ours.


  "Such, Lacedaemonians and allies, are the grounds and the reasons of


our revolt; clear enough to convince our hearers of the fairness of


our conduct, and sufficient to alarm ourselves, and to make us turn to


some means of safety. This we wished to do long ago, when we sent to


you on the subject while the peace yet lasted, but were balked by your


refusing to receive us; and now, upon the Boeotians inviting us, we at


once responded to the call, and decided upon a twofold revolt, from


the Hellenes and from the Athenians, not to aid the latter in


harming the former, but to join in their liberation, and not to


allow the Athenians in the end to destroy us, but to act in time


against them. Our revolt, however, has taken place prematurely and


without preparation- a fact which makes it all the more incumbent on


you to receive us into alliance and to send us speedy relief, in order


to show that you support your friends, and at the same time do harm to


your enemies. You have an opportunity such as you never had before.


Disease and expenditure have wasted the Athenians: their ships are


either cruising round your coasts, or engaged in blockading us; and it


is not probable that they will have any to spare, if you invade them a


second time this summer by sea and land; but they will either offer no


resistance to your vessels, or withdraw from both our shores. Nor must


it be thought that this is a case of putting yourselves into danger


for a country which is not yours. Lesbos may appear far off, but


when help is wanted she will be found near enough. It is not in Attica


that the war will be decided, as some imagine, but in the countries by


which Attica is supported; and the Athenian revenue is drawn from


the allies, and will become still larger if they reduce us; as not


only will no other state revolt, but our resources will be added to


theirs, and we shall be treated worse than those that were enslaved


before. But if you will frankly support us, you will add to your


side a state that has a large navy, which is your great want; you will


smooth the way to the overthrow of the Athenians by depriving them


of their allies, who will be greatly encouraged to come over; and


you will free yourselves from the imputation made against you, of


not supporting insurrection. In short, only show yourselves as


liberators, and you may count upon having the advantage in the war.


  "Respect, therefore, the hopes placed in you by the Hellenes, and


that Olympian Zeus, in whose temple we stand as very suppliants;


become the allies and defenders of the Mitylenians, and do not


sacrifice us, who put our lives upon the hazard, in a cause in which


general good will result to all from our success, and still more


general harm if we fail through your refusing to help us; but be the


men that the Hellenes think you, and our fears desire."


  Such were the words of the Mitylenians. After hearing them out,


the Lacedaemonians and confederates granted what they urged, and


took the Lesbians into alliance, and deciding in favour of the


invasion of Attica, told the allies present to march as quickly as


possible to the Isthmus with two-thirds of their forces; and


arriving there first themselves, got ready hauling machines to carry


their ships across from Corinth to the sea on the side of Athens, in


order to make their attack by sea and land at once. However, the


zeal which they displayed was not imitated by the rest of the


confederates, who came in but slowly, being engaged in harvesting


their corn and sick of making expeditions.


  Meanwhile the Athenians, aware that the preparations of the enemy


were due to his conviction of their weakness, and wishing to show


him that he was mistaken, and that they were able, without moving


the Lesbian fleet, to repel with ease that with which they were


menaced from Peloponnese, manned a hundred ships by embarking the


citizens of Athens, except the knights and Pentacosiomedimni, and


the resident aliens; and putting out to the Isthmus, displayed their


power, and made descents upon Peloponnese wherever they pleased. A


disappointment so signal made the Lacedaemonians think that the


Lesbians had not spoken the truth; and embarrassed by the


non-appearance of the confederates, coupled with the news that the


thirty ships round Peloponnese were ravaging the lands near Sparta,


they went back home. Afterwards, however, they got ready a fleet to


send to Lesbos, and ordering a total of forty ships from the different


cities in the league, appointed Alcidas to command the expedition in


his capacity of high admiral. Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred


ships, upon seeing the Lacedaemonians go home, went home likewise.


  If, at the time that this fleet was at sea, Athens had almost the


largest number of first-rate ships in commission that she ever


possessed at any one moment, she had as many or even more when the war


began. At that time one hundred guarded Attica, Euboea, and Salamis; a


hundred more were cruising round Peloponnese, besides those employed


at Potidaea and in other places; making a grand total of two hundred


and fifty vessels employed on active service in a single summer. It


was this, with Potidaea, that most exhausted her revenues- Potidaea


being blockaded by a force of heavy infantry (each drawing two


drachmae a day, one for himself and another for his servant), which


amounted to three thousand at first, and was kept at this number


down to the end of the siege; besides sixteen hundred with Phormio who


went away before it was over; and the ships being all paid at the same


rate. In this way her money was wasted at first; and this was the


largest number of ships ever manned by her.


  About the same time that the Lacedaemonians were at the Isthmus, the


Mitylenians marched by land with their mercenaries against Methymna,


which they thought to gain by treachery. After assaulting the town,


and not meeting with the success that they anticipated, they


withdrew to Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus; and taking measures for the


better security of these towns and strengthening their walls,


hastily returned home. After their departure the Methymnians marched


against Antissa, but were defeated in a sortie by the Antissians and


their mercenaries, and retreated in haste after losing many of their


number. Word of this reaching Athens, and the Athenians learning


that the Mitylenians were masters of the country and their own


soldiers unable to hold them in check, they sent out about the


beginning of autumn Paches, son of Epicurus, to take the command,


and a thousand Athenian heavy infantry; who worked their own passage


and, arriving at Mitylene, built a single wall all round it, forts


being erected at some of the strongest points. Mitylene was thus


blockaded strictly on both sides, by land and by sea; and winter now


drew near.


  The Athenians needing money for the siege, although they had for the


first time raised a contribution of two hundred talents from their own


citizens, now sent out twelve ships to levy subsidies from their


allies, with Lysicles and four others in command. After cruising to


different places and laying them under contribution, Lysicles went


up the country from Myus, in Caria, across the plain of the Meander,


as far as the hill of Sandius; and being attacked by the Carians and


the people of Anaia, was slain with many of his soldiers.


  The same winter the Plataeans, who were still being besieged by


the Peloponnesians and Boeotians, distressed by the failure of their


provisions, and seeing no hope of relief from Athens, nor any other


means of safety, formed a scheme with the Athenians besieged with them


for escaping, if possible, by forcing their way over the enemy's


walls; the attempt having been suggested by Theaenetus, son of


Tolmides, a soothsayer, and Eupompides, son of Daimachus, one of their


generals. At first all were to join: afterwards, half hung back,


thinking the risk great; about two hundred and twenty, however,


voluntarily persevered in the attempt, which was carried out in the


following way. Ladders were made to match the height of the enemy's


wall, which they measured by the layers of bricks, the side turned


towards them not being thoroughly whitewashed. These were counted by


many persons at once; and though some might miss the right


calculation, most would hit upon it, particularly as they counted over


and over again, and were no great way from the wall, but could see


it easily enough for their purpose. The length required for the


ladders was thus obtained, being calculated from the breadth of the


brick.


  Now the wall of the Peloponnesians was constructed as follows. It


consisted of two lines drawn round the place, one against the


Plataeans, the other against any attack on the outside from Athens,


about sixteen feet apart. The intermediate space of sixteen feet was


occupied by huts portioned out among the soldiers on guard, and


built in one block, so as to give the appearance of a single thick


wall with battlements on either side. At intervals of every ten


battlements were towers of considerable size, and the same breadth


as the wall, reaching right across from its inner to its outer face,


with no means of passing except through the middle. Accordingly on


stormy and wet nights the battlements were deserted, and guard kept


from the towers, which were not far apart and roofed in above.


  Such being the structure of the wall by which the Plataeans were


blockaded, when their preparations were completed, they waited for a


stormy night of wind and rain and without any moon, and then set


out, guided by the authors of the enterprise. Crossing first the ditch


that ran round the town, they next gained the wall of the enemy


unperceived by the sentinels, who did not see them in the darkness, or


hear them, as the wind drowned with its roar the noise of their


approach; besides which they kept a good way off from each other, that


they might not be betrayed by the clash of their weapons. They were


also lightly equipped, and had only the left foot shod to preserve


them from slipping in the mire. They came up to the battlements at one


of the intermediate spaces where they knew them to be unguarded: those


who carried the ladders went first and planted them; next twelve


light-armed soldiers with only a dagger and a breastplate mounted, led


by Ammias, son of Coroebus, who was the first on the wall; his


followers getting up after him and going six to each of the towers.


After these came another party of light troops armed with spears,


whose shields, that they might advance the easier, were carried by men


behind, who were to hand them to them when they found themselves in


presence of the enemy. After a good many had mounted they were


discovered by the sentinels in the towers, by the noise made by a tile


which was knocked down by one of the Plataeans as he was laying hold


of the battlements. The alarm was instantly given, and the troops


rushed to the wall, not knowing the nature of the danger, owing to the


dark night and stormy weather; the Plataeans in the town having also


chosen that moment to make a sortie against the wall of the


Peloponnesians upon the side opposite to that on which their men


were getting over, in order to divert the attention of the


besiegers. Accordingly they remained distracted at their several


posts, without any venturing to stir to give help from his own


station, and at a loss to guess what was going on. Meanwhile the three


hundred set aside for service on emergencies went outside the wall


in the direction of the alarm. Fire-signals of an attack were also


raised towards Thebes; but the Plataeans in the town at once displayed


a number of others, prepared beforehand for this very purpose, in


order to render the enemy's signals unintelligible, and to prevent his


friends getting a true idea of what was passing and coming to his


aid before their comrades who had gone out should have made good their


escape and be in safety.





  Meanwhile the first of the scaling party that had got up, after


carrying both the towers and putting the sentinels to the sword,


posted themselves inside to prevent any one coming through against


them; and rearing ladders from the wall, sent several men up on the


towers, and from their summit and base kept in check all of the


enemy that came up, with their missiles, while their main body planted


a number of ladders against the wall, and knocking down the


battlements, passed over between the towers; each as soon as he had


got over taking up his station at the edge of the ditch, and plying


from thence with arrows and darts any who came along the wall to


stop the passage of his comrades. When all were over, the party on the


towers came down, the last of them not without difficulty, and


proceeded to the ditch, just as the three hundred came up carrying


torches. The Plataeans, standing on the edge of the ditch in the dark,


had a good view of their opponents, and discharged their arrows and


darts upon the unarmed parts of their bodies, while they themselves


could not be so well seen in the obscurity for the torches; and thus


even the last of them got over the ditch, though not without effort


and difficulty; as ice had formed in it, not strong enough to walk


upon, but of that watery kind which generally comes with a wind more


east than north, and the snow which this wind had caused to fall


during the night had made the water in the ditch rise, so. that they


could scarcely breast it as they crossed. However, it was mainly the


violence of the storm that enabled them to effect their escape at all.


  Starting from the ditch, the Plataeans went all together along the


road leading to Thebes, keeping the chapel of the hero Androcrates


upon their right; considering that the last road which the


Peloponnesians would suspect them of having taken would be that


towards their enemies' country. Indeed they could see them pursuing


with torches upon the Athens road towards Cithaeron and


Druoskephalai or Oakheads. After going for rather more than half a


mile upon the road to Thebes, the Plataeans turned off and took that


leading to the mountain, to Erythrae and Hysiae, and reaching the


hills, made good their escape to Athens, two hundred and twelve men in


all; some of their number having turned back into the town before


getting over the wall, and one archer having been taken prisoner at


the outer ditch. Meanwhile the Peloponnesians gave up the pursuit


and returned to their posts; and the Plataeans in the town, knowing


nothing of what had passed, and informed by those who had turned


back that not a man had escaped, sent out a herald as soon as it was


day to make a truce for the recovery of the dead bodies, and then,


learning the truth, desisted. In this way the Plataean party got


over and were saved.


  Towards the close of the same winter, Salaethus, a Lacedaemonian,


was sent out in a galley from Lacedaemon to Mitylene. Going by sea


to Pyrrha, and from thence overland, he passed along the bed of a


torrent, where the line of circumvallation was passable, and thus


entering unperceived into Mitylene told the magistrates that Attica


would certainly be invaded, and the forty ships destined to relieve


them arrive, and that he had been sent on to announce this and to


superintend matters generally. The Mitylenians upon this took courage,


and laid aside the idea of treating with the Athenians; and now this


winter ended, and with it ended the fourth year of the war of which


Thucydides was the historian.


  The next summer the Peloponnesians sent off the forty-two ships


for Mitylene, under Alcidas, their high admiral, and themselves and


their allies invaded Attica, their object being to distract the


Athenians by a double movement, and thus to make it less easy for them


to act against the fleet sailing to Mitylene. The commander in this


invasion was Cleomenes, in the place of King Pausanias, son of


Pleistoanax, his nephew, who was still a minor. Not content with


laying waste whatever had shot up in the parts which they had before


devastated, the invaders now extended their ravages to lands passed


over in their previous incursions; so that this invasion was more


severely felt by the Athenians than any except the second; the enemy


staying on and on until they had overrun most of the country, in the


expectation of hearing from Lesbos of something having been achieved


by their fleet, which they thought must now have got over. However, as


they did not obtain any of the results expected, and their


provisions began to run short, they retreated and dispersed to their


different cities.


  In the meantime the Mitylenians, finding their provisions failing,


while the fleet from Peloponnese was loitering on the way instead of


appearing at Mitylene, were compelled to come to terms with the


Athenians in the following manner. Salaethus having himself ceased


to expect the fleet to arrive, now armed the commons with heavy


armour, which they had not before possessed, with the intention of


making a sortie against the Athenians. The commons, however, no sooner


found themselves possessed of arms than they refused any longer to


obey their officers; and forming in knots together, told the


authorities to bring out in public the provisions and divide them


amongst them all, or they would themselves come to terms with the


Athenians and deliver up the city.


  The government, aware of their inability to prevent this, and of the


danger they would be in, if left out of the capitulation, publicly


agreed with Paches and the army to surrender Mitylene at discretion


and to admit the troops into the town; upon the understanding that the


Mitylenians should be allowed to send an embassy to Athens to plead


their cause, and that Paches should not imprison, make slaves of, or


put to death any of the citizens until its return. Such were the terms


of the capitulation; in spite of which the chief authors of the


negotiation with Lacedaemon were so completely overcome by terror when


the army entered that they went and seated themselves by the altars,


from which they were raised up by Paches under promise that he would


do them no wrong, and lodged by him in Tenedos, until he should


learn the pleasure of the Athenians concerning them. Paches also


sent some galleys and seized Antissa, and took such other military


measures as he thought advisable.


  Meanwhile the Peloponnesians in the forty ships, who ought to have


made all haste to relieve Mitylene, lost time in coming round


Peloponnese itself, and proceeding leisurely on the remainder of the


voyage, made Delos without having been seen by the Athenians at


Athens, and from thence arriving at Icarus and Myconus, there first


heard of the fall of Mitylene. Wishing to know the truth, they put


into Embatum, in the Erythraeid, about seven days after the capture of


the town. Here they learned the truth, and began to consider what they


were to do; and Teutiaplus, an Elean, addressed them as follows:


  "Alcidas and Peloponnesians who share with me the command of this


armament, my advice is to sail just as we are to Mitylene, before we


have been heard of. We may expect to find the Athenians as much off


their guard as men generally are who have just taken a city: this will


certainly be so by sea, where they have no idea of any enemy attacking


them, and where our strength, as it happens, mainly lies; while even


their land forces are probably scattered about the houses in the


carelessness of victory. If therefore we were to fall upon them


suddenly and in the night, I have hopes, with the help of the


well-wishers that we may have left inside the town, that we shall


become masters of the place. Let us not shrink from the risk, but


let us remember that this is just the occasion for one of the baseless


panics common in war: and that to be able to guard against these in


one's own case, and to detect the moment when an attack will find an


enemy at this disadvantage, is what makes a successful general."


  These words of Teutiaplus failing to move Alcidas, some of the


Ionian exiles and the Lesbians with the expedition began to urge


him, since this seemed too dangerous, to seize one of the Ionian


cities or the Aeolic town of Cyme, to use as a base for effecting


the revolt of Ionia. This was by no means a hopeless enterprise, as


their coming was welcome everywhere; their object would be by this


move to deprive Athens of her chief source of revenue, and at the same


time to saddle her with expense, if she chose to blockade them; and


they would probably induce Pissuthnes to join them in the war.


However, Alcidas gave this proposal as bad a reception as the other,


being eager, since he had come too late for Mitylene, to find


himself back in Peloponnese as soon as possible.


  Accordingly he put out from Embatum and proceeded along shore; and


touching at the Teian town, Myonnesus, there butchered most of the


prisoners that he had taken on his passage. Upon his coming to


anchor at Ephesus, envoys came to him from the Samians at Anaia, and


told him that he was not going the right way to free Hellas in


massacring men who had never raised a hand against him, and who were


not enemies of his, but allies of Athens against their will, and


that if he did not stop he would turn many more friends into enemies


than enemies into friends. Alcidas agreed to this, and let go all


the Chians still in his hands and some of the others that he had


taken; the inhabitants, instead of flying at the sight of his vessels,


rather coming up to them, taking them for Athenian, having no sort


of expectation that while the Athenians commanded the sea


Peloponnesian ships would venture over to Ionia.


  From Ephesus Alcidas set sail in haste and fled. He had been seen by


the Salaminian and Paralian galleys, which happened to be sailing from


Athens, while still at anchor off Clarus; and fearing pursuit he now


made across the open sea, fully determined to touch nowhere, if he


could help it, until he got to Peloponnese. Meanwhile news of him


had come in to Paches from the Erythraeid, and indeed from all


quarters. As Ionia was unfortified, great fears were felt that the


Peloponnesians coasting along shore, even if they did not intend to


stay, might make descents in passing and plunder the towns; and now


the Paralian and Salaminian, having seen him at Clarus, themselves


brought intelligence of the fact. Paches accordingly gave hot chase,


and continued the pursuit as far as the isle of Patmos, and then


finding that Alcidas had got on too far to be overtaken, came back


again. Meanwhile he thought it fortunate that, as he had not fallen in


with them out at sea, he had not overtaken them anywhere where they


would have been forced to encamp, and so give him the trouble of


blockading them.


  On his return along shore he touched, among other places, at Notium,


the port of Colophon, where the Colophonians had settled after the


capture of the upper town by Itamenes and the barbarians, who had been


called in by certain individuals in a party quarrel. The capture of


the town took place about the time of the second Peloponnesian


invasion of Attica. However, the refugees, after settling at Notium,


again split up into factions, one of which called in Arcadian and


barbarian mercenaries from Pissuthnes and, entrenching these in a


quarter apart, formed a new community with the Median party of the


Colophonians who joined them from the upper town. Their opponents


had retired into exile, and now called in Paches, who invited Hippias,


the commander of the Arcadians in the fortified quarter, to a


parley, upon condition that, if they could not agree, he was to be put


back safe and sound in the fortification. However, upon his coming out


to him, he put him into custody, though not in chains, and attacked


suddenly and took by surprise the fortification, and putting the


Arcadians and the barbarians found in it to the sword, afterwards took


Hippias into it as he had promised, and, as soon as he was inside,


seized him and shot him down. Paches then gave up Notium to the


Colophonians not of the Median party; and settlers were afterwards


sent out from Athens, and the place colonized according to Athenian


laws, after collecting all the Colophonians found in any of the


cities.


  Arrived at Mitylene, Paches reduced Pyrrha and Eresus; and finding


the Lacedaemonian, Salaethus, in hiding in the town, sent him off to


Athens, together with the Mitylenians that he had placed in Tenedos,


and any other persons that he thought concerned in the revolt. He also


sent back the greater part of his forces, remaining with the rest to


settle Mitylene and the rest of Lesbos as he thought best.


  Upon the arrival of the prisoners with Salaethus, the Athenians at


once put the latter to death, although he offered, among other things,


to procure the withdrawal of the Peloponnesians from Plataea, which


was still under siege; and after deliberating as to what they should


do with the former, in the fury of the moment determined to put to


death not only the prisoners at Athens, but the whole adult male


population of Mitylene, and to make slaves of the women and


children. It was remarked that Mitylene had revolted without being,


like the rest, subjected to the empire; and what above all swelled the


wrath of the Athenians was the fact of the Peloponnesian fleet


having ventured over to Ionia to her support, a fact which was held to


argue a long meditated rebellion. They accordingly sent a galley to


communicate the decree to Paches, commanding him to lose no time in


dispatching the Mitylenians. The morrow brought repentance with it and


reflection on the horrid cruelty of a decree, which condemned a


whole city to the fate merited only by the guilty. This was no


sooner perceived by the Mitylenian ambassadors at Athens and their


Athenian supporters, than they moved the authorities to put the


question again to the vote; which they the more easily consented to


do, as they themselves plainly saw that most of the citizens wished


some one to give them an opportunity for reconsidering the matter.


An assembly was therefore at once called, and after much expression of


opinion upon both sides, Cleon, son of Cleaenetus, the same who had


carried the former motion of putting the Mitylenians to death, the


most violent man at Athens, and at that time by far the most


powerful with the commons, came forward again and spoke as follows:


  "I have often before now been convinced that a democracy is


incapable of empire, and never more so than by your present change


of mind in the matter of Mitylene. Fears or plots being unknown to you


in your daily relations with each other, you feel just the same with


regard to your allies, and never reflect that the mistakes into


which you may be led by listening to their appeals, or by giving way


to your own compassion, are full of danger to yourselves, and bring


you no thanks for your weakness from your allies; entirely


forgetting that your empire is a despotism and your subjects


disaffected conspirators, whose obedience is ensured not by your


suicidal concessions, but by the superiority given you by your own


strength and not their loyalty. The most alarming feature in the


case is the constant change of measures with which we appear to be


threatened, and our seeming ignorance of the fact that bad laws


which are never changed are better for a city than good ones that have


no authority; that unlearned loyalty is more serviceable than


quick-witted insubordination; and that ordinary men usually manage


public affairs better than their more gifted fellows. The latter are


always wanting to appear wiser than the laws, and to overrule every


proposition brought forward, thinking that they cannot show their


wit in more important matters, and by such behaviour too often ruin


their country; while those who mistrust their own cleverness are


content to be less learned than the laws, and less able to pick


holes in the speech of a good speaker; and being fair judges rather


than rival athletes, generally conduct affairs successfully. These


we ought to imitate, instead of being led on by cleverness and


intellectual rivalry to advise your people against our real opinions.


  "For myself, I adhere to my former opinion, and wonder at those


who have proposed to reopen the case of the Mitylenians, and who are


thus causing a delay which is all in favour of the guilty, by making


the sufferer proceed against the offender with the edge of his anger


blunted; although where vengeance follows most closely upon the wrong,


it best equals it and most amply requites it. I wonder also who will


be the man who will maintain the contrary, and will pretend to show


that the crimes of the Mitylenians are of service to us, and our


misfortunes injurious to the allies. Such a man must plainly either


have such confidence in his rhetoric as to adventure to prove that


what has been once for all decided is still undetermined, or be bribed


to try to delude us by elaborate sophisms. In such contests the


state gives the rewards to others, and takes the dangers for


herself. The persons to blame are you who are so foolish as to


institute these contests; who go to see an oration as you would to see


a sight, take your facts on hearsay, judge of the practicability of


a project by the wit of its advocates, and trust for the truth as to


past events not to the fact which you saw more than to the clever


strictures which you heard; the easy victims of new-fangled arguments,


unwilling to follow received conclusions; slaves to every new paradox,


despisers of the commonplace; the first wish of every man being that


he could speak himself, the next to rival those who can speak by


seeming to be quite up with their ideas by applauding every hit almost


before it is made, and by being as quick in catching an argument as


you are slow in foreseeing its consequences; asking, if I may so


say, for something different from the conditions under which we


live, and yet comprehending inadequately those very conditions; very


slaves to the pleasure of the ear, and more like the audience of a


rhetorician than the council of a city.


  "In order to keep you from this, I proceed to show that no one state


has ever injured you as much as Mitylene. I can make allowance for


those who revolt because they cannot bear our empire, or who have been


forced to do so by the enemy. But for those who possessed an island


with fortifications; who could fear our enemies only by sea, and there


had their own force of galleys to protect them; who were independent


and held in the highest honour by you- to act as these have done,


this is not revolt- revolt implies oppression; it is deliberate and


wanton aggression; an attempt to ruin us by siding with our


bitterest enemies; a worse offence than a war undertaken on their


own account in the acquisition of power. The fate of those of their


neighbours who had already rebelled and had been subdued was no lesson


to them; their own prosperity could not dissuade them from


affronting danger; but blindly confident in the future, and full of


hopes beyond their power though not beyond their ambition, they


declared war and made their decision to prefer might to right, their


attack being determined not by provocation but by the moment which


seemed propitious. The truth is that great good fortune coming


suddenly and unexpectedly tends to make a people insolent; in most


cases it is safer for mankind to have success in reason than out of


reason; and it is easier for them, one may say, to stave off adversity


than to preserve prosperity. Our mistake has been to distinguish the


Mitylenians as we have done: had they been long ago treated like the


rest, they never would have so far forgotten themselves, human


nature being as surely made arrogant by consideration as it is awed by


firmness. Let them now therefore be punished as their crime


requires, and do not, while you condemn the aristocracy, absolve the


people. This is certain, that all attacked you without distinction,


although they might have come over to us and been now again in


possession of their city. But no, they thought it safer to throw in


their lot with the aristocracy and so joined their rebellion! Consider


therefore: if you subject to the same punishment the ally who is


forced to rebel by the enemy, and him who does so by his own free


choice, which of them, think you, is there that will not rebel upon


the slightest pretext; when the reward of success is freedom, and


the penalty of failure nothing so very terrible? We meanwhile shall


have to risk our money and our lives against one state after


another; and if successful, shall receive a ruined town from which


we can no longer draw the revenue upon which our strength depends;


while if unsuccessful, we shall have an enemy the more upon our hands,


and shall spend the time that might be employed in combating our


existing foes in warring with our own allies.


  "No hope, therefore, that rhetoric may instil or money purchase,


of the mercy due to human infirmity must be held out to the


Mitylenians. Their offence was not involuntary, but of malice and


deliberate; and mercy is only for unwilling offenders. I therefore,


now as before, persist against your reversing your first decision,


or giving way to the three failings most fatal to empire- pity,


sentiment, and indulgence. Compassion is due to those who can


reciprocate the feeling, not to those who will never pity us in


return, but are our natural and necessary foes: the orators who


charm us with sentiment may find other less important arenas for their


talents, in the place of one where the city pays a heavy penalty for a


momentary pleasure, themselves receiving fine acknowledgments for


their fine phrases; while indulgence should be shown towards those who


will be our friends in future, instead of towards men who will


remain just what they were, and as much our enemies as before. To


sum up shortly, I say that if you follow my advice you will do what is


just towards the Mitylenians, and at the same time expedient; while by


a different decision you will not oblige them so much as pass sentence


upon yourselves. For if they were right in rebelling, you must be


wrong in ruling. However, if, right or wrong, you determine to rule,


you must carry out your principle and punish the Mitylenians as your


interest requires; or else you must give up your empire and


cultivate honesty without danger. Make up your minds, therefore, to


give them like for like; and do not let the victims who escaped the


plot be more insensible than the conspirators who hatched it; but


reflect what they would have done if victorious over you, especially


they were the aggressors. It is they who wrong their neighbour without


a cause, that pursue their victim to the death, on account of the


danger which they foresee in letting their enemy survive; since the


object of a wanton wrong is more dangerous, if he escape, than an


enemy who has not this to complain of. Do not, therefore, be


traitors to yourselves, but recall as nearly as possible the moment of


suffering and the supreme importance which you then attached to


their reduction; and now pay them back in their turn, without yielding


to present weakness or forgetting the peril that once hung over you.


Punish them as they deserve, and teach your other allies by a striking


example that the penalty of rebellion is death. Let them once


understand this and you will not have so often to neglect your enemies


while you are fighting with your own confederates."


  Such were the words of Cleon. After him Diodotus, son of Eucrates,


who had also in the previous assembly spoken most strongly against


putting the Mitylenians to death, came forward and spoke as follows:


  "I do not blame the persons who have reopened the case of the


Mitylenians, nor do I approve the protests which we have heard against


important questions being frequently debated. I think the two things


most opposed to good counsel are haste and passion; haste usually goes


hand in hand with folly, passion with coarseness and narrowness of


mind. As for the argument that speech ought not to be the exponent


of action, the man who uses it must be either senseless or interested:


senseless if he believes it possible to treat of the uncertain


future through any other medium; interested if, wishing to carry a


disgraceful measure and doubting his ability to speak well in a bad


cause, he thinks to frighten opponents and hearers by well-aimed


calumny. What is still more intolerable is to accuse a speaker of


making a display in order to be paid for it. If ignorance only were


imputed, an unsuccessful speaker might retire with a reputation for


honesty, if not for wisdom; while the charge of dishonesty makes him


suspected, if successful, and thought, if defeated, not only a fool


but a rogue. The city is no gainer by such a system, since fear


deprives it of its advisers; although in truth, if our speakers are to


make such assertions, it would be better for the country if they could


not speak at all, as we should then make fewer blunders. The good


citizen ought to triumph not by frightening his opponents but by


beating them fairly in argument; and a wise city, without


over-distinguishing its best advisers, will nevertheless not deprive


them of their due, and, far from punishing an unlucky counsellor, will


not even regard him as disgraced. In this way successful orators would


be least tempted to sacrifice their convictions to popularity, in


the hope of still higher honours, and unsuccessful speakers to


resort to the same popular arts in order to win over the multitude.


  "This is not our way; and, besides, the moment that a man is


suspected of giving advice, however good, from corrupt motives, we


feel such a grudge against him for the gain which after all we are not


certain he will receive, that we deprive the city of its certain


benefit. Plain good advice has thus come to be no less suspected


than bad; and the advocate of the most monstrous measures is not


more obliged to use deceit to gain the people, than the best


counsellor is to lie in order to be believed. The city and the city


only, owing to these refinements, can never be served openly and


without disguise; he who does serve it openly being always suspected


of serving himself in some secret way in return. Still, considering


the magnitude of the interests involved, and the position of


affairs, we orators must make it our business to look a little farther


than you who judge offhand; especially as we, your advisers, are


responsible, while you, our audience, are not so. For if those who


gave the advice, and those who took it, suffered equally, you would


judge more calmly; as it is, you visit the disasters into which the


whim of the moment may have led you upon the single person of your


adviser, not upon yourselves, his numerous companions in error.


  "However, I have not come forward either to oppose or to accuse in


the matter of Mitylene; indeed, the question before us as sensible men


is not their guilt, but our interests. Though I prove them ever so


guilty, I shall not, therefore, advise their death, unless it be


expedient; nor though they should have claims to indulgence, shall I


recommend it, unless it be dearly for the good of the country. I


consider that we are deliberating for the future more than for the


present; and where Cleon is so positive as to the useful deterrent


effects that will follow from making rebellion capital, I, who


consider the interests of the future quite as much as he, as


positively maintain the contrary. And I require you not to reject my


useful considerations for his specious ones: his speech may have the


attraction of seeming the more just in your present temper against


Mitylene; but we are not in a court of justice, but in a political


assembly; and the question is not justice, but how to make the


Mitylenians useful to Athens.


  "Now of course communities have enacted the penalty of death for


many offences far lighter than this: still hope leads men to


venture, and no one ever yet put himself in peril without the inward


conviction that he would succeed in his design. Again, was there


ever city rebelling that did not believe that it possessed either in


itself or in its alliances resources adequate to the enterprise?


All, states and individuals, are alike prone to err, and there is no


law that will prevent them; or why should men have exhausted the


list of punishments in search of enactments to protect them from


evildoers? It is probable that in early times the penalties for the


greatest offences were less severe, and that, as these were


disregarded, the penalty of death has been by degrees in most cases


arrived at, which is itself disregarded in like manner. Either then


some means of terror more terrible than this must be discovered, or it


must be owned that this restraint is useless; and that as long as


poverty gives men the courage of necessity, or plenty fills them


with the ambition which belongs to insolence and pride, and the


other conditions of life remain each under the thraldom of some


fatal and master passion, so long will the impulse never be wanting to


drive men into danger. Hope also and cupidity, the one leading and the


other following, the one conceiving the attempt, the other


suggesting the facility of succeeding, cause the widest ruin, and,


although invisible agents, are far stronger than the dangers that


are seen. Fortune, too, powerfully helps the delusion and, by the


unexpected aid that she sometimes lends, tempts men to venture with


inferior means; and this is especially the case with communities,


because the stakes played for are the highest, freedom or empire, and,


when all are acting together, each man irrationally magnifies his


own capacity. In fine, it is impossible to prevent, and only great


simplicity can hope to prevent, human nature doing what it has once


set its mind upon, by force of law or by any other deterrent force


whatsoever.





  "We must not, therefore, commit ourselves to a false policy


through a belief in the efficacy of the punishment of death, or


exclude rebels from the hope of repentance and an early atonement of


their error. Consider a moment. At present, if a city that has already


revolted perceive that it cannot succeed, it will come to terms


while it is still able to refund expenses, and pay tribute afterwards.


In the other case, what city, think you, would not prepare better than


is now done, and hold out to the last against its besiegers, if it


is all one whether it surrender late or soon? And how can it be


otherwise than hurtful to us to be put to the expense of a siege,


because surrender is out of the question; and if we take the city,


to receive a ruined town from which we can no longer draw the


revenue which forms our real strength against the enemy? We must


not, therefore, sit as strict judges of the offenders to our own


prejudice, but rather see how by moderate chastisements we may be


enabled to benefit in future by the revenue-producing powers of our


dependencies; and we must make up our minds to look for our protection


not to legal terrors but to careful administration. At present we do


exactly the opposite. When a free community, held in subjection by


force, rises, as is only natural, and asserts its independence, it


is no sooner reduced than we fancy ourselves obliged to punish it


severely; although the right course with freemen is not to chastise


them rigorously when they do rise, but rigorously to watch them before


they rise, and to prevent their ever entertaining the idea, and, the


insurrection suppressed, to make as few responsible for it as


possible.


  "Only consider what a blunder you would commit in doing as Cleon


recommends. As things are at present, in all the cities the people


is your friend, and either does not revolt with the oligarchy, or,


if forced to do so, becomes at once the enemy of the insurgents; so


that in the war with the hostile city you have the masses on your


side. But if you butcher the people of Mitylene, who had nothing to do


with the revolt, and who, as soon as they got arms, of their own


motion surrendered the town, first you will commit the crime of


killing your benefactors; and next you will play directly into the


hands of the higher classes, who when they induce their cities to


rise, will immediately have the people on their side, through your


having announced in advance the same punishment for those who are


guilty and for those who are not. On the contrary, even if they were


guilty, you ought to seem not to notice it, in order to avoid


alienating the only class still friendly to us. In short, I consider


it far more useful for the preservation of our empire voluntarily to


put up with injustice, than to put to death, however justly, those


whom it is our interest to keep alive. As for Cleon's idea that in


punishment the claims of justice and expediency can both be satisfied,


facts do not confirm the possibility of such a combination.


  "Confess, therefore, that this is the wisest course, and without


conceding too much either to pity or to indulgence, by neither of


which motives do I any more than Cleon wish you to be influenced, upon


the plain merits of the case before you, be persuaded by me to try


calmly those of the Mitylenians whom Paches sent off as guilty, and to


leave the rest undisturbed. This is at once best for the future, and


most terrible to your enemies at the present moment; inasmuch as


good policy against an adversary is superior to the blind attacks of


brute force."


  Such were the words of Diodotus. The two opinions thus expressed


were the ones that most directly contradicted each other; and the


Athenians, notwithstanding their change of feeling, now proceeded to a


division, in which the show of hands was almost equal, although the


motion of Diodotus carried the day. Another galley was at once sent


off in haste, for fear that the first might reach Lesbos in the


interval, and the city be found destroyed; the first ship having about


a day and a night's start. Wine and barley-cakes were provided for the


vessel by the Mitylenian ambassadors, and great promises made if


they arrived in time; which caused the men to use such diligence


upon the voyage that they took their meals of barley-cakes kneaded


with oil and wine as they rowed, and only slept by turns while the


others were at the oar. Luckily they met with no contrary wind, and


the first ship making no haste upon so horrid an errand, while the


second pressed on in the manner described, the first arrived so little


before them, that Paches had only just had time to read the decree,


and to prepare to execute the sentence, when the second put into


port and prevented the massacre. The danger of Mitylene had indeed


been great.


  The other party whom Paches had sent off as the prime movers in


the rebellion, were upon Cleon's motion put to death by the Athenians,


the number being rather more than a thousand. The Athenians also


demolished the walls of the Mitylenians, and took possession of


their ships. Afterwards tribute was not imposed upon the Lesbians; but


all their land, except that of the Methymnians, was divided into three


thousand allotments, three hundred of which were reserved as sacred


for the gods, and the rest assigned by lot to Athenian shareholders,


who were sent out to the island. With these the Lesbians agreed to pay


a rent of two minae a year for each allotment, and cultivated the land


themselves. The Athenians also took possession of the towns on the


continent belonging to the Mitylenians, which thus became for the


future subject to Athens. Such were the events that took place at


Lesbos.


                           CHAPTER X.





         Fifth Year of the War - Trial and Execution of


              the Plataeans - Corcyraean Revolution





  DURING the same summer, after the reduction of Lesbos, the Athenians


under Nicias, son of Niceratus, made an expedition against the


island of Minoa, which lies off Megara and was used as a fortified


post by the Megarians, who had built a tower upon it. Nicias wished to


enable the Athenians to maintain their blockade from this nearer


station instead of from Budorum and Salamis; to stop the Peloponnesian


galleys and privateers sailing out unobserved from the island, as they


had been in the habit of doing; and at the same time prevent


anything from coming into Megara. Accordingly, after taking two towers


projecting on the side of Nisaea, by engines from the sea, and


clearing the entrance into the channel between the island and the


shore, he next proceeded to cut off all communication by building a


wall on the mainland at the point where a bridge across a morass


enabled succours to be thrown into the island, which was not far off


from the continent. A few days sufficing to accomplish this, he


afterwards raised some works in the island also, and leaving a


garrison there, departed with his forces.


  About the same time in this summer, the Plataeans, being now without


provisions and unable to support the siege, surrendered to the


Peloponnesians in the following manner. An assault had been made


upon the wall, which the Plataeans were unable to repel. The


Lacedaemonian commander, perceiving their weakness, wished to avoid


taking the place by storm; his instructions from Lacedaemon having


been so conceived, in order that if at any future time peace should be


made with Athens, and they should agree each to restore the places


that they had taken in the war, Plataea might be held to have come


over voluntarily, and not be included in the list. He accordingly sent


a herald to them to ask if they were willing voluntarily to


surrender the town to the Lacedaemonians, and accept them as their


judges, upon the understanding that the guilty should be punished, but


no one without form of law. The Plataeans were now in the last state


of weakness, and the herald had no sooner delivered his message than


they surrendered the town. The Peloponnesians fed them for some days


until the judges from Lacedaemon, who were five in number, arrived.


Upon their arrival no charge was preferred; they simply called up


the Plataeans, and asked them whether they had done the Lacedaemonians


and allies any service in the war then raging. The Plataeans asked


leave to speak at greater length, and deputed two of their number to


represent them: Astymachus, son of Asopolaus, and Lacon, son of


Aeimnestus, proxenus of the Lacedaemonians, who came forward and spoke


as follows:


  "Lacedaemonians, when we surrendered our city we trusted in you, and


looked forward to a trial more agreeable to the forms of law than


the present, to which we had no idea of being subjected; the judges


also in whose hands we consented to place ourselves were you, and


you only (from whom we thought we were most likely to obtain justice),


and not other persons, as is now the case. As matters stand, we are


afraid that we have been doubly deceived. We have good reason to


suspect, not only that the issue to be tried is the most terrible of


all, but that you will not prove impartial; if we may argue from the


fact that no accusation was first brought forward for us to answer,


but we had ourselves to ask leave to speak, and from the question


being put so shortly, that a true answer to it tells against us, while


a false one can be contradicted. In this dilemma, our safest, and


indeed our only course, seems to be to say something at all risks:


placed as we are, we could scarcely be silent without being


tormented by the damning thought that speaking might have saved us.


Another difficulty that we have to encounter is the difficulty of


convincing you. Were we unknown to each other we might profit by


bringing forward new matter with which you were unacquainted: as it


is, we can tell you nothing that you do not know already, and we fear,


not that you have condemned us in your own minds of having failed in


our duty towards you, and make this our crime, but that to please a


third party we have to submit to a trial the result of which is


already decided. Nevertheless, we will place before you what we can


justly urge, not only on the question of the quarrel which the Thebans


have against us, but also as addressing you and the rest of the


Hellenes; and we will remind you of our good services, and endeavour


to prevail with you.


  "To your short question, whether we have done the Lacedaemonians and


allies any service in this war, we say, if you ask us as enemies, that


to refrain from serving you was not to do you injury; if as friends,


that you are more in fault for having marched against us. During the


peace, and against the Mede, we acted well: we have not now been the


first to break the peace, and we were the only Boeotians who then


joined in defending against the Mede the liberty of Hellas. Although


an inland people, we were present at the action at Artemisium; in


the battle that took place in our territory we fought by the side of


yourselves and Pausanias; and in all the other Hellenic exploits of


the time we took a part quite out of proportion to our strength.


Besides, you, as Lacedaemonians, ought not to forget that at the


time of the great panic at Sparta, after the earthquake, caused by the


secession of the Helots to Ithome, we sent the third part of our


citizens to assist you.


  "On these great and historical occasions such was the part that we


chose, although afterwards we became your enemies. For this you were


to blame. When we asked for your alliance against our Theban


oppressors, you rejected our petition, and told us to go to the


Athenians who were our neighbours, as you lived too far off. In the


war we never have done to you, and never should have done to you,


anything unreasonable. If we refused to desert the Athenians when


you asked us, we did no wrong; they had helped us against the


Thebans when you drew back, and we could no longer give them up with


honour; especially as we had obtained their alliance and had been


admitted to their citizenship at our own request, and after


receiving benefits at their hands; but it was plainly our duty loyally


to obey their orders. Besides, the faults that either of you may


commit in your supremacy must be laid, not upon the followers, but


on the chiefs that lead them astray.


  "With regard to the Thebans, they have wronged us repeatedly, and


their last aggression, which has been the means of bringing us into


our present position, is within your own knowledge. In seizing our


city in time of peace, and what is more at a holy time in the month,


they justly encountered our vengeance, in accordance with the


universal law which sanctions resistance to an invader; and it


cannot now be right that we should suffer on their account. By


taking your own immediate interest and their animosity as the test


of justice, you will prove yourselves to be rather waiters on


expediency than judges of right; although if they seem useful to you


now, we and the rest of the Hellenes gave you much more valuable


help at a time of greater need. Now you are the assailants, and others


fear you; but at the crisis to which we allude, when the barbarian


threatened all with slavery, the Thebans were on his side. It is just,


therefore, to put our patriotism then against our error now, if


error there has been; and you will find the merit outweighing the


fault, and displayed at a juncture when there were few Hellenes who


would set their valour against the strength of Xerxes, and when


greater praise was theirs who preferred the dangerous path of honour


to the safe course of consulting their own interest with respect to


the invasion. To these few we belonged, and highly were we honoured


for it; and yet we now fear to perish by having again acted on the


same principles, and chosen to act well with Athens sooner than wisely


with Sparta. Yet in justice the same cases should be decided in the


same way, and policy should not mean anything else than lasting


gratitude for the service of good ally combined with a proper


attention to one's own immediate interest.


  "Consider also that at present the Hellenes generally regard you


as a pattern of worth and honour; and if you pass an unjust sentence


upon us in this which is no obscure cause, but one in which you, the


judges, are as illustrious as we, the prisoners, are blameless, take


care that displeasure be not felt at an unworthy decision in the


matter of honourable men made by men yet more honourable than they,


and at the consecration in the national temples of spoils taken from


the Plataeans, the benefactors of Hellas. Shocking indeed will it seem


for Lacedaemonians to destroy Plataea, and for the city whose name


your fathers inscribed upon the tripod at Delphi for its good service,


to be by you blotted out from the map of Hellas, to please the


Thebans. To such a depth of misfortune have we fallen that, while


the Medes' success had been our ruin, Thebans now supplant us in


your once fond regards; and we have been subjected to two dangers, the


greatest of any- that of dying of starvation then, if we had not


surrendered our town, and now of being tried for our lives. So that we


Plataeans, after exertions beyond our power in the cause of the


Hellenes, are rejected by all, forsaken and unassisted; helped by none


of our allies, and reduced to doubt the stability of our only hope,


yourselves.


  "Still, in the name of the gods who once presided over our


confederacy, and of our own good service in the Hellenic cause, we


adjure you to relent; to recall the decision which we fear that the


Thebans may have obtained from you; to ask back the gift that you have


given them, that they disgrace not you by slaying us; to gain a pure


instead of a guilty gratitude, and not to gratify others to be


yourselves rewarded with shame. Our lives may be quickly taken, but it


will be a heavy task to wipe away the infamy of the deed; as we are no


enemies whom you might justly punish, but friends forced into taking


arms against you. To grant us our lives would be, therefore, a


righteous judgment; if you consider also that we are prisoners who


surrendered of their own accord, stretching out our hands for quarter,


whose slaughter Hellenic law forbids, and who besides were always your


benefactors. Look at the sepulchres of your fathers, slain by the


Medes and buried in our country, whom year by year we honoured with


garments and all other dues, and the first-fruits of all that our land


produced in their season, as friends from a friendly country and


allies to our old companions in arms. Should you not decide aright,


your conduct would be the very opposite to ours. Consider only:


Pausanias buried them thinking that he was laying them in friendly


ground and among men as friendly; but you, if you kill us and make the


Plataean territory Theban, will leave your fathers and kinsmen in a


hostile soil and among their murderers, deprived of the honours


which they now enjoy. What is more, you will enslave the land in which


the freedom of the Hellenes was won, make desolate the temples of


the gods to whom they prayed before they overcame the Medes, and


take away your ancestral sacrifices from those who founded and


instituted them.


  "It were not to your glory, Lacedaemonians, either to offend in this


way against the common law of the Hellenes and against your own


ancestors, or to kill us your benefactors to gratify another's


hatred without having been wronged yourselves: it were more so to


spare us and to yield to the impressions of a reasonable compassion;


reflecting not merely on the awful fate in store for us, but also on


the character of the sufferers, and on the impossibility of predicting


how soon misfortune may fall even upon those who deserve it not. We,


as we have a right to do and as our need impels us, entreat you,


calling aloud upon the gods at whose common altar all the Hellenes


worship, to hear our request, to be not unmindful of the oaths which


your fathers swore, and which we now plead- we supplicate you by the


tombs of your fathers, and appeal to those that are gone to save us


from falling into the hands of the Thebans and their dearest friends


from being given up to their most detested foes. We also remind you of


that day on which we did the most glorious deeds, by your fathers'


sides, we who now on this are like to suffer the most dreadful fate.


Finally, to do what is necessary and yet most difficult for men in our


situation- that is, to make an end of speaking, since with that


ending the peril of our lives draws near- in conclusion we say that


we did not surrender our city to the Thebans (to that we would have


preferred inglorious starvation), but trusted in and capitulated to


you; and it would be just, if we fail to persuade you, to put us


back in the same position and let us take the chance that falls to us.


And at the same time we adjure you not to give us up- your


suppliants, Lacedaemonians, out of your hands and faith, Plataeans


foremost of the Hellenic patriots, to Thebans, our most hated


enemies- but to be our saviours, and not, while you free the rest of


the Hellenes, to bring us to destruction."


  Such were the words of the Plataeans. The Thebans, afraid that the


Lacedaemonians might be moved by what they had heard, came forward and


said that they too desired to address them, since the Plataeans had,


against their wish, been allowed to speak at length instead of being


confined to a simple answer to the question. Leave being granted,


the Thebans spoke as follows:


  "We should never have asked to make this speech if the Plataeans


on their side had contented themselves with shortly answering the


question, and had not turned round and made charges against us,


coupled with a long defence of themselves upon matters outside the


present inquiry and not even the subject of accusation, and with


praise of what no one finds fault with. However, since they have


done so, we must answer their charges and refute their self-praise, in


order that neither our bad name nor their good may help them, but that


you may hear the real truth on both points, and so decide.


  "The origin of our quarrel was this. We settled Plataea some time


after the rest of Boeotia, together with other places out of which


we had driven the mixed population. The Plataeans not choosing to


recognize our supremacy, as had been first arranged, but separating


themselves from the rest of the Boeotians, and proving traitors to


their nationality, we used compulsion; upon which they went over to


the Athenians, and with them did as much harm, for which we


retaliated.


  "Next, when the barbarian invaded Hellas, they say that they were


the only Boeotians who did not Medize; and this is where they most


glorify themselves and abuse us. We say that if they did not Medize,


it was because the Athenians did not do so either; just as


afterwards when the Athenians attacked the Hellenes they, the


Plataeans, were again the only Boeotians who Atticized. And yet


consider the forms of our respective governments when we so acted. Our


city at that juncture had neither an oligarchical constitution in


which all the nobles enjoyed equal rights, nor a democracy, but that


which is most opposed to law and good government and nearest a


tyranny- the rule of a close cabal. These, hoping to strengthen their


individual power by the success of the Mede, kept down by force the


people, and brought him into the town. The city as a whole was not its


own mistress when it so acted, and ought not to be reproached for


the errors that it committed while deprived of its constitution.


Examine only how we acted after the departure of the Mede and the


recovery of the constitution; when the Athenians attacked the rest


of Hellas and endeavoured to subjugate our country, of the greater


part of which faction had already made them masters. Did not we


fight and conquer at Coronea and liberate Boeotia, and do we not now


actively contribute to the liberation of the rest, providing horses to


the cause and a force unequalled by that of any other state in the


confederacy?


  "Let this suffice to excuse us for our Medism. We will now endeavour


to show that you have injured the Hellenes more than we, and are


more deserving of condign punishment. It was in defence against us,


say you, that you became allies and citizens of Athens. If so, you


ought only to have called in the Athenians against us, instead of


joining them in attacking others: it was open to you to do this if you


ever felt that they were leading you where you did not wish to follow,


as Lacedaemon was already your ally against the Mede, as you so much


insist; and this was surely sufficient to keep us off, and above all


to allow you to deliberate in security. Nevertheless, of your own


choice and without compulsion you chose to throw your lot in with


Athens. And you say that it had been base for you to betray your


benefactors; but it was surely far baser and more iniquitous to


sacrifice the whole body of the Hellenes, your fellow confederates,


who were liberating Hellas, than the Athenians only, who were


enslaving it. The return that you made them was therefore neither


equal nor honourable, since you called them in, as you say, because


you were being oppressed yourselves, and then became their accomplices


in oppressing others; although baseness rather consists in not


returning like for like than in not returning what is justly due but


must be unjustly paid.


  "Meanwhile, after thus plainly showing that it was not for the


sake of the Hellenes that you alone then did not Medize, but because


the Athenians did not do so either, and you wished to side with them


and to be against the rest; you now claim the benefit of good deeds


done to please your neighbours. This cannot be admitted: you chose the


Athenians, and with them you must stand or fall. Nor can you plead the


league then made and claim that it should now protect you. You


abandoned that league, and offended against it by helping instead of


hindering the subjugation of the Aeginetans and others of its members,


and that not under compulsion, but while in enjoyment of the same


institutions that you enjoy to the present hour, and no one forcing


you as in our case. Lastly, an invitation was addressed to you


before you were blockaded to be neutral and join neither party: this


you did not accept. Who then merit the detestation of the Hellenes


more justly than you, you who sought their ruin under the mask of


honour? The former virtues that you allege you now show not to be


proper to your character; the real bent of your nature has been at


length damningly proved: when the Athenians took the path of injustice


you followed them.


  "Of our unwilling Medism and your wilful Atticizing this then is our


explanation. The last wrong wrong of which you complain consists in


our having, as you say, lawlessly invaded your town in time of peace


and festival. Here again we cannot think that we were more in fault


than yourselves. If of our own proper motion we made an armed attack


upon your city and ravaged your territory, we are guilty; but if the


first men among you in estate and family, wishing to put an end to the


foreign connection and to restore you to the common Boeotian


country, of their own free will invited us, wherein is our crime?


Where wrong is done, those who lead, as you say, are more to blame


than those who follow. Not that, in our judgment, wrong was done


either by them or by us. Citizens like yourselves, and with more at


stake than you, they opened their own walls and introduced us into


their own city, not as foes but as friends, to prevent the bad among


you from becoming worse; to give honest men their due; to reform


principles without attacking persons, since you were not to be


banished from your city, but brought home to your kindred, nor to be


made enemies to any, but friends alike to all.


  "That our intention was not hostile is proved by our behaviour. We


did no harm to any one, but publicly invited those who wished to


live under a national, Boeotian government to come over to us; which


as first you gladly did, and made an agreement with us and remained


tranquil, until you became aware of the smallness of our numbers.


Now it is possible that there may have been something not quite fair


in our entering without the consent of your commons. At any rate you


did not repay us in kind. Instead of refraining, as we had done,


from violence, and inducing us to retire by negotiation, you fell upon


us in violation of your agreement, and slew some of us in fight, of


which we do not so much complain, for in that there was a certain


justice; but others who held out their hands and received quarter, and


whose lives you subsequently promised us, you lawlessly butchered.


If this was not abominable, what is? And after these three crimes


committed one after the other- the violation of your agreement, the


murder of the men afterwards, and the lying breach of your promise not


to kill them, if we refrained from injuring your property in the


country- you still affirm that we are the criminals and yourselves


pretend to escape justice. Not so, if these your judges decide aright,


but you will be punished for all together.


  "Such, Lacedaemonians, are the facts. We have gone into them at some


length both on your account and on our own, that you may fed that


you will justly condemn the prisoners, and we, that we have given an


additional sanction to our vengeance. We would also prevent you from


being melted by hearing of their past virtues, if any such they had:


these may be fairly appealed to by the victims of injustice, but


only aggravate the guilt of criminals, since they offend against their


better nature. Nor let them gain anything by crying and wailing, by


calling upon your fathers' tombs and their own desolate condition.


Against this we point to the far more dreadful fate of our youth,


butchered at their hands; the fathers of whom either fell at


Coronea, bringing Boeotia over to you, or seated, forlorn old men by


desolate hearths, with far more reason implore your justice upon the


prisoners. The pity which they appeal to is rather due to men who


suffer unworthily; those who suffer justly as they do are on the


contrary subjects for triumph. For their present desolate condition


they have themselves to blame, since they wilfully rejected the better


alliance. Their lawless act was not provoked by any action of ours:


hate, not justice, inspired their decision; and even now the


satisfaction which they afford us is not adequate; they will suffer by


a legal sentence, not as they pretend as suppliants asking for quarter


in battle, but as prisoners who have surrendered upon agreement to


take their trial. Vindicate, therefore, Lacedaemonians, the Hellenic


law which they have broken; and to us, the victims of its violation,


grant the reward merited by our zeal. Nor let us be supplanted in your


favour by their harangues, but offer an example to the Hellenes,


that the contests to which you invite them are of deeds, not words:


good deeds can be shortly stated, but where wrong is done a wealth


of language is needed to veil its deformity. However, if leading


powers were to do what you are now doing, and putting one short


question to all alike were to decide accordingly, men would be less


tempted to seek fine phrases to cover bad actions."


  Such were the words of the Thebans. The Lacedaemonian judges decided


that the question whether they had received any service from the


Plataeans in the war, was a fair one for them to put; as they had


always invited them to be neutral, agreeably to the original


covenant of Pausanias after the defeat of the Mede, and had again


definitely offered them the same conditions before the blockade.


This offer having been refused, they were now, they conceived, by


the loyalty of their intention released from their covenant; and


having, as they considered, suffered evil at the hands of the


Plataeans, they brought them in again one by one and asked each of


them the same question, that is to say, whether they had done the


Lacedaemonians and allies any service in the war; and upon their


saying that they had not, took them out and slew them, all without


exception. The number of Plataeans thus massacred was not less than


two hundred, with twenty-five Athenians who had shared in the siege.


The women were taken as slaves. The city the Thebans gave for about


a year to some political emigrants from Megara and to the surviving


Plataeans of their own party to inhabit, and afterwards razed it to


the ground from the very foundations, and built on to the precinct


of Hera an inn two hundred feet square, with rooms all round above and


below, making use for this purpose of the roofs and doors of the


Plataeans: of the rest of the materials in the wall, the brass and the


iron, they made couches which they dedicated to Hera, for whom they


also built a stone chapel of a hundred feet square. The land they


confiscated and let out on a ten years' lease to Theban occupiers. The


adverse attitude of the Lacedaemonians in the whole Plataean affair


was mainly adopted to please the Thebans, who were thought to be


useful in the war at that moment raging. Such was the end of


Plataea, in the ninety-third year after she became the ally of Athens.


  Meanwhile, the forty ships of the Peloponnesians that had gone to


the relief of the Lesbians, and which we left flying across the open


sea, pursued by the Athenians, were caught in a storm off Crete, and


scattering from thence made their way to Peloponnese, where they found


at Cyllene thirteen Leucadian and Ambraciot galleys, with Brasidas,


son of Tellis, lately arrived as counsellor to Alcidas; the


Lacedaemonians, upon the failure of the Lesbian expedition, having


resolved to strengthen their fleet and sail to Corcyra, where a


revolution had broken out, so as to arrive there before the twelve


Athenian ships at Naupactus could be reinforced from Athens.


Brasidas and Alcidas began to prepare accordingly.


  The Corcyraean revolution began with the return of the prisoners


taken in the sea-fights off Epidamnus. These the Corinthians had


released, nominally upon the security of eight hundred talents given


by their proxeni, but in reality upon their engagement to bring over


Corcyra to Corinth. These men proceeded to canvass each of the


citizens, and to intrigue with the view of detaching the city from


Athens. Upon the arrival of an Athenian and a Corinthian vessel,


with envoys on board, a conference was held in which the Corcyraeans


voted to remain allies of the Athenians according to their


agreement, but to be friends of the Peloponnesians as they had been


formerly. Meanwhile, the returned prisoners brought Peithias, a


volunteer proxenus of the Athenians and leader of the commons, to


trial, upon the charge of enslaving Corcyra to Athens. He, being


acquitted, retorted by accusing five of the richest of their number of


cutting stakes in the ground sacred to Zeus and Alcinous; the legal


penalty being a stater for each stake. Upon their conviction, the


amount of the penalty being very large, they seated themselves as


suppliants in the temples to be allowed to pay it by instalments;


but Peithias, who was one of the senate, prevailed upon that body to


enforce the law; upon which the accused, rendered desperate by the


law, and also learning that Peithias had the intention, while still


a member of the senate, to persuade the people to conclude a defensive


and offensive alliance with Athens, banded together armed with


daggers, and suddenly bursting into the senate killed Peithias and


sixty others, senators and private persons; some few only of the party


of Peithias taking refuge in the Athenian galley, which had not yet


departed.


  After this outrage, the conspirators summoned the Corcyraeans to


an assembly, and said that this would turn out for the best, and would


save them from being enslaved by Athens: for the future, they moved to


receive neither party unless they came peacefully in a single ship,


treating any larger number as enemies. This motion made, they


compelled it to be adopted, and instantly sent off envoys to Athens to


justify what had been done and to dissuade the refugees there from any


hostile proceedings which might lead to a reaction.


  Upon the arrival of the embassy, the Athenians arrested the envoys


and all who listened to them, as revolutionists, and lodged them in


Aegina. Meanwhile a Corinthian galley arriving in the island with


Lacedaemonian envoys, the dominant Corcyraean party attacked the


commons and defeated them in battle. Night coming on, the commons took


refuge in the Acropolis and the higher parts of the city, and


concentrated themselves there, having also possession of the Hyllaic


harbour; their adversaries occupying the market-place, where most of


them lived, and the harbour adjoining, looking towards the mainland.


  The next day passed in skirmishes of little importance, each party


sending into the country to offer freedom to the slaves and to


invite them to join them. The mass of the slaves answered the appeal


of the commons; their antagonists being reinforced by eight hundred


mercenaries from the continent.


  After a day's interval hostilities recommenced, victory remaining


with the commons, who had the advantage in numbers and position, the


women also valiantly assisting them, pelting with tiles from the


houses, and supporting the melee with a fortitude beyond their sex.


Towards dusk, the oligarchs in full rout, fearing that the


victorious commons might assault and carry the arsenal and put them to


the sword, fired the houses round the marketplace and the


lodging-houses, in order to bar their advance; sparing neither their


own, nor those of their neighbours; by which much stuff of the


merchants was consumed and the city risked total destruction, if a


wind had come to help the flame by blowing on it. Hostilities now


ceasing, both sides kept quiet, passing the night on guard, while


the Corinthian ship stole out to sea upon the victory of the


commons, and most of the mercenaries passed over secretly to the


continent.


  The next day the Athenian general, Nicostratus, son of Diitrephes,


came up from Naupactus with twelve ships and five hundred Messenian


heavy infantry. He at once endeavoured to bring about a settlement,


and persuaded the two parties to agree together to bring to trial


ten of the ringleaders, who presently fled, while the rest were to


live in peace, making terms with each other, and entering into a


defensive and offensive alliance with the Athenians. This arranged, he


was about to sail away, when the leaders of the commons induced him to


leave them five of his ships to make their adversaries less disposed


to move, while they manned and sent with him an equal number of


their own. He had no sooner consented, than they began to enroll their


enemies for the ships; and these, fearing that they might be sent


off to Athens, seated themselves as suppliants in the temple of the


Dioscuri. An attempt on the part of Nicostratus to reassure them and


to persuade them to rise proving unsuccessful, the commons armed


upon this pretext, alleging the refusal of their adversaries to sail


with them as a proof of the hollowness of their intentions, and took


their arms out of their houses, and would have dispatched some whom


they fell in with, if Nicostratus had not prevented it. The rest of


the party, seeing what was going on, seated themselves as suppliants


in the temple of Hera, being not less than four hundred in number;


until the commons, fearing that they might adopt some desperate


resolution, induced them to rise, and conveyed them over to the island


in front of the temple, where provisions were sent across to them.


  At this stage in the revolution, on the fourth or fifth day after


the removal of the men to the island, the Peloponnesian ships


arrived from Cyllene where they had been stationed since their


return from Ionia, fifty-three in number, still under the command of


Alcidas, but with Brasidas also on board as his adviser; and


dropping anchor at Sybota, a harbour on the mainland, at daybreak made


sail for Corcyra.


  The Corcyraeans in great confusion and alarm at the state of


things in the city and at the approach of the invader, at once


proceeded to equip sixty vessels, which they sent out, as fast as they


were manned, against the enemy, in spite of the Athenians recommending


them to let them sail out first, and to follow themselves afterwards


with all their ships to. gether. Upon their vessels coming up to the


enemy in this straggling fashion, two immediately deserted: in


others the crews were fighting among themselves, and there was no


order in anything that was done; so that the Peloponnesians, seeing


their confusion, placed twenty ships to oppose the Corcyraeans, and


ranged the rest against the twelve Athenian ships, amongst which


were the two vessels Salaminia and Paralus.


  While the Corcyraeans, attacking without judgment and in small


detachments, were already crippled by their own misconduct, the


Athenians, afraid of the numbers of the enemy and of being surrounded,


did not venture to attack the main body or even the centre of the


division opposed to them, but fell upon its wing and sank one


vessel; after which the Peloponnesians formed in a circle, and the


Athenians rowed round them and tried to throw them into disorder.


Perceiving this, the division opposed to the Corcyraeans, fearing a


repetition of the disaster of Naupactus, came to support their


friends, and the whole fleet now bore down, united, upon the


Athenians, who retired before it, backing water, retiring as leisurely


as possible in order to give the Corcyraeans time to escape, while the


enemy was thus kept occupied. Such was the character of this


sea-fight, which lasted until sunset.


  The Corcyraeans now feared that the enemy would follow up their


victory and sail against the town and rescue the men in the island, or


strike some other blow equally decisive, and accordingly carried the


men over again to the temple of Hera, and kept guard over the city.


The Peloponnesians, however, although victorious in the sea-fight, did


not venture to attack the town, but took the thirteen Corcyraean


vessels which they had captured, and with them sailed back to the


continent from whence they had put out. The next day equally they


refrained from attacking the city, although the disorder and panic


were at their height, and though Brasidas, it is said, urged


Alcidas, his superior officer, to do so, but they landed upon the


promontory of Leukimme and laid waste the country.


  Meanwhile the commons in Corcyra, being still in great fear of the


fleet attacking them, came to a parley with the suppliants and their


friends, in order to save the town; and prevailed upon some of them to


go on board the ships, of which they still manned thirty, against


the expected attack. But the Peloponnesians after ravaging the country


until midday sailed away, and towards nightfall were informed by


beacon signals of the approach of sixty Athenian vessels from


Leucas, under the command of Eurymedon, son of Thucles; which had been


sent off by the Athenians upon the news of the revolution and of the


fleet with Alcidas being about to sail for Corcyra.


  The Peloponnesians accordingly at once set off in haste by night for


home, coasting along shore; and hauling their ships across the Isthmus


of Leucas, in order not to be seen doubling it, so departed. The


Corcyraeans, made aware of the approach of the Athenian fleet and of


the departure of the enemy, brought the Messenians from outside the


walls into the town, and ordered the fleet which they had manned to


sail round into the Hyllaic harbour; and while it was so doing, slew


such of their enemies as they laid hands on, dispatching afterwards,


as they landed them, those whom they had persuaded to go on board


the ships. Next they went to the sanctuary of Hera and persuaded about


fifty men to take their trial, and condemned them all to death. The


mass of the suppliants who had refused to do so, on seeing what was


taking place, slew each other there in the consecrated ground; while


some hanged themselves upon the trees, and others destroyed themselves


as they were severally able. During seven days that Eurymedon stayed


with his sixty ships, the Corcyraeans were engaged in butchering those


of their fellow citizens whom they regarded as their enemies: and


although the crime imputed was that of attempting to put down the


democracy, some were slain also for private hatred, others by their


debtors because of the moneys owed to them. Death thus raged in


every shape; and, as usually happens at such times, there was no


length to which violence did not go; sons were killed by their


fathers, and suppliants dragged from the altar or slain upon it; while


some were even walled up in the temple of Dionysus and died there.


  So bloody was the march of the revolution, and the impression


which it made was the greater as it was one of the first to occur.


Later on, one may say, the whole Hellenic world was convulsed;


struggles being every, where made by the popular chiefs to bring in


the Athenians, and by the oligarchs to introduce the Lacedaemonians.


In peace there would have been neither the pretext nor the wish to


make such an invitation; but in war, with an alliance always at the


command of either faction for the hurt of their adversaries and


their own corresponding advantage, opportunities for bringing in the


foreigner were never wanting to the revolutionary parties. The


sufferings which revolution entailed upon the cities were many and


terrible, such as have occurred and always will occur, as long as


the nature of mankind remains the same; though in a severer or


milder form, and varying in their symptoms, according to the variety


of the particular cases. In peace and prosperity, states and


individuals have better sentiments, because they do not find


themselves suddenly confronted with imperious necessities; but war


takes away the easy supply of daily wants, and so proves a rough


master, that brings most men's characters to a level with their


fortunes. Revolution thus ran its course from city to city, and the


places which it arrived at last, from having heard what had been


done before, carried to a still greater excess the refinement of their


inventions, as manifested in the cunning of their enterprises and


the atrocity of their reprisals. Words had to change their ordinary


meaning and to take that which was now given them. Reckless audacity


came to be considered the courage of a loyal ally; prudent hesitation,


specious cowardice; moderation was held to be a cloak for unmanliness;


ability to see all sides of a question, inaptness to act on any.


Frantic violence became the attribute of manliness; cautious plotting,


a justifiable means of self-defence. The advocate of extreme


measures was always trustworthy; his opponent a man to be suspected.


To succeed in a plot was to have a shrewd head, to divine a plot a


still shrewder; but to try to provide against having to do either


was to break up your party and to be afraid of your adversaries. In


fine, to forestall an intending criminal, or to suggest the idea of


a crime where it was wanting, was equally commended until even blood


became a weaker tie than party, from the superior readiness of those


united by the latter to dare everything without reserve; for such


associations had not in view the blessings derivable from


established institutions but were formed by ambition for their


overthrow; and the confidence of their members in each other rested


less on any religious sanction than upon complicity in crime. The fair


proposals of an adversary were met with jealous precautions by the


stronger of the two, and not with a generous confidence. Revenge


also was held of more account than self-preservation. Oaths of


reconciliation, being only proffered on either side to meet an


immediate difficulty, only held good so long as no other weapon was at


hand; but when opportunity offered, he who first ventured to seize


it and to take his enemy off his guard, thought this perfidious


vengeance sweeter than an open one, since, considerations of safety


apart, success by treachery won him the palm of superior intelligence.


Indeed it is generally the case that men are readier to call rogues


clever than simpletons honest, and are as ashamed of being the


second as they are proud of being the first. The cause of all these


evils was the lust for power arising from greed and ambition; and from


these passions proceeded the violence of parties once engaged in


contention. The leaders in the cities, each provided with the


fairest professions, on the one side with the cry of political


equality of the people, on the other of a moderate aristocracy, sought


prizes for themselves in those public interests which they pretended


to cherish, and, recoiling from no means in their struggles for


ascendancy engaged in the direst excesses; in their acts of


vengeance they went to even greater lengths, not stopping at what


justice or the good of the state demanded, but making the party


caprice of the moment their only standard, and invoking with equal


readiness the condemnation of an unjust verdict or the authority of


the strong arm to glut the animosities of the hour. Thus religion


was in honour with neither party; but the use of fair phrases to


arrive at guilty ends was in high reputation. Meanwhile the moderate


part of the citizens perished between the two, either for not


joining in the quarrel, or because envy would not suffer them to


escape.


  Thus every form of iniquity took root in the Hellenic countries by


reason of the troubles. The ancient simplicity into which honour so


largely entered was laughed down and disappeared; and society became


divided into camps in which no man trusted his fellow. To put an end


to this, there was neither promise to be depended upon, nor oath


that could command respect; but all parties dwelling rather in their


calculation upon the hopelessness of a permanent state of things, were


more intent upon self-defence than capable of confidence. In this


contest the blunter wits were most successful. Apprehensive of their


own deficiencies and of the cleverness of their antagonists, they


feared to be worsted in debate and to be surprised by the combinations


of their more versatile opponents, and so at once boldly had


recourse to action: while their adversaries, arrogantly thinking


that they should know in time, and that it was unnecessary to secure


by action what policy afforded, often fell victims to their want of


precaution.


  Meanwhile Corcyra gave the first example of most of the crimes


alluded to; of the reprisals exacted by the governed who had never


experienced equitable treatment or indeed aught but insolence from


their rulers- when their hour came; of the iniquitous resolves of


those who desired to get rid of their accustomed poverty, and ardently


coveted their neighbours' goods; and lastly, of the savage and


pitiless excesses into which men who had begun the struggle, not in


a class but in a party spirit, were hurried by their ungovernable


passions. In the confusion into which life was now thrown in the


cities, human nature, always rebelling against the law and now its


master, gladly showed itself ungoverned in passion, above respect


for justice, and the enemy of all superiority; since revenge would not


have been set above religion, and gain above justice, had it not


been for the fatal power of envy. Indeed men too often take upon


themselves in the prosecution of their revenge to set the example of


doing away with those general laws to which all alike can look for


salvation in adversity, instead of allowing them to subsist against


the day of danger when their aid may be required.


  While the revolutionary passions thus for the first time displayed


themselves in the factions of Corcyra, Eurymedon and the Athenian


fleet sailed away; after which some five hundred Corcyraean exiles who


had succeeded in escaping, took some forts on the mainland, and


becoming masters of the Corcyraean territory over the water, made this


their base to Plunder their countrymen in the island, and did so


much damage as to cause a severe famine in the town. They also sent


envoys to Lacedaemon and Corinth to negotiate their restoration; but


meeting with no success, afterwards got together boats and mercenaries


and crossed over to the island, being about six hundred in all; and


burning their boats so as to have no hope except in becoming masters


of the country, went up to Mount Istone, and fortifying themselves


there, began to annoy those in the city and obtained command of the


country.


  At the close of the same summer the Athenians sent twenty ships


under the command of Laches, son of Melanopus, and Charoeades, son


of Euphiletus, to Sicily, where the Syracusans and Leontines were at


war. The Syracusans had for allies all the Dorian cities except


Camarina- these had been included in the Lacedaemonian confederacy


from the commencement of the war, though they had not taken any active


part in it- the Leontines had Camarina and the Chalcidian cities. In


Italy the Locrians were for the Syracusans, the Rhegians for their


Leontine kinsmen. The allies of the Leontines now sent to Athens and


appealed to their ancient alliance and to their Ionian origin, to


persuade the Athenians to send them a fleet, as the Syracusans were


blockading them by land and sea. The Athenians sent it upon the plea


of their common descent, but in reality to prevent the exportation


of Sicilian corn to Peloponnese and to test the possibility of


bringing Sicily into subjection. Accordingly they established


themselves at Rhegium in Italy, and from thence carried on the war


in concert with their allies.


                           CHAPTER XI.





           Year of the War - Campaigns of Demosthenes


              in Western Greece - Ruin of Ambracia





  SUMMER was now over. The winter following, the plague a second


time attacked the Athenians; for although it had never entirely left


them, still there had been a notable abatement in its ravages. The


second visit lasted no less than a year, the first having lasted


two; and nothing distressed the Athenians and reduced their power more


than this. No less than four thousand four hundred heavy infantry in


the ranks died of it and three hundred cavalry, besides a number of


the multitude that was never ascertained. At the same time took


place the numerous earthquakes in Athens, Euboea, and Boeotia,


particularly at Orchomenus in the last-named country.


  The same winter the Athenians in Sicily and the Rhegians, with


thirty ships, made an expedition against the islands of Aeolus; it


being impossible to invade them in summer, owing to the want of water.


These islands are occupied by the Liparaeans, a Cnidian colony, who


live in one of them of no great size called Lipara; and from this as


their headquarters cultivate the rest, Didyme, Strongyle, and Hiera.


In Hiera the people in those parts believe that Hephaestus has his


forge, from the quantity of flame which they see it send out by night,


and of smoke by day. These islands lie off the coast of the Sicels and


Messinese, and were allies of the Syracusans. The Athenians laid waste


their land, and as the inhabitants did not submit, sailed back to


Rhegium. Thus the winter ended, and with it ended the fifth year of


this war, of which Thucydides was the historian.


  The next summer the Peloponnesians and their allies set out to


invade Attica under the command of Agis, son of Archidamus, and went


as far as the Isthmus, but numerous earthquakes occurring, turned back


again without the invasion taking place. About the same time that


these earthquakes were so common, the sea at Orobiae, in Euboea,


retiring from the then line of coast, returned in a huge wave and


invaded a great part of the town, and retreated leaving some of it


still under water; so that what was once land is now sea; such of


the inhabitants perishing as could not run up to the higher ground


in time. A similar inundation also occurred at Atalanta, the island


off the Opuntian Locrian coast, carrying away part of the Athenian


fort and wrecking one of two ships which were drawn up on the beach.


At Peparethus also the sea retreated a little, without however any


inundation following; and an earthquake threw down part of the wall,


the town hall, and a few other buildings. The cause, in my opinion, of


this phenomenon must be sought in the earthquake. At the point where


its shock has been the most violent, the sea is driven back and,


suddenly recoiling with redoubled force, causes the inundation.


Without an earthquake I do not see how such an accident could happen.


  During the same summer different operations were carried on by the


different beligerents in Sicily; by the Siceliots themselves against


each other, and by the Athenians and their allies: I shall however


confine myself to the actions in which the Athenians took part,


choosing the most important. The death of the Athenian general


Charoeades, killed by the Syracusans in battle, left Laches in the


sole command of the fleet, which he now directed in concert with the


allies against Mylae, a place belonging to the Messinese. Two


Messinese battalions in garrison at Mylae laid an ambush for the party


landing from the ships, but were routed with great slaughter by the


Athenians and their allies, who thereupon assaulted the


fortification and compelled them to surrender the Acropolis and to


march with them upon Messina. This town afterwards also submitted upon


the approach of the Athenians and their allies, and gave hostages


and all other securities required.


  The same summer the Athenians sent thirty ships round Peloponnese


under Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, and Procles, son of


Theodorus, and sixty others, with two thousand heavy infantry, against


Melos, under Nicias, son of Niceratus; wishing to reduce the


Melians, who, although islanders, refused to be subjects of Athens


or even to join her confederacy. The devastation of their land not


procuring their submission, the fleet, weighing from Melos, sailed


to Oropus in the territory of Graea, and landing at nightfall, the


heavy infantry started at once from the ships by land for Tanagra in


Boeotia, where they were met by the whole levy from Athens,


agreeably to a concerted signal, under the command of Hipponicus,


son of Callias, and Eurymedon, son of Thucles. They encamped, and


passing that day in ravaging the Tanagraean territory, remained


there for the night; and next day, after defeating those of the


Tanagraeans who sailed out against them and some Thebans who had


come up to help the Tanagraeans, took some arms, set up a trophy,


and retired, the troops to the city and the others to the ships.


Nicias with his sixty ships coasted alongshore and ravaged the Locrian


seaboard, and so returned home.


  About this time the Lacedaemonians founded their colony of


Heraclea in Trachis, their object being the following: the Malians


form in all three tribes, the Paralians, the Hiereans, and the


Trachinians. The last of these having suffered severely in a war


with their neighbours the Oetaeans, at first intended to give


themselves up to Athens; but afterwards fearing not to find in her the


security that they sought, sent to Lacedaemon, having chosen Tisamenus


for their ambassador. In this embassy joined also the Dorians from the


mother country of the Lacedaemonians, with the same request, as they


themselves also suffered from the same enemy. After hearing them,


the Lacedaemonians determined to send out the colony, wishing to


assist the Trachinians and Dorians, and also because they thought that


the proposed town would lie conveniently for the purposes of the war


against the Athenians. A fleet might be got ready there against


Euboea, with the advantage of a short passage to the island; and the


town would also be useful as a station on the road to Thrace. In


short, everything made the Lacedaemonians eager to found the place.


After first consulting the god at Delphi and receiving a favourable


answer, they sent off the colonists, Spartans, and Perioeci,


inviting also any of the rest of the Hellenes who might wish to


accompany them, except Ionians, Achaeans, and certain other


nationalities; three Lacedaemonians leading as founders of the colony,


Leon, Alcidas, and Damagon. The settlement effected, they fortified


anew the city, now called Heraclea, distant about four miles and a


half from Thermopylae and two miles and a quarter from the sea, and


commenced building docks, closing the side towards Thermopylae just by


the pass itself, in order that they might be easily defended.


  The foundation of this town, evidently meant to annoy Euboea (the


passage across to Cenaeum in that island being a short one), at


first caused some alarm at Athens, which the event however did nothing


to justify, the town never giving them any trouble. The reason of this


was as follows. The Thessalians, who were sovereign in those parts,


and whose territory was menaced by its foundation, were afraid that it


might prove a very powerful neighbour, and accordingly continually


harassed and made war upon the new settlers, until they at last wore


them out in spite of their originally considerable numbers, people


flocking from all quarters to a place founded by the Lacedaemonians,


and thus thought secure of prosperity. On the other hand the


Lacedaemonians themselves, in the persons of their governors, did


their full share towards ruining its prosperity and reducing its


population, as they frightened away the greater part of the


inhabitants by governing harshly and in some cases not fairly, and


thus made it easier for their neighbours to prevail against them.


  The same summer, about the same time that the Athenians were


detained at Melos, their fellow citizens in the thirty ships


cruising round Peloponnese, after cutting off some guards in an ambush


at Ellomenus in Leucadia, subsequently went against Leucas itself with


a large armament, having been reinforced by the whole levy of the


Acarnanians except Oeniadae, and by the Zacynthians and


Cephallenians and fifteen ships from Corcyra. While the Leucadians


witnessed the devastation of their land, without and within the


isthmus upon which the town of Leucas and the temple of Apollo


stand, without making any movement on account of the overwhelming


numbers of the enemy, the Acarnanians urged Demosthenes, the


Athenian general, to build a wall so as to cut off the town from the


continent, a measure which they were convinced would secure its


capture and rid them once and for all of a most troublesome enemy.


  Demosthenes however had in the meanwhile been persuaded by the


Messenians that it was a fine opportunity for him, having so large


an army assembled, to attack the Aetolians, who were not only the


enemies of Naupactus, but whose reduction would further make it easy


to gain the rest of that part of the continent for the Athenians.


The Aetolian nation, although numerous and warlike, yet dwelt in


unwalled villages scattered far apart, and had nothing but light


armour, and might, according to the Messenians, be subdued without


much difficulty before succours could arrive. The plan which they


recommended was to attack first the Apodotians, next the Ophionians,


and after these the Eurytanians, who are the largest tribe in Aetolia,


and speak, as is said, a language exceedingly difficult to understand,


and eat their flesh raw. These once subdued, the rest would easily


come in.


  To this plan Demosthenes consented, not only to please the


Messenians, but also in the belief that by adding the Aetolians to his


other continental allies he would be able, without aid from home, to


march against the Boeotians by way of Ozolian Locris to Kytinium in


Doris, keeping Parnassus on his right until he descended to the


Phocians, whom he could force to join him if their ancient


friendship for Athens did not, as he anticipated, at once decide


them to do so. Arrived in Phocis he was already upon the frontier of


Boeotia. He accordingly weighed from Leucas, against the wish of the


Acarnanians, and with his whole armament sailed along the coast to


Sollium, where he communicated to them his intention; and upon their


refusing to agree to it on account of the non-investment of Leucas,


himself with the rest of the forces, the Cephallenians, the


Messenians, and Zacynthians, and three hundred Athenian marines from


his own ships (the fifteen Corcyraean vessels having departed),


started on his expedition against the Aetolians. His base he


established at Oeneon in Locris, as the Ozolian Locrians were allies


of Athens and were to meet him with all their forces in the


interior. Being neighbours of the Aetolians and armed in the same way,


it was thought that they would be of great service upon the


expedition, from their acquaintance with the localities and the


warfare of the inhabitants.


  After bivouacking with the army in the precinct of Nemean Zeus, in


which the poet Hesiod is said to have been killed by the people of the


country, according to an oracle which had foretold that he should


die in Nemea, Demosthenes set out at daybreak to invade Aetolia. The


first day he took Potidania, the next Krokyle, and the third


Tichium, where he halted and sent back the booty to Eupalium in


Locris, having determined to pursue his conquests as far as the


Ophionians, and, in the event of their refusing to submit, to return


to Naupactus and make them the objects of a second expedition.


Meanwhile the Aetolians had been aware of his design from the moment


of its formation, and as soon as the army invaded their country came


up in great force with all their tribes; even the most remote


Ophionians, the Bomiensians, and Calliensians, who extend towards


the Malian Gulf, being among the number.


  The Messenians, however, adhered to their original advice.


Assuring Demosthenes that the Aetolians were an easy conquest, they


urged him to push on as rapidly as possible, and to try to take the


villages as fast as he came up to them, without waiting until the


whole nation should be in arms against him. Led on by his advisers and


trusting in his fortune, as he had met with no opposition, without


waiting for his Locrian reinforcements, who were to have supplied


him with the light-armed darters in which he was most deficient, he


advanced and stormed Aegitium, the inhabitants flying before him and


posting themselves upon the hills above the town, which stood on


high ground about nine miles from the sea. Meanwhile the Aetolians had


gathered to the rescue, and now attacked the Athenians and their


allies, running down from the hills on every side and darting their


javelins, falling back when the Athenian army advanced, and coming


on as it retired; and for a long while the battle was of this


character, alternate advance and retreat, in both which operations the


Athenians had the worst.


  Still as long as their archers had arrows left and were able to


use them, they held out, the light-armed Aetolians retiring before the


arrows; but after the captain of the archers had been killed and his


men scattered, the soldiers, wearied out with the constant


repetition of the same exertions and hard pressed by the Aetolians


with their javelins, at last turned and fled, and falling into


pathless gullies and places that they were unacquainted with, thus


perished, the Messenian Chromon, their guide, having also


unfortunately been killed. A great many were overtaken in the


pursuit by the swift-footed and light-armed Aetolians, and fell


beneath their javelins; the greater number however missed their road


and rushed into the wood, which had no ways out, and which was soon


fired and burnt round them by the enemy. Indeed the Athenian army fell


victims to death in every form, and suffered all the vicissitudes of


flight; the survivors escaped with difficulty to the sea and Oeneon in


Locris, whence they had set out. Many of the allies were killed, and


about one hundred and twenty Athenian heavy infantry, not a man


less, and all in the prime of life. These were by far the best men


in the city of Athens that fell during this war. Among the slain was


also Procles, the colleague of Demosthenes. Meanwhile the Athenians


took up their dead under truce from the Aetolians, and retired to


Naupactus, and from thence went in their ships to Athens;


Demosthenes staying behind in Naupactus and in the neighbourhood,


being afraid to face the Athenians after the disaster.


  About the same time the Athenians on the coast of Sicily sailed to


Locris, and in a descent which they made from the ships defeated the


Locrians who came against them, and took a fort upon the river Halex.


  The same summer the Aetolians, who before the Athenian expedition


had sent an embassy to Corinth and Lacedaemon, composed of Tolophus,


an Ophionian, Boriades, an Eurytanian, and Tisander, an Apodotian,


obtained that an army should be sent them against Naupactus, which had


invited the Athenian invasion. The Lacedaemonians accordingly sent off


towards autumn three thousand heavy infantry of the allies, five


hundred of whom were from Heraclea, the newly founded city in Trachis,


under the command of Eurylochus, a Spartan, accompanied by Macarius


and Menedaius, also Spartans.


  The army having assembled at Delphi, Eurylochus sent a herald to the


Ozolian Locrians; the road to Naupactus lying through their territory,


and he having besides conceived the idea of detaching them from


Athens. His chief abettors in Locris were the Amphissians, who were


alarmed at the hostility of the Phocians. These first gave hostages


themselves, and induced the rest to do the same for fear of the


invading army; first, their neighbours the Myonians, who held the most


difficult of the passes, and after them the Ipnians, Messapians,


Tritaeans, Chalaeans, Tolophonians, Hessians, and Oeanthians, all of


whom joined in the expedition; the Olpaeans contenting themselves with


giving hostages, without accompanying the invasion; and the Hyaeans


refusing to do either, until the capture of Polis, one of their


villages.


  His preparations completed, Eurylochus lodged the hostages in


Kytinium, in Doris, and advanced upon Naupactus through the country of


the Locrians, taking upon his way Oeneon and Eupalium, two of their


towns that refused to join him. Arrived in the Naupactian territory,


and having been now joined by the Aetolians, the army laid waste the


land and took the suburb of the town, which was unfortified; and after


this Molycrium also, a Corinthian colony subject to Athens.


Meanwhile the Athenian Demosthenes, who since the affair in Aetolia


had remained near Naupactus, having had notice of the army and fearing


for the town, went and persuaded the Acarnanians, although not without


difficulty because of his departure from Leucas, to go to the relief


of Naupactus. They accordingly sent with him on board his ships a


thousand heavy infantry, who threw themselves into the place and saved


it; the extent of its wall and the small number of its defenders


otherwise placing it in the greatest danger. Meanwhile Eurylochus


and his companions, finding that this force had entered and that it


was impossible to storm the town, withdrew, not to Peloponnese, but to


the country once called Aeolis, and now Calydon and Pleuron, and to


the places in that neighbourhood, and Proschium in Aetolia; the


Ambraciots having come and urged them to combine with them in


attacking Amphilochian Argos and the rest of Amphilochia and


Acarnania; affirming that the conquest of these countries would


bring all the continent into alliance with Lacedaemon. To this


Eurylochus consented, and dismissing the Aetolians, now remained quiet


with his army in those parts, until the time should come for the


Ambraciots to take the field, and for him to join them before Argos.


  Summer was now over. The winter ensuing, the Athenians in Sicily


with their Hellenic allies, and such of the Sicel subjects or allies


of Syracuse as had revolted from her and joined their army, marched


against the Sicel town Inessa, the acropolis of which was held by


the Syracusans, and after attacking it without being able to take


it, retired. In the retreat, the allies retreating after the Athenians


were attacked by the Syracusans from the fort, and a large part of


their army routed with great slaughter. After this, Laches and the


Athenians from the ships made some descents in Locris, and defeating


the Locrians, who came against them with Proxenus, son of Capaton,


upon the river Caicinus, took some arms and departed.


  The same winter the Athenians purified Delos, in compliance, it


appears, with a certain oracle. It had been purified before by


Pisistratus the tyrant; not indeed the whole island, but as much of it


as could be seen from the temple. All of it was, however, now purified


in the following way. All the sepulchres of those that had died in


Delos were taken up, and for the future it was commanded that no one


should be allowed either to die or to give birth to a child in the


island; but that they should be carried over to Rhenea, which is so


near to Delos that Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, having added Rhenea to


his other island conquests during his period of naval ascendancy,


dedicated it to the Delian Apollo by binding it to Delos with a chain.


  The Athenians, after the purification, celebrated, for the first


time, the quinquennial festival of the Delian games. Once upon a time,


indeed, there was a great assemblage of the Ionians and the


neighbouring islanders at Delos, who used to come to the festival,


as the Ionians now do to that of Ephesus, and athletic and poetical


contests took place there, and the cities brought choirs of dancers.


Nothing can be clearer on this point than the following verses of


Homer, taken from a hymn to Apollo:





    Phoebus, wherever thou strayest, far or near,


    Delos was still of all thy haunts most dear.


    Thither the robed Ionians take their way


    With wife and child to keep thy holiday,


    Invoke thy favour on each manly game,


    And dance and sing in honour of thy name.





  That there was also a poetical contest in which the Ionians went


to contend, again is shown by the following, taken from the same hymn.


After celebrating the Delian dance of the women, he ends his song of


praise with these verses, in which he also alludes to himself:





    Well, may Apollo keep you all! and so,


    Sweethearts, good-bye- yet tell me not I go


    Out from your hearts; and if in after hours


    Some other wanderer in this world of ours


    Touch at your shores, and ask your maidens here


    Who sings the songs the sweetest to your ear,


    Think of me then, and answer with a smile,


    'A blind old man of Scio's rocky isle.'





  Homer thus attests that there was anciently a great assembly and


festival at Delos. In later times, although the islanders and the


Athenians continued to send the choirs of dancers with sacrifices, the


contests and most of the ceremonies were abolished, probably through


adversity, until the Athenians celebrated the games upon this occasion


with the novelty of horse-races.


  The same winter the Ambraciots, as they had promised Eurylochus when


they retained his army, marched out against Amphilochian Argos with


three thousand heavy infantry, and invading the Argive territory


occupied Olpae, a stronghold on a hill near the sea, which had been


formerly fortified by the Acarnanians and used as the place of assizes


for their nation, and which is about two miles and three-quarters from


the city of Argos upon the sea-coast. Meanwhile the Acarnanians went


with a part of their forces to the relief of Argos, and with the


rest encamped in Amphilochia at the place called Crenae, or the Wells,


to watch for Eurylochus and his Peloponnesians, and to prevent their


passing through and effecting their junction with the Ambraciots;


while they also sent for Demosthenes, the commander of the Aetolian


expedition, to be their leader, and for the twenty Athenian ships that


were cruising off Peloponnese under the command of Aristotle, son of


Timocrates, and Hierophon, son of Antimnestus. On their part, the


Ambraciots at Olpae sent a messenger to their own city, to beg them to


come with their whole levy to their assistance, fearing that the


army of Eurylochus might not be able to pass through the


Acarnanians, and that they might themselves be obliged to fight


single-handed, or be unable to retreat, if they wished it, without


danger.


  Meanwhile Eurylochus and his Peloponnesians, learning that the


Ambraciots at Olpae had arrived, set out from Proschium with all haste


to join them, and crossing the Achelous advanced through Acarnania,


which they found deserted by its population, who had gone to the


relief of Argos; keeping on their right the city of the Stratians


and its garrison, and on their left the rest of Acarnania.


Traversing the territory of the Stratians, they advanced through


Phytia, next, skirting Medeon, through Limnaea; after which they


left Acarnania behind them and entered a friendly country, that of the


Agraeans. From thence they reached and crossed Mount Thymaus, which


belongs to the Agraeans, and descended into the Argive territory after


nightfall, and passing between the city of Argos and the Acarnanian


posts at Crenae, joined the Ambraciots at Olpae.


  Uniting here at daybreak, they sat down at the place called


Metropolis, and encamped. Not long afterwards the Athenians in the


twenty ships came into the Ambracian Gulf to support the Argives, with


Demosthenes and two hundred Messenian heavy infantry, and sixty


Athenian archers. While the fleet off Olpae blockaded the hill from


the sea, the Acarnanians and a few of the Amphilochians, most of


whom were kept back by force by the Ambraciots, had already arrived at


Argos, and were preparing to give battle to the enemy, having chosen


Demosthenes to command the whole of the allied army in concert with


their own generals. Demosthenes led them near to Olpae and encamped, a


great ravine separating the two armies. During five days they remained


inactive; on the sixth both sides formed in order of battle. The


army of the Peloponnesians was the largest and outflanked their


opponents; and Demosthenes fearing that his right might be surrounded,


placed in ambush in a hollow way overgrown with bushes some four


hundred heavy infantry and light troops, who were to rise up at the


moment of the onset behind the projecting left wing of the enemy,


and to take them in the rear. When both sides were ready they joined


battle; Demosthenes being on the right wing with the Messenians and


a few Athenians, while the rest of the line was made up of the


different divisions of the Acarnanians, and of the Amphilochian


carters. The Peloponnesians and Ambraciots were drawn up pell-mell


together, with the exception of the Mantineans, who were massed on the


left, without however reaching to the extremity of the wing, where


Eurylochus and his men confronted the Messenians and Demosthenes.


  The Peloponnesians were now well engaged and with their


outflanking wing were upon the point of turning their enemy's right;


when the Acarnanians from the ambuscade set upon them from behind, and


broke them at the first attack, without their staying to resist; while


the panic into which they fell caused the flight of most of their


army, terrified beyond measure at seeing the division of Eurylochus


and their best troops cut to pieces. Most of the work was done by


Demosthenes and his Messenians, who were posted in this part of the


field. Meanwhile the Ambraciots (who are the best soldiers in those


countries) and the troops upon the right wing, defeated the division


opposed to them and pursued it to Argos. Returning from the pursuit,


they found their main body defeated; and hard pressed by the


Acarnanians, with difficulty made good their passage to Olpae,


suffering heavy loss on the way, as they dashed on without


discipline or order, the Mantineans excepted, who kept their ranks


best of any in the army during the retreat.


  The battle did not end until the evening. The next day Menedaius,


who on the death of Eurylochus and Macarius had succeeded to the


sole command, being at a loss after so signal a defeat how to stay and


sustain a siege, cut off as he was by land and by the Athenian fleet


by sea, and equally so how to retreat in safety, opened a parley


with Demosthenes and the Acarnanian generals for a truce and


permission to retreat, and at the same time for the recovery of the


dead. The dead they gave back to him, and setting up a trophy took


up their own also to the number of about three hundred. The retreat


demanded they refused publicly to the army; but permission to depart


without delay was secretly granted to the Mantineans and to


Menedaius and the other commanders and principal men of the


Peloponnesians by Demosthenes and his Acarnanian colleagues; who


desired to strip the Ambraciots and the mercenary host of foreigners


of their supporters; and, above all, to discredit the Lacedaemonians


and Peloponnesians with the Hellenes in those parts, as traitors and


self-seekers.


  While the enemy was taking up his dead and hastily burying them as


he could, and those who obtained permission were secretly planning


their retreat, word was brought to Demosthenes and the Acarnanians


that the Ambraciots from the city, in compliance with the first


message from Olpae, were on the march with their whole levy through


Amphilochia to join their countrymen at Olpae, knowing nothing of what


had occurred. Demosthenes prepared to march with his army against


them, and meanwhile sent on at once a strong division to beset the


roads and occupy the strong positions. In the meantime the


Mantineans and others included in the agreement went out under the


pretence of gathering herbs and firewood, and stole off by twos and


threes, picking on the way the things which they professed to have


come out for, until they had gone some distance from Olpae, when


they quickened their pace. The Ambraciots and such of the rest as


had accompanied them in larger parties, seeing them going on, pushed


on in their turn, and began running in order to catch them up. The


Acarnanians at first thought that all alike were departing without


permission, and began to pursue the Peloponnesians; and believing that


they were being betrayed, even threw a dart or two at some of their


generals who tried to stop them and told them that leave had been


given. Eventually, however, they let pass the Mantineans and


Peloponnesians, and slew only the Ambraciots, there being much dispute


and difficulty in distinguishing whether a man was an Ambraciot or a


Peloponnesian. The number thus slain was about two hundred; the rest


escaped into the bordering territory of Agraea, and found refuge


with Salynthius, the friendly king of the Agraeans.


  Meanwhile the Ambraciots from the city arrived at Idomene. Idomene


consists of two lofty hills, the higher of which the troops sent on by


Demosthenes succeeded in occupying after nightfall, unobserved by


the Ambraciots, who had meanwhile ascended the smaller and


bivouacked under it. After supper Demosthenes set out with the rest of


the army, as soon as it was evening; himself with half his force


making for the pass, and the remainder going by the Amphilochian


hills. At dawn he fell upon the Ambraciots while they were still abed,


ignorant of what had passed, and fully thinking that it was their


own countrymen- Demosthenes having purposely put the Messenians in


front with orders to address them in the Doric dialect, and thus to


inspire confidence in the sentinels, who would not be able to see them


as it was still night. In this way he routed their army as soon as


he attacked it, slaying most of them where they were, the rest


breaking away in flight over the hills. The roads, however, were


already occupied, and while the Amphilochians knew their own


country, the Ambraciots were ignorant of it and could not tell which


way to turn, and had also heavy armour as against a light-armed enemy,


and so fell into ravines and into the ambushes which had been set


for them, and perished there. In their manifold efforts to escape some


even turned to the sea, which was not far off, and seeing the Athenian


ships coasting alongshore just while the action was going on, swam off


to them, thinking it better in the panic they were in, to perish, if


perish they must, by the hands of the Athenians, than by those of


the barbarous and detested Amphilochians. Of the large Ambraciot force


destroyed in this manner, a few only reached the city in safety; while


the Acarnanians, after stripping the dead and setting up a trophy,


returned to Argos.


  The next day arrived a herald from the Ambraciots who had fled


from Olpae to the Agraeans, to ask leave to take up the dead that


had fallen after the first engagement, when they left the camp with


the Mantineans and their companions, without, like them, having had


permission to do so. At the sight of the arms of the Ambraciots from


the city, the herald was astonished at their number, knowing nothing


of the disaster and fancying that they were those of their own


party. Some one asked him what he was so astonished at, and how many


of them had been killed, fancying in his turn that this was the herald


from the troops at Idomene. He replied: "About two hundred"; upon


which his interrogator took him up, saying: "Why, the arms you see


here are of more than a thousand." The herald replied: "Then they


are not the arms of those who fought with us?" The other answered:


"Yes, they are, if at least you fought at Idomene yesterday." "But


we fought with no one yesterday; but the day before in the retreat."


"However that may be, we fought yesterday with those who came to


reinforce you from the city of the Ambraciots." When the herald


heard this and knew that the reinforcement from the city had been


destroyed, he broke into wailing and, stunned at the magnitude of


the present evils, went away at once without having performed his


errand, or again asking for the dead bodies. Indeed, this was by far


the greatest disaster that befell any one Hellenic city in an equal


number of days during this war; and I have not set down the number


of the dead, because the amount stated seems so out of proportion to


the size of the city as to be incredible. In any case I know that if


the Acarnanians and Amphilochians had wished to take Ambracia as the


Athenians and Demosthenes advised, they would have done so without a


blow; as it was, they feared that if the Athenians had it they would


be worse neighbours to them than the present.


  After this the Acarnanians allotted a third of the spoils to the


Athenians, and divided the rest among their own different towns. The


share of the Athenians was captured on the voyage home; the arms now


deposited in the Attic temples are three hundred panoplies, which


the Acarnanians set apart for Demosthenes, and which he brought to


Athens in person, his return to his country after the Aetolian


disaster being rendered less hazardous by this exploit. The


Athenians in the twenty ships also went off to Naupactus. The


Acarnanians and Amphilochians, after the departure of Demosthenes


and the Athenians, granted the Ambraciots and Peloponnesians who had


taken refuge with Salynthius and the Agraeans a free retreat from


Oeniadae, to which place they had removed from the country of


Salynthius, and for the future concluded with the Ambraciots a


treaty and alliance for one hundred years, upon the terms following.


It was to be a defensive, not an offensive alliance; the Ambraciots


could not be required to march with the Acarnanians against the


Peloponnesians, nor the Acarnanians with the Ambraciots against the


Athenians; for the rest the Ambraciots were to give up the places


and hostages that they held of the Amphilochians, and not to give help


to Anactorium, which was at enmity with the Acarnanians. With this


arrangement they put an end to the war. After this the Corinthians


sent a garrison of their own citizens to Ambracia, composed of three


hundred heavy infantry, under the command of Xenocleides, son of


Euthycles, who reached their destination after a difficult journey


across the continent. Such was the history of the affair of Ambracia.


  The same winter the Athenians in Sicily made a descent from their


ships upon the territory of Himera, in concert with the Sicels, who


had invaded its borders from the interior, and also sailed to the


islands of Aeolus. Upon their return to Rhegium they found the


Athenian general, Pythodorus, son of Isolochus, come to supersede


Laches in the command of the fleet. The allies in Sicily had sailed to


Athens and induced the Athenians to send out more vessels to their


assistance, pointing out that the Syracusans who already commanded


their land were making efforts to get together a navy, to avoid


being any longer excluded from the sea by a few vessels. The Athenians


proceeded to man forty ships to send to them, thinking that the war in


Sicily would thus be the sooner ended, and also wishing to exercise


their navy. One of the generals, Pythodorus, was accordingly sent


out with a few ships; Sophocles, son of Sostratides, and Eurymedon,


son of Thucles, being destined to follow with the main body. Meanwhile


Pythodorus had taken the command of Laches' ships, and towards the end


of winter sailed against the Locrian fort, which Laches had formerly


taken, and returned after being defeated in battle by the Locrians.


  In the first days of this spring, the stream of fire issued from


Etna, as on former occasions, and destroyed some land of the


Catanians, who live upon Mount Etna, which is the largest mountain


in Sicily. Fifty years, it is said, had elapsed since the last


eruption, there having been three in all since the Hellenes have


inhabited Sicily. Such were the events of this winter; and with it


ended the sixth year of this war, of which Thucydides was the


historian.